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Abstract: 
Technology has supposed a profound paradigm shift in human evolution, following Haraway’s 
cyborg metaphor we have forged a profound psycho-social rapport machines. This connectivity 
has also brought changes in crime patterns and fostered the development of cybercrime.  
From a criminological perspective, this work aims to explore the role of Per-Olof Wikströms 
Situational Action Theory in explaining cybercrime by including Syke and Matza’s neutralisation 
techniques in its formulation. The SAT-RI (SAT- Revised for the Internet) takes into 
consideration the interaction between cyber-crime propensity (based essentially in moral 
perceptions), the internet, neutralisation techniques (cognitive scripts used as protection 
against blame) and self-control.  
The theory was tested by using a mixed methods design that includes an online survey (N=709) 
and case studies (N=20) stemming from interviews with law enforcement agents.  Once the 
data was analysed, it was demonstrated that individuals with low self-control tend to have 
higher cybercrime propensity and are more prone to justify their acts by using adequate 
neutralisations. In addition, there are differences in the perceptions of cybercriminals by law 
enforcement agents depending on whether they are fraudsters, child sex abusers, sex abusers 
or hackers. 
The resulting theory can be useful in terms of prevention, as it can help design programmes 
that focus on the different stages of the cybercrime process (self-control, propensity or 
neutralisation). Also, the thesis calls for a more anthropological conception of cyber-
criminology called cyborg criminology.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Digital technology has become a central part of human existence. Mobile phones, computers, 
watches, cars and even kitchen appliances are interlinked via the internet. In parallel, social 
networking sites (like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and Twitter) facilitate immediate sharing 
and editing of pictures and videos, text and voice messages, news and opinions. Those sites 
also facilitate the discussion of current political and philosophical matters; thus transforming 
users from mere consumers of information to creators, curators and disseminators of 
information. In addition, education has been profoundly changed by technology due to the 
proliferation of distance learning courses. As an example, in higher education, Universidad 
Europea de Madrid (2015) offers campus-based, distance learning, blended courses and 
degrees, and there are distance learning universities such as Universitat Oberta de Catalunya 
(2015), in Spain, or The Open University (2015) in the UK. This digitisation of education has also 
been fostered by e-books, web-conference platforms and even YouTube tutorials and 
conferences (see for example Graham Gibbs’ (2014, 2015) YouTube channel on research 
methods). From a different perspective, sexuality can now be expressed by and through the 
internet due to almost unrestricted access to pornographic content, as well as online dating 
services and soliciting platforms. Augmented Reality applications, on the other hand, are 
merging the virtual and real world by adding a “digital texture” to the environment, according 
to Kipper and Rampolla (2013) “Augmented Reality allows the user to see the real world, with 
virtual objects superimposed upon or composited with the real world” (Chapter 1, para. 1). In 
addition, IKEA (2015) catalogues offer an Augmented Reality experience that enable clients to 
see how the products fit in their homes before buying them. Marvel (2015) also offers 
Augmented Reality applications that allow readers to access special content in comic-books 
such as creator commentaries. Another example is  Empresa Municipal de Transportes de 
Madrid (Municipal Transport Company in Madrid) (2015) that has produced an application that 
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enables iPhones to guide the user to the closest bus stop and gives detailed transport 
information.  
 
Donna Haraway (1991) talked about the metaphorical “cyborg” - a post-modern entity that 
addresses the fusion between machine and human being, natural and artificial, biological and 
mechanical (formulated from a feminist standpoint). All of the changes mentioned above, 
serve as examples of how the internet has penetrated all facets of human entity and identity in 
a similar fashion to the cyborg theorisation (i.e. culture, recreation, relationships and 
sexuality). Subsequently, the internet has reached a mythical status in our society, embedded 
with quasi-mystical properties. Lives have tightly interconnected matrices, forming a kind of 
networked society as defined by Manuel Castells (2010) with “information as its raw material” 
(p. 71), whilst social networking sites have thrived in the culture of “hypernarcissism” 
(Lipovetsky, 2005).  Moreover, the technological medium is also a culture of video-games and 
online worlds that function as a collective electronic zeitgeist, as argued by Castells (2010)  
“every cultural expression … comes together in this digital universe that links up in a giant, 
non-historical hypertext, past, present and future manifestations of the communicative mind” 
(p. 403). The computer is thus “a new mirror, the first psychological machine” (Turkle, 2005, p. 
279). The mythic status of the internet can also be understood following Baudrillard’s (1988) 
simulacrum. Baudrillard theorised about the image that started as a reflection of reality, 
turned into a perversion of reality, then a mask of reality  and then became “its own pure 
simulacrum” (1988). Similarly, Zizek indicates that: 
cyberspace merely radicalizes the gap constitutive of the symbolic order: Symbolic 
reality always-already was “virtual”; that is to say: Every access to (social) reality has to 
be supported by an implicit phantasmic hypertext (2009, p. 184) 
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The internet is, thus, conceived as a realm that is consensual, synthetic and may be 
philosophically real or unreal. It can, ontologically, be a copy of reality, an augmentation of 
reality or simply another reality in itself. A construction that simulates perverts and then 
supersedes reality has to contain all single aspects of reality. Crime, inherently understood by 
some criminologists as part of society, also adapts, changes and evolves; it lives dormant in 
every human being as if encysted in social structures. Durkheim (2013) recognised how crime 
was embedded in the fabric of modern societies and served the purpose of unifying citizens by 
creating threads of solidarity stemming from the shared experience of citizens repulsion 
towards crime. Durkheim (2013) recognized not only the normalcy of crime, but also its 
functional purpose as means of advancing society. Criminologists have devoted their 
experience to trying to map, understand and tackle crime, criminals and the effects of crime in 
society. A huge corpus of criminological theory explains how crime is a result of psychological 
phenomena, of social tension and social structure, of psychiatric and neurological 
complexities, of biological drives and/or a sum of all of these. Criminologists are also 
concerned with the history and development of crime. Crimes can range from, for example, 
more conventional violent crime (see for example Agnew, 1992; Wikström & Treiber, 2009) to 
white-collar (Sutherland 1937, 1983) crime and to crimes against wildlife (Wellsmith, 2012). 
 
Cybercrime is currently, as indicated by the National Police Corp (Cuerpo National de Policía - 
CNP), one of the major preoccupations of policing agencies in high income countries, being 
“the third most lucrative crime world-wide” (CNP, 2013bi). However, data from Ministerio del 
Interior (Ministry of Interior) (2013) showed that cybercriminality in Spain in 2013 amounted 
to only 2% of registered criminal acts (p. 7). Specifically, from the cybercrime data registered in 
2013, 62.8 % of crimes were frauds, 21.4 % threats and 4.6 % “crimes against honour” (p. 6). 
Cybercrime does not, therefore, seem to be excessive in terms of quantity, but law 
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enforcement agents recognise its seriousness. Furthermore, in 2013 the National 
Cybersecurity Strategy from the Spanish Government was published, and it indicated that 
“cybersecurity is a necessity of our society and economic model” (Gobierno de España, 2013, 
p. 10ii). 
 
Cybercrime is an ever-changing phenomenon that develops as fast as digital technology does. 
According to Europol’s Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (2015): 
It is a common axiom that technology, and cybercrime with it, develops so fast that law 
enforcement cannot keep up. Whilst this may be true in some respects, the vast 
majority of cybercrimes consist of using vulnerabilities that were well known for quite a 
while. It is the lack of digital hygiene of citizens and businesses (p. 8) 
Europol (2015) also indicates that: 
Cybercrime is becoming more aggressive and confrontational. The evolution of 
cybercrime reported in this document shows that there is a shift from hidden, stealthy 
interventions by highly competent hackers towards direct, confrontational contact 
between the criminal and the victim, where the victim is put under considerable 
pressure to comply with the perpetrator’s demands (p. 62) 
As an example of current cybercrime trends, agencies like the Children Exploitation and Online 
Protection Centre (CEOP) in the UK, refer to the proliferation of self-generated indecent 
images of children (CEOP, 2013b, p.11-12; Europol, 2015, p. 8) that stem from practices such 
as sexting1 and can generate cyber-victimisation of children. In addition, Europol (2015) 
explains current cyber-threats such as the creation of malware like “CryptoLocker” (p. 18), the 
1
 The practice of taking naked or pornographic pictures and/or videos of oneself and sending it to others 
via instant messaging applications, SMS, social networking sites or similar applications and sites 
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use of the Darknet2 (p. 29) or massive data breaches (p. 40). The Internet Complaint Centre 
(IC3) from the FBI indicates that “over the last five years, the IC3 received an average of nearly 
300,000 complaints per year” (2014, p. 5) and that the total loses reported in 2014 from the 
complaints that had reported economic loss reached $800,492,073 (p. 8). The most frequently 
reported cybercrimes, according to the IC3 (2014), were different types of frauds and scams 
(including romantic scams and extortion) (pp. 10-14). The IC3 (2014) also indicated that 
current trends in cybercrime tend to be related to social networking sites (p. 15), schemes 
related to virtual currency, like Bitcoin (pp. 15-16), and a new type of scam called “business e-
mail compromise” that “is defined as a sophisticated scam targeting businesses working with 
foreign suppliers and/or businesses which regularly perform wire transfer payments” (p. 16). 
Finally, Europol (2015) warns that “the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) or the Internet of 
Everything (IoE) is seen as a major challenge for law enforcement together with Big Data and 
the Cloud.”  (p. 54). The Internet of things (or the internet of everything connects objects 
between themselves, the internet and software (Servera, 2015). 
 
The the complexity of how cybercrime comes about and its causes are studied in this work. In 
trying to understand this phenomenon from a new point of view, a revision of criminological 
theory is explored. Per-Olof Wikström’s Situational Action Theory (SAT) (Wikström, 2006, 
2010; Wikström & Treiber, 2007, 2009) is the theoretical core of this work. The reason for 
choosing SAT is due to its understanding of crime as an interaction between any given 
environment with a certain set of moral rules (that can or cannot be conducive to crime) and 
an individual with a certain set of moral rules (that can or cannot be conducive to crime). The 
theory is used to understand the effects that coming in contact with the internet has in 
individuals. The SAT also takes into consideration the role of self-control. The environment 
2
 The non-indexed internet (as opposed to the Surface Web) that cannot be accessed through 
conventional bowsers and guarantees a much higher degree of anonymity. 
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considered in this study is the internet, which is seen, as conducive to crime or criminogenic in 
itself because of its particular architecture and characteristics (Miró Llinares, 2011; Newman & 
Clarke, 2004; Yar, 2005). However, recent literature on cybercrime also seems to emphasise 
the role of neutralisation techniques in the commission of cybercrimes (Higgins, Wolfe, & 
Marcum, 2011; Hinduja, 2007; Ingram & Hinduja, 2008; Moore, 2011; Moore & McMullan, 
2009, Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2011).  These techniques, following Sykes and Matza (1957) 
formulation, refer to psychic and social scripts used by offenders to justify their actions and 
protect themselves from blame, therefore enabling them to commit any given crime. The 
theoretical development proposed in this work is referred to as SAT-RI (Situation Action 
Theory Revised for the Internet). The theory measures the propensity for the commission of 
cybercrime in certain individuals once they come into contact with the internet, and have an 
adequate catalogue of neutralisations at their disposal. 
 
This thesis is divided in seven chapters: 
 
Chapter 2 addresses all the above mentioned theoretical issues. It discusses the concept of 
cybercrime and the way cybercrime is addressed in the literature and in legal instruments. At 
the same time, it explains the SAT key elements as well as the SAT-RI key elements.  
 
Chapter 3 addresses the methodological design of the study; discusses the instruments and 
the different issues that arose during the data collection process. In this case, the study uses a 
mixed methods convergent design (Creswell, 2015, pp. 35-36) where the qualitative and 
quantitative strands of data have similar or equal weight in the study, and are integrated in a 
penultimate chapter. The methods that were used in this study comprise an online 
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questionnaire survey and interviews with law enforcement about cybercrime cases they 
investigated. This chapter also discusses epistemological issues that arise from the mixed 
methods design.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the data obtained from the online questionnaire survey (quantitative data) 
and discusses the relationships between the different variables (in this study: self-control, 
cybercrime propensity comprised of engagement and perception of morality, and the use of 
neutralisation techniques) by using statistical tests. It sheds light on how cybercrime is 
perceived by individuals in terms of morality and whether or not individuals might engage in 
certain cybercrimes. In addition, it indicates the neutralisation techniques that have been 
chosen by individuals in order to justify their actions and how they affect their cybercrime 
propensity. The chapter also compares the variables with the sample’s measure of self-control 
obtained from the survey. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the data obtained from interviews with law enforcement agents 
(qualitative data) in the form of case studies (data obtained from the interviews was broken 
down into a sample of several cybercrime cases, as explained  by law enforcement agents and 
reflecting the heterogeneity of cybercrime). These cases represent different types of 
cybercrime investigated by the agents. Given that particular cultural and ideological issues 
might stem from the data, as they represent institutions of social control exerting power over 
criminals and society, a discourse analysis was also performed. 
 
Chapter 6 integrates the qualitative and quantitative strands of data, and explicates the final 
design of the SAT-RI theory. It takes into consideration broader social and cultural issues that 
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emerged during the quantitative and qualitative analysis, and binds them with the adjusted 
theoretical model.  Finally, it addresses (in a brief manner) issues relating to the prevention of 
cybercrime. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 serves as a conclusion of the chapters mentioned above: focusing on future 
research and the implications of the study. 
 
Overall, this work develops cybercrime theory by trying to understand the psychic rapport 
forged between individuals and the internet (propensity, neutralisation and self-control when 
applied to the internet), as well as the perceptions of individuals of internet crime. In addition, 
it also tries to understand how law enforcement agents investigate cybercrime and how they 
understand cybercrime and cybercriminals.  This exploration of how cybercrime comes about 
can have repercussions in the prevention of cybercrime, once the theoretical model is tested.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1. Cybercrime 
 
2.1.1. The concept of crime 
 
Durkheim (2013) discussed the nature of crime in his explanation of the organic society. Such a 
society3 is based on the division of labour, its members are interconnected, as if they were 
organs in a body. Crimes, according to Durkheim (2013) were acts that generate a punishment 
and “universally they strike the moral consciousness of nations” (Book I, Chapter II, epigraph I, 
para. 2). The characteristics of every single crime are that they create an intense feeling of 
repulsion in “normal individuals” as well as offending the collective consciousness of society 
(Durkheim, 2013, Original annotated table of contents, Book I, Chapter II, epigraph I, para. 2). 
In summary, according to Durkheim (2013) crimes were understood as an inherent element of 
society. Crimes are necessary to foster solidarity between individuals (as it generates general 
repulsion amongst all members of society and elicits a collective response from the system). 
Crime and punishment are inextricably linked in Durkheim’s (2013) elaboration of the organic 
society as two necessary facets of the expression of the collectivity.  
 
Gottfredosn and Hirschi (1990) defined crime as “acts of force or fraud undertaken in pursuit 
of self-interest” (p. 15). The authors also signaled the difference between crime and deviant 
behaviour (pp. 8-14) by indicating that crime generated a formal response from the state, 
whereas deviant behaviour generated informal group reactions. Crime is, therefore, 
exclusively castigated by the administrative apparatus, whereas deviant behavior is generated 
and castigated by social pressure.  In other words, according to Goode (2006) deviance is   
3
 Durkheim (2013) was referring to the society of the late 19th century. 
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“nonnormative behavior that attracts condemnation” (p. 553). Several authors (see for 
example, Goode, 2006; Miller, Wright, & Dannels , 2001; Sumner, 1994) discuss whether or not 
sociology of deviance is “dead” as an academic subject, being one of the reasons for its demise 
that sociology of deviance has been absorbed by other disciples such as criminology. 
Notwithstanding that academic discussion, in the definition of cybercrime presented in this 
chapter, and used throughout the whole of this study cybercrime is understood as both illegal 
behaviour and deviant behaviour. 
 
Cornish and Clarke (1986), offered a vision of criminal behaviour based on a rational (albeit 
limited) decision-making process.  This “Rational Choice Theory” (RCT) approach to crime 
understood crime as the result of a rational process (performed by the criminal) that weighted 
the means, ends and consequences of crime (even if constrained by situational elements like 
time and space) an acted accordingly. Also, this approach (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 1987) 
considered that different types of crimes required a different decision making processes (for 
example theft of cash and illegal substance abuse). Another characteristic of the RCT model is 
that it is not entirely a theoretical construction, but applicable in policy making for the 
prevention of crime.   
 
2.1.2. The concept of cybercrime 
 
One of the main problems of cybercrime is its heterogeneity; an ever-changing and malleable 
phenomenon that hindered a proper identification of its key characteristics (see Europol, 2015, 
for examples on the current evolution of cybercrime). Moreover, a widely accepted definition 
of cybercrime does not exist in current literature or legal texts (Wall, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).  
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According to David Wall (2007), cybercrime “is fairly meaningless, because it tends to be used 
metaphorically and emotively rather than scientifically or legally, usually to signify the 
occurrence of harmful behaviour that is somehow connected to the misuse of a computer 
system” (p. 10). Wall (2007, 2008a, 2008b) argued that the term has been widely used by the 
media with a certain science-fiction inspiration and aspiration.  
 
Others share this notion contending that cybercrime is the use of computer technology to 
engage in unlawful activity (Brenner, 2007, pp. 382-384, 2010, p. 10). As Brenner (2010) stated 
“cyberspace becomes the tool criminals use to commit old crimes in new ways” (p. 10) 
.Cybercrime has been presented as a rather vague concept by authors and by different law 
enforcement actors.  
 
Yar (2005) encountered the same problems when defining cybercrime. As he has stated “A 
primary problem for the analysis of cybercrime is the absence of a consistent current 
definition, even amongst those law enforcement agencies charged with tackling it” (p. 409). He 
also referred to Thomas and Loader’s (2000) definition “computer-mediated activities which 
are either illegal or considered illicit by certain parties and which can be conducted through 
global electronic networks” (p. 3, cited in Yar, 2005, p. 409). The problems Yar (2005) tried to 
convey is the absence of uniform definitions of cybercrime (pp. 409-410). Wall (2007), 
acknowledged the existence of three generations of cybercrimes and of three criminologies of 
cybercrime. The three generations of cybercrime refer to: the first generation to cybercrimes 
that merely assisted traditional offending via offender’s use of computers (pp. 44-45); the 
second one to cybercrimes that spanned through networks (pp. 45-47); and the third to 
cybercrimes that have been wholly mediated by technology (p. 47-49). In addition, the three 
criminologies of cybercrime, according to Wall (2007) are: computer integrity crimes, for 
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example hacking (pp. 52-60), computer-assisted crimes like different types of cyberfrauds, (pp. 
69-102, for a detailed explanation of identity crime; see also Wall, 2013); and finally content 
crimes (pp. 103-129), for instance child pornography crimes. 
 
Jewkes and Sharp (2003) talked about the internet providing “a locus for creative authorship of 
the self” (p. 3). Important questions were posed by the authors regarding the physical nature 
of the internet, considering whether the internet is or is not a real place. A mythical 
conception of the internet seemed to be present as a liquid borderless environment that is 
somehow real (see Baudrillard, 1988 for a discussion on simulacra) , or at  least, echoes the 
reality people live in : the cyberspace According to Lessig (2006) “[cyberspace] evokes, or calls 
to life, ways of interacting that were not possible before” (p. 83) and he then distinguished 
between the internet (a medium of communication) and cyberspace (as some sort of “second 
life” with a community aspect). The term cyberspace was defined by Michael Benedikt (2000), 
using metaphorical imagery: 
Cyberspace: The realm of pure information, filling like a lake, siphoning the jangle of 
messages, transfiguring the physical world, decontaminating the natural and urban 
landscape, redeeming them … from all the inefficiencies, pollution (chemical and 
informational) and corruptions attendant to the process of moving information attached 
to things - from paper to brains- across, over and under the vast bumpy surface of the 
earth rather than letting it fly free on the soft hail of electrons that is cyberspace ( p. 30) 
However, in the next paragraph Benedikt (2000) argues that “cyberspace as just described 
does not exist” (p. 30). He subscribed to Karl Popper’s ideas as to the existence of three worlds 
(Benedikt, 2000, p. 1). World 3 is the one that related to the existence of “objective, real and 
public structures, which are the not-necessarily intentional products of the mind of living 
creatures, interacting with each other and with the natural world World 1” (2000, p. 31), the 
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interesting thing about this so-called World 3 is that many of the structures existing there were 
purely abstract, made of information or patterns. Benedikt (2000) used the idea of World 3 to 
explain the existence and characteristics of cyberspace by mentioning four key threads in the 
evolution of this world. The first one being the idea of myths (pp. 31-32); the second one the 
history of technology and the development of different technical means (pp. 33-36); the third 
one the idea of architecture (pp. 38-40); and the fourth and final one the idea of geometry, 
time and space (pp. 40-42).Subsequently, communications on the internet do not have to be 
purely synchronous (Message boards, for example,  can contain conversations that  have a 
very long life-span and blogs can be accessible as long as the author desires). In relation to 
space on the internet it must be borne in mind that dimensions such as distance are not 
operative because of the almost instantaneous access to terminals or contents world-wide. 
Lessig (2006) also used the idea of architecture in order to explain how the internet regulates 
itself. The analysis of the three worlds made by Benedikt (2000) and Lessig’s (2006) mention of 
architecture pointed towards the conception of the internet as an abstract “place” where time, 
space, form,  and substance  differ from their manifestations in the real world.  
 
Manuel Castells (2010) referred to “real virtuality” (not a virtual reality) when talking about 
digitized systems of communication and elaborated on what has been discussed above: 
A system in which reality itself (that is, people’s material/symbolic existence) is entirely 
captured, fully immersed in a virtual setting, in the world of make believe, in which 
appearances are not just on the screen through which experience is communicated, but 
they become the experience. (p. 404) 
Cyberspace, the internet and cybercrime seemed to have captured public imagination due to 
its ubiquity and the permeation of several aspects of our daily lives. The Internet of Things and 
the Cloud guarantee constant connectivity between objects and individuals. As Servera (2015) 
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pointed out “the objective is to connect the objects that surround us with people, and at the 
same time, to connect the objects between each otheriii”. In relation to this, Europol (2015) 
warned about the Internet of Things (IoT) and the Cloud, and the ever-present connectivity 
they generate, understanding it as one of the major challenges that law enforcement agents 
would face in the future (p. 54). This apocalyptic internet discourse was criticized by David 
Wall (2008a, 2008b) as he understood it as emotionally charged and nurtured by science-
fiction dystopian misconceptions.  
 
Another fundamental problem to be accounted was the amount of physical objects or devices 
that can be used for the commission of cybercrimes, or against the devices .A plethora of 
objects have become intertwined with the internet and with human beings, including mobile 
phones, TV’s and all sorts of gadgets that have been named “wearables”. As an example, 
according to its web-page, Fitbit products, such as watches and bracelets monitor pulse, 
weight and sleep and synchronise and share this information with the internet on a 24/7 basis 
(Fitbit, 2015). From another point of view, Servera (2015) mentioned the use of wearables for 
the prevention of crime by using emotion detection and Big Data.   
 
It is through continuous contact with machines that the frontiers between human identity and 
cybernetics become blurred, thus generating what was theorised by Donna Haraway as 
cyborgs. As Haraway (1991) argued “By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we 
are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are 
cyborgs” (p. 150). All our lives and routines have been linked to these instruments, and all 
these instruments have been linked between themselves through invisible threads of 
information and data.  Crimes can be committed whilst comfortably travelling on the train, 
whilst watching a movie or in the classroom. Thus crime becomes over-reaching by 
26 
 
transcending time and space. It is the age of convergence and connectivity, thus - and as will 
be explained in further chapters -cybercrime is becoming part of our daily lives, “the 
criminologies of everyday life” as according to David Garland (2000, 2001). 
 
Moreso, the idea of cyberspace (the environment) as the key element in cybercrime (at least 
from the architectural point of view) seemed to be emphasised by the new developments in 
cloud computing (see for example Anderson, 2008; Europol, 2015; Johnson, 2008; Schofield, 
2008). As already mentioned, a paradigm shift has occurred in the past few years in relation to 
the use of the internet and information systems. Instead of using specific physical storage (the 
user’s hard-drive, for example), personal content is disseminated thought different servers all 
over the world in different platforms, such us Dropbox or Google Drive and also social 
networks like Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. These new trends have altered the nature of 
cyberspace towards a more nodal existence, linking with ideas predicted by Lawrence Lessig 
(2006), about the regulation of markets by themselves and the ability of the internet to also 
regulate itself. Cyborg theory might have not have predicted that the fusion between the 
individual, society and the machine would result in the creation of satellite human identity (the 
fragmented existence of individuals as cloud data in several social networks, web-pages or 
data storage services). According to Lessig (2006) “cyberspace too arose from the unplanned 
displacement of certain architecture of control. The tolled, single-purpose network of 
telephones was displaced by the untolled and multipurpose network of packet-switched data” 
(p. 2). 
 
One important phenomenon that the current literature has not been really able to address is 
the idea of the convergence of systems hinted at in previous paragraphs. Smart phones, 
tablets, TV’s, computers, eBooks, as examples, are all capable of accessing cyberspace in way 
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or another, to send and receive information, to create networks and links and to share data 
between themselves. 
 
Subsequently, the idea of cybercrime has been addressed by law enforcement agencies and 
governments, given its rapid growth and potential for global harm. The Internet Crime 
Complaint Centre stated in its Annual Report (IC3, 2013, p. 7): “the Internet Crime Complaint 
Center (IC3) actively pursued its mission to address crimes committed using the Internet” 
without giving any definition of the term cybercrime.  
 
2.1.3. Cybercrime in UK and Spanish legislation 
 
The European Convention on Cybercrime (2001)4 addressed the perils new technologies might 
bring upon us, in terms of crime as well as the challenges in studying the evidence of these 
crimes. That is one of the main reasons why European countries such as the United Kingdom 
and Spain are legislating against cybercrime. In this thesis reference is made only to legislation 
in English and Welsh, and Spanish legislation, in order to present examples of two different 
legal systems trying to tackle the problem of cybercrime. The reason for doing this is related to 
the author’s experience and closeness to the British (the essentially the Scottish) and Spanish 
legal systems5. Having said that, the English legal system differentiates between Common Law 
offences, those contained in Case Law developed by judges and statutory offences, those 
written in legal texts. In the Spanish legal system, the Criminal Code iv is the main legal text in 
4
 The Convention was signed by Spain and the United Kingdom in 23/11/2001 (later ratified by Spain in 
3/6/2010, and by the UK in 25/5/2011). The Convention’s entry into force in Spain took place in 
1/10/2010, and in the UK in 1/9/2011. 
 
5
 It must be taken into account that, whilst the England and Wales system is based on Common Law the 
Spanish legal system is a codified system. 
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criminal matters and has been subjected to profound amendments in the past few years (for 
example in 2010 and 2015). Said reforms seemed to be addressing the problem of cybercrime 
in Spain because of the requirements of European policy. The “problem” of cybercrime is, thus, 
understood as a crucial key in the European arena (CNP, 2013a, 2013b, Europol, 2015), 
however legal instruments fail to offer definitions of cybercrime. 
 
The key question in terms of defining cybercrime should be whether or not a general definition 
of cybercrime is needed or whether cybercrime should be defined according to its different 
manifestations. Legislators seemed to be favouring the second course of action. Recent 
amendments of the Spanish Criminal Code served as an example of this with the inclusion of 
crimes such as child grooming (Ley Orgánica 5/2010, de 22 de junio por la que se modifica la 
Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre del Código Penal6 and then the Ley Orgánica 
1/2015, de 30 de marzo, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, 
del Código Penal7, hereinafter Spanish Criminal Code (SCC)). In 2010 article 183 bis was placed 
in Chapter II bis relating to “sexual assault and abuse to minors of less than thirteen”, within 
Title VIII of the legal text named “offences against sexual freedom and indemnity”  
He/she who via the internet, phone or any other means of information technology and 
communication contacts a minor of less than thirteen and proposes according an 
encounter with the finality of committing any of the offences described in articles 178 to 
183 and 189, provided that the proposition is accompanied by material acts devised to 
granting the contact … (emphasis addedv)  
6
 Organic Act 5/2010, 22nd june, by which the Organic Act of the Criminal Code 10/1995, 23rd 
November, is amended. 
 
7
 Organic Act 1/2015, 30
th
 march, by which the Organic Act of the Criminal Code 10/1995, 23rd 
November, is amended. 
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Following the amendment in 2015, article 183 bis became 183 ter and Chapter II bis “sexual 
assault and abuse to minors of less than sixteen”. Article 183 ter was, then, divided into two 
sections (183 ter.1 and 183 ter.2). Article  183 ter. 1, indicated that the minor subjected to the 
contact (grooming) should be less than sixteen. However, article 183 ter.2 was enacted as 
follows: 
He/she who via the internet, phone or any other means of information technology and 
communication contacts a minor of less than sixteen and performs acts devised to 
ensnare the minor  so that the minor facilitates pornographic material or shows 
pornographic images where a minor appears or is represented… vi 
Therefore the crime, “child grooming” become an autonomous entity in Spanish law. This 
offence did not refer to committing sexual abuse or aggression to children -which are 
penalised in different articles -, but to all the preparatory acts using the internet (or any other 
telematic means) for doing so. The internet was once again understood as a vital instrument in 
the commission of criminal offences, and in this case, as necessary grounds for an individual to 
be indicted. Also, the legislator tried to use a “blank formula” when indicating “via the 
internet, phone or any other means of information technology and communication”. This 
clause left the door open for any possible technological developments in the near future 
similar to the internet or phone. 
 
These changes in the regulations of child grooming were mentioned in the in the Preambles of 
the aforementioned Amendment Acts of the Spanish Criminal Code (from 2010 and 2015). 
Preambles indicate the reasons for the creation of any given Act in Spain, and discuss its 
necessity and pertinence.  
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Stemming from the Council of Europe Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003, 
on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography8, Part XIII of the 
Preamble of the 2010 Acts indicated the necessity of regulating child pornography and child 
abuse. Part XIII of the Preamble of the 2010 Amendment Act indicates: 
On the other hand, the extent of the use of the internet and the technologies of 
information and communication with sexual intentions towards minors has evidenced 
the necessity of criminally punishing the conducts that an adult person develops through 
said media in order to win the minor’s trust and organise encounters to obtain sexual 
favours. vii 
 
But this was not the only example of specific cybercrimes that can be found in the current 
Spanish Criminal Code since the 2010 reform. Title XIII “offences against patrimony and 
socioeconomic order”, Chapter VI, Section I, contained article 248.2 that stated:  
Also will be considered liable for fraud: 
a) Those who with an intention of profit and by using any computer manipulation or 
similar artifice, manage to obtain a non-consented transfer of any patrimonial 
active in the prejudice of other 
b) Those who manufacture, introduce, possess or facilitate computer programmes 
specifically designed to the commission of frauds mentioned in this article 
c) Those that by using credit or debit cards, traveller’s cheques, or data contained 
within any of them carry out operations of any kind in prejudice of the card-holder 
or any other third party.  (2010viii)  
8
 This obligation to regulate child abuse also stems from the Council of Europe Convention on the 
Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse 2007 
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Article 197 bis9, punished unauthorised access to data or computer programmes by breaching 
security measures in place. This breach has to be performed always against the will of the 
person entitled to exclude the intruder ix . What this article contains is the express 
criminalisation of hacking in the Spanish legal system. In this case, the amendment was 
performed to satisfy the indications of the Council of Europe Framework 
Decision2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems. Also, the 
interception of private electronic communications between devices was criminalised in section 
197 bis. Finally, section 197 ter, criminalised the creation of software or access codes for the 
commission of hacking offences.     
 
The case of including cybercrime in UK legislation seems to be extremely similar to the one in 
Spain. The pioneering Computer Misuse Act 1990 introduced a series of statutory offences 
such as “unauthorised access to computer material” (s.1), “unauthorised access with intent to 
commit or facilitate commission of further offences” (s.2) and, “unauthorised access with 
intent to impair, or with recklessness as to impairing, operation of computer”(s.3). This is to 
say, an act for the creation of hacking offences in the UK.   
 
Also, the offence of child grooming was introduced in UK’s legislation under the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, it can be read in section 15: 
Meeting a child following sexual grooming etc. 
[F1(1)A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if— . 
[F2(a)A has met or communicated with another person (B) on at least two 
occasions and subsequently— .  
9
 since the 2015 amendment 
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And then, in the very same section: 
 (a)the reference to A having met or communicated with B is a reference to A having 
met B in any part of the world or having communicated with B by any means from, to or 
in any part of the world. (2003, emphasis added) 
In this case, unlike section 183 ter of Spanish Criminal Code that criminalised the contact of 
minors via the internet, the idea of cybergrooming children in the UK (in this particular section 
under 16) was contemplated via a blank clause represented by the addition of “by any means” 
instead of resorting to the mention of the internet and information and communication 
technologies (ICTs). 
 
In addition, section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 criminalised “causing or inciting children 
under thirteen to engage in sexual activity”. But there is no mention of the means used for said 
purposes. Under British legislation “child grooming” is punished as a statutory offence. 
However, the legislator did not mention the usage of computers, message forums or any ICT’s 
in the Act. The cybernetic aspect of the crime is purposely forgotten and not included, but this 
does not mean the offence does not exist. 
 
According to the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP, 2012) “child sexual 
exploitation and abuse takes place in both online and offline environments and that the 
distinction is in many ways artificial to children and young people in 2012” (p.  6). CEOP (2012) 
also highlights current trends related to consensual uploads of self-generated indecent 
imagery (SGII) used for social networks profiles, attachments or public video sent or created 
for their boyfriends/girlfriends that end up being distributed by the receptors “CEOP has seen 
a marked increase in the number of reports where young teenagers appear to have taken still 
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or video indecent imagery of themselves which is then shared online” (p. 6). This creates 
several vulnerabilities for children and teenagers, as they might be subject to extortion or their 
pictures disseminated without their consent.  
More work can be done, however, to identify the sliding scale of risk and harm that 
accompanies the variety of ways in which SGII is being produced and distributed, and 
the extent to which these are driven by the malevolent intentions of a third party in 
grooming, deceiving and threatening children. (CEOP, 2012, p. 7) 
Governments, legislators and agencies have finally understood the necessity of tackling the 
problems that result from cybercrime. For example, according to Ignacio Cosidó (General 
Director of the Spanish Police (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía)), the fight against cybercrime was 
one of the major strategic issues for the police as indicated in the Strategic Plan 2013-2016 
(CNP, 2013a, 2013b). 
 
As it has been analysed, cybercrime has been catalogued by various scholars, agencies and 
international bodies, but all fail to ascribe a proper meaning to the word cybercrime. Only its 
different manifestations are explained and defined. Maybe there is no necessity for such a 
definition, they were just referring to an umbrella concept or meta-structure as immensely 
liquid as to being able to contain a myriad of mutating phenomena that change and adapt as 
fast as technology does. This might be related to Zygmunt Bauman’s “liquid modernity” and his 
discourse on time and space: “once the distance passed in a unit of time came to be 
dependant on technology, on artificial means of transportation, all extant, inherited limits of to 
the speed of movement could be in principle transgressed” (Bauman, 2000, p.9).  Bauman 
(2000) offers a very blunt description of today’s world when contending that: “the 
insubstantial, instantaneous time of the software world is also an inconsequential time” (p. 
118). Jewkes and Sharp (2003) added to that idea, from another point of view by arguing that 
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“the internet is the postmodern medium ‘par excellence’; the slate upon which we can write or 
rewrite our personalities in a perpetual act of self-creation” (p. 2).The idea of machines and 
technology serving as transcendence for the common boundaries of time and space was 
criticised by Bauman (2000) who reasoned: “even the most advanced technology, armed with 
ever more powerful processors has still some way to go to attain genuine ‘Instantaneity’” (p. 
119).  Miró Llinares (2011) talked about the contraction of time and space in cyberspace (pp. 6-
10), arguing that cyberspace is real space, yet a new kind of space where the “coordinates of 
time and space acquire a different meaning and see their scope and limits redefined” (p. 6). 
 
In light of what has been discussed before, three important shortcomings are present in 
current definitions of cybercrime and the approaches taken by legislators:  
1) They do not offer an explanation of what cybercrime really is. The term is devoid of 
meaning 
2) They tend to focus excessively on the manifestations of crime (like cyberfraud, hacking 
or child porn offences) 
3) They do not seem to include manifestations of cyber-deviant behaviour and focus 
mostly on illegal behaviour. 
  
A more exhaustive definition of cybercrime was therefore needed, one that addresses all 
forms and manifestations and will endure liquid time. The following is the proposed definition 
of cybercrime that will be used in this work:  
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Any action (or lack thereof), be it considered a crime or a legal wrong in any country or a 
deviation from normalised patterns of behaviour perpetrated via means of ICT (or against any 
ICT’s), that can have consequences on the internet and/or the real world. Said consequences 
may result in physical and/or psychological damage, economic and/or property loss; loss of 
dignity, of reputation, of social and/or political stability, of peace of mind or contravention of 
human rights.  
 
2.1.4. Classifications of cybercrime 
 
One of the essentials features of cybercrime has been its heterogeneity; sex crime, property 
crime and verbal abuse, for example, fall under the umbrella of the term. It was important to 
study the different manifestations of cybercrime that have been identified by scholars 
presented by scholars and to offer a new classification that takes into account the realities 
presented in the aforementioned definition.  
 
Authors such as Brenner (2010) have divided cybercrimes in three major categories (pp 39-47): 
target cybercrimes, tool cybercrimes and computer incidental. According to Brenner in target 
cybercrimes the computer is “broken into” or “bombarded” from the outside (p.39), in tool 
cybercrimes the computer is the “implement” (p.42) and in computer incidental, “the 
computer plays a minor rule in the offense” (p.45). Following this categorisation, the majority 
of cybercrimes fall under the label of “tool cybercrimes” (i.e. child grooming, cyber-harassment 
and cyber-fraud), whereas a small subset relate to the “target cybercrimes” label (for instance, 
hacking, denial of service attacks and defacement). As for computer incidental, the role played 
by the computer is related to the offence but is not fundamental to it (for example, making 
drugs following instructions downloaded from the internet). As indicated in previous 
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paragraphs, Wall (2007) mentioned the existence of “computer integrity crimes”, “computer-
assisted crimes” and “computer content crimes”. Clough (2010) believes there is something of 
an international consensus surrounding this classification, as it stems from the one used by the 
US Department of Justice. 
 
These three categories are interesting from the point of view of the present work, but a more 
criminological classification could be added, one that takes into consideration the different 
manifestations of crime (traditional, non-cybernetic crime) in criminological literature as 
according to their targets. The following is the suggested classification: 
 
a) Violent cybercrime: 
1. Violence against the person (for instance, cyberbullying and cyberstalking.) 
2. Violence against systems (for instance, hacking, denial of service and defacements.) 
 
The latter was equivalent to “target cybercrimes” and “computer integrity crimes”, as 
the offence would be directed towards the computer. A violent component is 
understood to exist in this type of crime, as the destruction or corruption of systems is 
sought. In addition, when talking about violence against the person, one could argue 
that a similarity exists between “tool cybercrimes” as the computer was the vehicle by 
which the offence is committed. However, these types of cybercrimes seek the 
“destruction” of the person (instead of the system) albeit in a metaphorical manner by 
intending to destroy his/her reputation, dignity or peace of mind. These types of crime 
could also be considered “computer content crimes” (Wall, 2007) and a species of 
“identity crime” (Wall, 2013). 
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b) Sexual cybercrime: for example child pornography, some types of stalking, and 
grooming. Some of these crimes could also have a violent element and might be 
considered a hybrid between these categories and the first one (for instance, some 
types of cyberstalking). In this case, even though they should have been considered 
tool cybercrimes, the goal is purely sexual (to obtain sexual gratification). Also, these 
types of crime fall under Wall’s (2007) conception of “computer content crime”. 
 
c) Property cybercrime (especially cyberfraud): including spam, identity theft and 
intellectual property crime. All of these crimes imply an abuse of property or use 
rights, including fraud, and they also tend to involve economic loss. These types 
related to Wall’s (2007) “computer-assisted crime” but also Wall’s (2013) “identity 
crimes”. 
 
 
d) Socio-political cybercrime: Cyber-terrorism or hacktivism 10  would be good 
examples. These types of crimes aim to disrupt social or political stability.  
 
2.1.5. The explanation of cybercrime via criminological theory 
 
From a general point of view, cybercrimes are essentially opportunistic (Newman & Clarke, 
2003). Yar believed that “novel sociointeractional features of the cyberspace environment 
(primarily the collapse of spatial–temporal barriers, many-to-many connectivity, and the 
anonymity and plasticity of online identity) make possible new forms and patterns of illicit 
activity” (2005, p.411). In addition, Newman and Clarke (2003) advocated for the prevention of 
10
 Hackers pursuing a political agenda, usually trying to achieve a higher democratic order or trying to 
fight a democratic order that is understood as unfair or corrupt. The Anonymous movement serves as an 
example 
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e-commerce fraud by using Situational Crime Prevention, following also Cornish and Clarke 
(1986, 1987) .This approach, from a theoretical standpoint, was based in four different 
assumptions: the limited rationality of crime; the modification of situations to hinder the 
commission of crimes; the secondary importance of personal predispositions in understanding 
crime; and the relation between crime prevention and the motivation of offenders (Newman & 
Clarke, 2003, p.7).  The internet can be become an extremely criminogenic setting, according 
to Newman and Clarke (2003):“the prime ingredient of cyberspace is information, that both 
defines and constructs situations in which crime occurs” (p.10). Information has been 
considered to be an extremely “hot product”, a product that possesses profound criminogenic 
qualities following Clarke’s CRAVED acronym (information is Concealable, Removable, 
Available, Valuable, Enjoyable and Disposable) (Newman & Clarke, 2003, p. 68, citing Clarke, 
1999). The CRAVED acronym could be crucial when explaining different types of cyber-frauds, 
yet it does fail to include the peculiarities of, for example, violent cybercrimes and sexual 
cybercrimes. However, an element of limited rationality and opportunism might be found 
behind the offender’s motivation (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 1987).In addition, Clough (2010) 
talks about scale, accessibility, anonymity, portability and transferability, global reach and 
absence of capable guardians as the “key features of digital technology which facilitate crime 
and hamper law enforcement” (p. 5). Similarly, according to Europol (2015), the main issues in 
terms of investigative challenges were “attribution, anonymisation, encryption and 
jurisdiction” (p. 9). The internet is considered as a criminogenic setting in itself given its 
particular characteristics. It is complicated to prove (not only in legal terms) who committed 
any given cybercrime but also where the cybercrime was committed and where it should be 
tried.  
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In contrast, David Wall (2008a) stated that: 
Intertwined with the innate distrust of internet users is the fairly widespread view that 
not only does the internet place individuals at risk, but it can also corrupt normally law-
abiding individuals who go on a moral holiday when on the internet. The internet 
certainly broadens internet users’ life experience and exposes them to a range of social 
activity that may be outside the confines of their everyday life (p. 875) 
Wall warned against the mainstream and media-constructed discourse on the dangers on the 
internet. From his point of view, the realities of internet are “the reorganisation of criminal 
labour online” (2008b, p. 55), and the already discussed three generations of internet crime 
and three offending patterns (hacking, content crime and computer-assisted crime) (p. 55; see 
also Wall, 2007). Wall explained that cybercrime was starting to follow certain patterns of 
specialisation that mirror market structures (for example, outsourcing certain services). In a 
very similar fashion, Europol (2015) seemed to point to a trend towards collaborative work 
between certain cybercriminals (p. 64) and the concept of “crime-as-a-service” (p. 64). 
However, these realities did not seem to contradict the fact that certain intrinsic features of 
the internet attract the commission of crime. 
 
In relation to Routine Activity Theory, a triptych comprising the “motivated offender”, “the 
absence of capable guardians” and “the suitable target” is used to explain the commission of a 
crime. Said triptych is obviously dependent on variables of time and space (see Yar, 2005, pp. 
415-418 for a discussion on the spatiality and temporality of the internet), and is closely linked 
to the idea of “hot products” (or suitable targets). Yar used Felson’s VIVA (Value, Inertia, 
Visibility, Accessibility) concept instead of Clarke’s (1999) CRAVED notion, to explain the 
qualities of eventual targets (Yar, 2005, pp.418-422).  Targets (whether they operate in 
economic or leisure realms) on the internet tend to be valuable, they possess a certain amount 
40 
 
of weightlessness (inertia), the internet is a public medium (visibility) and the internet is very 
easy to access but at the same time easy to get away from, owing to the  anonymity it grants 
(accessibility).    
 
The “absence of capable legal guardians” (as argued by Clough, 2010; Grabosky & Smith, 2001; 
Yar, 2005, pp. 422-423) facilitates the committing of internet related crime. The concept of 
absence of legal guardians and lack of deterrent qualities might be understood as facilitators 
that boost the opportunity for the commission of deviant acts. However, Yar (2005) concludes 
that: 
it would appear that RAT’s concept of capable guardianship is transposable to 
cyberspace, even if the structural properties of the environment (such as its variable 
spatial and temporal topology) amplify the limitations upon establishing guardianship 
already apparent in the terrestrial world .(p. 423) 
 
Grabosky (2001), and Grabosky and Smith (2001), talked about different motivations for the 
commission of computer crime, namely lust, greed, hatred, political views or revenge. 
Grabosky and Duffield (2001) mentioned the concept of “ego challenge” (and also echo Robert 
Agnew’s types of strain as motivators, Agnew, 1992; Agnew, Brezina, Wright, & Cullen, 2002). 
By contrast, KPMG’s (2007) survey on the profile of an online fraudster indicated, from a 
theoretical point of view, that fraud is a triangle that comprises motivations, opportunity and 
rationalization; “financial pressure resulting from a fraudster’s excessive life style” (p.2) being 
one of the essential motivations for offenders. 
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On the other hand, theories such as Merton’s (1968) could be used as a more specific template 
for fraud motivations (and even other types of crimes) as they try to specify the strain and 
frustration that certain individuals face once they fail to reach certain legitimate social goals 
(these goals are essentially pecuniary). This results in a social state of normlessness where 
individuals innovate and “adapt through the use of institutionally proscribed but often 
effective means of attaining at least the simulacrum of success-wealth and power” (Merton, 
1968, p.141; see also Agnew, 1992; Agnew et al. 2002). According to Robert Agnew, the 
individual can face three types of strain: strain produced because of the anticipated failure to 
achieve positively valued goals; strain produced because of the removal of positive stimuli; and 
strain produced by actual or anticipated noxious stimuli (Agnew, 1992; Agnew et al., 2002). 
Agnew’s theory, despite having more reach than Merton’s, was also incomplete when applied 
to cybercrime, because as he himself explained, individuals have a catalogue of coping 
mechanisms that can protect them from suffering such strain, and therefore avoid crime 
(Agnew, 1992). In a current study about illegal downloading and its relationship with self-
control and Strain Theory, Hinduja (2012) concluded that “The results suggest that individuals 
do not download music illegally because they are experiencing strain” (p. 961). This study by 
Hinduja (2012) indicates how Strain Theory is not the cause behind the commission of music 
piracy (illegal downloads). 
 
Finally, Sutherland (1937, 1983) explained that White Collar crime is rooted in a “differential 
association”, meaning that “criminal behaviour is learned in association with those who define 
such criminal behaviour favorably and in isolation from those who define it unfavorably” 
(Sutherland, 1983, p.240). Then “if the weight of favorable definitions, exceeds the weight of 
the unfavorable definitions”, the individual will resort to crime (p.240). Sutherland (1983) also 
pointed out the importance of a state of “social disorganisation” that can be considered as 
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either anomie, or the “lack of social standards which direct the behavior of members of a 
society in general or in specific areas of behavior” (p. 255). Sutherland’s theory has been used 
in criminology as an explanation of white-collar crime and theft (both being economic crimes), 
indicating that individuals commit these crimes after a process of “tutelage” by other 
individuals that transmit the values, techniques and motivations behind crime. Authors such as 
Herrero Herrero (2007) have classified cybercrime as a type of economic crime. In this thesis, 
however, that is not the case.  Although Sutherland’s theory (1937, 1983) seems insufficient to 
explain cybercrime, the part about “social disorganization” and “lack of social standards” can 
serve as an explanation of the absence of strong moral rules on the internet. In addition, 
Sutherland’s differential association theory could help explain certain types of cybercrime that 
stem from a corporate structure. As indicated earlier, it must be recognised, that 
understanding cybercrime as a sub-type of economic crime would be an extremely narrow 
view, as it explains some types of cyberfraud, and yet fails to explain sex-related crimes, “child 
grooming” or cyberbullying. 
 
In relation to “self-control theory” (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), crimes are committed by 
individuals with low self-control, as they are unable to postpone the satisfaction of desire and 
pleasure. Crime is, according to these authors, the best way to satisfy an instant necessity as 
well as being extremely gratifying, thrilling and easy to commit at the very same time.  
Gottfredson and Hirschi elaborated a static conception of self-control, one that was forged 
during infancy and remained constant throughout adulthood. Can a lack of self-control explain 
the commission of cybercrimes? Are cyber-criminals individuals with low self-control who 
resort to the internet as the easiest way to satisfy their predatory impulses? It is very difficult 
to refer to self-control (in Gottfredson and Hirschi’s conception) in relation to cyber-criminals, 
taking into account studies mentioned earlier such as Moore and MacMullan’s (2009) and 
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Hinduja (2012). Individuals involved in illegal downloading might be law-abiding citizens who 
are able to neutralise the deviant component of said offences by using different cognitive 
scripts.  
 
 All in all, current criminological theory does not seem to produce a clear explanation of the 
reasons behind the commission of cybercrimes. It might be able, up to a point, to explain the 
opportunistic and situational factors inherently linked to the nature of cyberspace (absence of 
capable guardians, motivated offenders and information as a hot product) but not the 
aetiology. Sociological explanations of crime also fail to explain cybercrime as social conflict 
(the individual versus society, frustration). Self-control or differential association could explain 
facets or manifestations of cybercrime but not the whole of cybercrime. Neutralisation theory, 
on the hand, has offered better results.  Eclectic or multi-factorial explanations of crime are to 
be taken into consideration by criminologists in order to explain the reasons behind the 
commission of cybercrimes, but what is proposed in this thesis is the development of one of 
the most over-reaching current theories into a new paradigm that includes the specificities of 
cyberspace and cybercriminals, and links endogenous or personal variables with exogenous or 
environmental variables. 
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2.2. Situational Action Theory (SAT) 
 
The essential aspect of Situational Action Theory of Crime Causation is that it considers crime 
to be the result of a process of deliberation, a moral choice (Wikström, 2006; Wikström & 
Treiber, 2007; Wikström & Treiber, 2009; Wikström, 2010). This theory defers from Newman 
and Clarke’s (1986, 1987) rational approach by emphasising the importance of morality in the 
decision-making process. 
 
This theory aimed to be considered a general theory of crime, overcoming the problems 
encountered by major criminological theories (according to Wikström). Namely, a clear 
definition of what crime is, what is it that moves people to engage in acts of crime, the 
interaction between environmental factors and personal factors, and the role of social 
conditions and individual development (Wikström, 2010).  It is, therefore, an eclectic theory, 
one that takes into account social factors (the environment in itself, the rules of said 
environment and the moral context) and personal factors (the moral make-up of the 
individual, his/her tendencies and habits, as shall be explained below) and linked them. 
Sociological theories have been mentioned earlier, for example, “differential association” 
(Sutherland, 1937, 1983) - explaining how individuals learn criminal motivations and 
techniques from others. Other theories have also been mentioned, relating to the 
criminogenic frustration and strain generated by the inequality between societal goals and 
means to achieve them (Merton, 1968; see also Agnew, 1992; Agnew et al. 2002). Similarly, 
“self-control” theory (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) has been put forward to explain how any 
given individual’s self-control (his/hers capacity to cope with frustration and need for 
immediate pleasure) is forged by his/her parents during infancy. These theories describe the 
interaction between the individual and others or the individual and society. On the other hand, 
SAT, considers both societal variables and personal variables, understating how their linkage 
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generated a moral process of deliberation resulting in an eventual act of crime. Wikström 
(2010) stated:  
I submit that mainstream criminological theory generally (not all theories in all respects but 
all theories at least in some respects) fail to fully address: 
(i) what crime is (to clearly define what it is the theory aims to explain), 
(ii) what it is that moves people to engage in acts of crime (to present an adequate action 
theory), 
(iii) how personal and environmental factors interact in moving people to engage in acts of 
crime (to properly integrate key insights from personal and environmental explanatory 
approaches), 
(iv) the role of broader social conditions and individual development (life histories) (to 
analyse their influence not as causes but as causes of the causes).  (pp. 213-214, also 
Wikström & Treiber, 2009, p. 78) 
These points cited above of paramount importance in order to understand SAT as one of the 
most comprehensive criminological theories of current times.  Its eclecticism was manifested 
when Wikström explained how theories such as Gottfredson and Hirschi’s focused on 
individual differences whereas other theories focused on the environment “Nevertheless, such 
accounts rarely provide any elaborate attempt to integrate individual and environmental 
factors in crime causation” (Wikström, 2010, p.215). Another relevant criticism made by 
Wikström (2010) is that “criminological theories often ignore the role of agency” (p. 225). The 
following paragraph sums up the preceding point and presents in a very concise manner the 
key elements of SAT: 
Crimes are moral actions so what we need to explain acts of crime is a theory of moral 
action; an action theory that explains why and how people are moved to carry out acts in 
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compliance with or in breach of rules of conduct. Such a theory helps us focus our 
attention on what kinds of personal and environmental factors may be relevant in the 
explanation of acts of crime. (Wikström, 2010, p. 214) 
 
When explaining the SAT, Wikström (2006) emphasised the relationship between the 
individual’s actions, motivations, and moral values and the setting: “the action a particular 
individual takes is always a result of the features of the settings in which he takes part and his 
processing and evaluation of the environmental input” (p.93).  Thus, Wikström indicates the 
creation of a moral context that leads to the formulation of a moral choice. The environment is 
defined as “all that is external to the individual and that with which he comes into contact” (p.  
86). He expanded the definition by stating that: 
The individual’s environment can be conceptualised as his activity field. An activity 
field may be defined as the configuration of the settings in which the individual takes 
part during a particular period of time (e.g., his daily activity field or his annual 
activity field). A setting might be defined as the social and physical environment 
(objects, persons and events) that the individual, at a particular moment in time, can 
access with his senses (e.g., what he can see, hear and feel) this also includes 
everything he can see, hear and feel through the exposure of various media (e.g., 
television, radio, telephone, computers, newspapers, books, etc.) present in the 
setting. (p.86) 
The relevant question arising from this explanation should be: is the internet a proper setting? 
In order to develop SAT to explain cybercrime, and drawing on the conceptualisations 
advanced in previous paragraphs (relating to the specific geo-spatial characteristics of the 
internet that refer to the contraction of time and space as already indicated by Miró Llinares 
(2011, pp.6-10), it shall be indicated that it is. When the individual is connected to the internet 
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from any given environment (his/her home, for example), his/hers decision whether to commit 
an act of moral rule-breaking is not entirely linked (as it is hypothesized in this work) to the 
moral characteristics of the physical environment but to the moral characteristics of the non-
physical environment (the internet). That internet environment is independent from the 
physical environment and its moral rules and/or deterrent qualities. However, one could argue 
that both environments (and their qualities) might be connected in a certain way (if the 
internet is conceived as a simulacrum of reality or as a virtual reality, see Baudrillard, 1988; 
Castells, 2010). Also (according to the hypotheses presented in this work), the propensity of 
the eventual offender varies depending upon whether he/she is considering moral rule-
breaking in the physical environment or in the real life environment. This is closely linked to 
the idea of neutralisation techniques developed in further paragraphs. The internet, therefore, 
is considered an environment in itself, unrelated to where it is accessed from, but related to 
whom it is accessed by.  
 
Subsequently, Wikström (2010) explained the situational model by indicating the existence of 
four key elements: person, setting, situation and action. Therefore moral actions can be 
understood as an outcome of situational processes: 
the concept of crime propensity refers to the personal factors that affect a person’s 
likelihood to perceiving an act of crime as an action alternative and carrying it out, in 
response to a particular setting … This general reasoning is also applicable to analyses of 
specific kinds of crime, in which case we would talk about [type of crime] propensity, 
for example shoplifting propensity or partner violence propensity.  (p. 220, emphasis 
added) 
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This is one of the reasons why SAT can be used for explaining cybercrime, as there are certain 
aspects of it (especially the legally and morally liquid setting) that require certain types of 
personality traits. For Wikström (2010), there is an intersection between the individual’s 
propensity to engage in acts of crime and in his/her exposure to criminogenic settings 
(Wikström, 2010). Therefore, Propensity x Exposure = Crime (Wikström, 2006; Wikström & 
Treiber, 2007; Wikström & Treiber, 2009; Wikström, 2010). This deliberation process leading to 
crime is explained in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The steps of the perception–choice process in crime causation illustrated. 
(Wikström, 2010, p. 224) 
 
 
In order to understand Figure 1, it is important to mention another key concept in SAT: the 
role of motivation or goal-direction attention (Wikström, 2010, p.226). It is important to note 
that “It is necessary because to act people first have to be motivated to do so, but it is not 
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sufficient because no particular motivation (goal-directed attention) in itself always causes 
people to breach a moral rule (defined in law)”(Wikström, 2010, p. 226; see also Wikström & 
Treiber, 2009 pp. 80-81). Individuals might wish to commit a crime (for example to hit 
someone or to steal expensive clothing from a shop) yet this desire alone (according to the SAT 
framework) will not result in an actual law-breaking act. Motivation is, therefore, a situational 
concept that stems from the relationship forged between the individual and the environment, 
and which originates from temptation or provocation (for definitions and further discussion on 
the matter, see Wikström, 2010, p. 226 and Wikström & Treiber 2009, pp. 85-86). So, what 
exactly will make a motivated individual abstain from an act of shop-lifting? Or in other words, 
what will make the individual perceive his/her motivation to steal as an action alternative? The 
answer is the moral filter, defined as “the moral rule-induced selective perception of action 
alternatives) circumscribes what actions are perceived as appropriate in response to a 
particular motivation” (Wikström, 2010, p. 227). Also in relation to motivations, “the ability to 
exercise self-control (controls that are internal in origin) and (ii) deterrence (controls that are 
external in origin) are the core potential inhibitors of a particular motivation” (Wikström & 
Treiber, 2007, p.249). Once again, the idea of internal and external factors correlating has been 
posited as the very crux of SAT. 
 
Going back to the moral filter, it can be argued that it can be applied in a semi-automated way 
(out of moral habit) or can be used as a pattern for moral deliberation.  The role of the moral 
filter, explained in the previous paragraph, is depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. The role of the moral filter illustrated (Wikström, 2010, p. 227) 
 
 
Finally, the last key concept in relation to SAT is the role of self-control. As self-control “may 
only come into play, (become causally relevant) when a person is motivated and sees an action 
that would breach a rule of conduct as an alternative to satisfy the motivation” (Wikström, 
2010, p.229). Self-control has been mentioned as the essential element in Gottfredson and 
Hirschi’s General Theory of Crime (1990) and defined as “the tendency to avoid acts whose 
long-term costs exceed their momentary advantages” (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, p.3 , cited 
in Wikström, 2010, p.231) and has always been regarded a “stable individual trait” 
(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, cited in Wikström, 2010, p. 231). However, there is within SAT, a 
radical re-conceptualisation of self-control, where it is seen as: 
[A]situational process (and not, for example, a person’s impulsivity or police presence in 
a setting), defined as the cognitive process by which people manage conflicting rule-
guidance when deliberating whether or not to act upon a particular motivation that 
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involves a breach of a rule of conduct (Wikström, 2010, p. 232 also explained in 
Wikström & Treiber, 2009, pp.79-80 and Wikström & Treiber, 2007, p.243).  
 
This conception of self-control was very novel as it differed from accepting self-control as a 
static internal trait.  SAT developed self-control into a dynamic situational concept that 
depended not only on individual characteristics, but also on environmental characteristics 
relating to the setting. As Wikström and Treiber (2007) explained: 
We argue that self-control is best analysed as a situational concept rather than an 
individual trait. We submit that an individual’s ability to exercise self-control is an 
outcome of the interaction between his/her executive capabilities (an individual trait) 
and the settings in which he/she takes part (his/her environment). (p.238)  
This is the reason reason why “self-control comes into play in the process of choice only when 
the temptations and provocations an individual faces in a particular setting conflict with 
his/her moral rules” (Wikström & Treiber, 2007, p.243). However, in relation to the relative 
importance of self-control, it must be noted that “the primary reason for individuals’ law 
abidance is strong moral beliefs (and moral habits) that correspond to the moral rules of the 
law, rather than their ability to exercise self-control” (Wikström & Treiber, 2007, p. 250). To 
develop what has been said, according to the results of a study by Wikström and Svensson 
(2010), self-control plays decisive role only when individuals have weak morality. When 
individuals are able to contemplate the possibilities of committing crimes, in their own words 
“both personal morality and the ability to exercise self-control are important factors for a 
person’s crime involvement, (ii) personal morality is the more fundamental of the two since 
the role of a person’s ability to exercise self-control in predicting crime involvement is 
conditional on his or her personal morality” (Wikström & Svensson, 2010, p.405). 
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 This connection between personal morality and self-control is one of the major reasons why 
SAT becomes a crucial instrument when trying to understand the reason why people engage in 
acts of cybercrime, especially why law-abiding citizens might consider cybercrime as an action 
alternative.  This is also the reason why SAT is being presented as a template for the 
explanation of cybercrime by adding new variables to the theory.  
 
It is, therefore also necessary to talk about the deterrent qualities of the setting.  As “if there is 
an effective monitoring of and effective sanctioning of moral rule-breaking, the setting has 
strong deterrent qualities” (Wikström, 2006, p.101; see also Wikström & Treiber, 2007). 
Wikström also contended that “casually relevant environmental factors that affect the 
criminogenic exposure a setting provides are (iii)the moral rules of the setting, (iv) their level 
of enforcement (through the process of deterrence)” (Wikström, 2010, p.221). This can be 
connected to Yar’s (2005) work on Routine Activity for the Internet. The apparent lack of 
capable guardians (with deterrent capabilities) has already been discussed in previous 
paragraphs. Yar (2005) concluded that they exist, even if the internet has intrinsic limitations in 
terms of guardianship.  
 
In Table 1, the relation between Propensity and Exposure to a moral context is explained in 
relation to violent crime. If the context is conducive to violence and the individual’s propensity 
is also conducive to violence, violence is likely to happen. However, if the individual’s 
propensity is not conducive to violence but the context is, violence will depend on the actor’s 
ability to exercise self-control. This is a relevant in relation to the internet, as it is important 
proving that cyberspace is conducive to crime (not only violent crime, but any kind). Should 
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that be proved, the commission of cybercrimes would rely solely on the individual’s capacity to 
exercise self-control (as a situational concept, not as a static one). The fact of considering 
whether the internet is conducive to crime lies once again on the very specific characteristics 
of the internet hindering the capacity for self-control (especially anonymity). On the internet, 
the idea of self-control might be profoundly interwoven with the ideas of neutralisation and 
rationalisation of conducts.  
 
Table 1. Situational context and violent action (Wikström & Treiber, 2009, p. 92) 
 
 
In order to sum up the intricacies of the theory being discussed in this chapter, Figure 3 
illustrates the SAT process by explaining the role of motivators, the moral filter and controls, as 
a flow chart. If the individual faces motivation (he is tempted to do something), and there 
exists a moral filter that implies congruent rule-guidance encouraging the commission of an 
action, then the action will be committed. However, if this moral filter is congruent in terms of 
rule-guidance and discourages the commission of a crime, the action will not be committed. In 
contrast, if the moral filter implies conflicting rule-guidance, then the rules of the setting 
and/or the rules of the person will be the ones dictating the commission of an action, 
depending on the capacity of the person to exercise self-control or the deterrent capabilities of 
the setting. Wikström, Oberwittler, Treiber, and Hardie (2013) conducted a longitudinal study 
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of juvenile urban crime in Peterborough known as the Peterborough Adolescent and Young 
Adult Development Study (hereinafter PADS+). Wikström et al. (2013) measured certain 
personal and environmental variables. through time, using the SAT theoretical framework. 
They measured self-control and crime propensity, activity patterns and the perception-choice 
process. The instruments used by Wikström et al. (2013) are discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 3 (Methodology).  
 
Figure 3. The roles of motivations, the moral filter and controls in the action processing 
according to SAT illustrated (Wikström, 2010, p.234) 
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 2.3. Situational Action Theory Revised for the Internet (SAT-RI) 
 
As indicated in previous paragraphs, SAT is a general theory that aims to overcome the 
problems presented by current and past criminological theorisations and it offers an over-
reaching explanation of all types of crime (including causes of crime and causes of the causes) 
(for an in depth explanation see Wikström, 2010, pp. 213-216, also Wikström et al., 2013). One 
might argue that such a complex theory suffices to explain the phenomena of cybercrimes. 
However, the formula Propensity x Exposure = criminal action, might generate some troubling 
issues when addressed in this work in relation to the internet.  
 
2.3.1. The internet as an environment 
 
 It should be borne in mind that the exposure variable refers to the feedback established 
between the individual, and an environment that has its own set of moral rules and deterrent 
qualities. However, the internet exists as a juxtaposed and simultaneous reality; the internet is 
in itself an environment (virtual reality) within another environment (the physical world). Any 
kind of crime committed by using any information and communications technology (ICT), 
against any person or ICT (see definition of cybercrime provided in this work) is not entirely 
caused by the context the ICT is accessed from. Such a crime is also cause by the context of the 
internet and the personal moral variables of the offender. In other words, when considering 
the “exposure” variable, a specific environment is mentioned (internet) that does not need to 
relate to the physical environment the offender was immersed in. Figure 4 depicts the internet 
as being immersed in another environment (i.e. a community, a country or a town) and thus, 
the internet, sharing the moral norms of the offline environment. In Figure 4, cybercrime is 
caused because of the interaction between personal propensity and both environments 
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(online and offline). On the other hand, Figure 5 depicts the internet and the offline 
environment as autonomous environments (the individual can come into contact with either 
the online or the offline environment) and the crimes that result will be different. When the 
individual comes into contact with the online environment, and his/her personal propensity is 
conducive to crime, he/she might commit a cybercrime.  This thesis also explores whether 
there is a specific personal propensity for the commission of cybercrimes (cybercrime 
propensity). 
 
Figure 4.  Cyberspace (the internet) as a sub-set of the environment 
 
 
Figure 5. Cyberspace (the internet) as an environment in itself 
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In this thesis, the formulation presented in Figure 5 is the one to be considered for the update 
of SAT in order to explain cybercrime. In SAT-RI (Situational Action Theory Revised for the 
Internet), the only environment that is considered is the internet - as an autonomous moral 
context, unrelated to the offline moral context. The internet is viewed as having its own set of 
moral values and normative by which it regulates itself (see Lessig, 2006 for a detailed 
explanation of how the internet regulates itself). Therefore, when talking about SAT-RI, this 
author will consider only interactions that occur when individuals come into contact with the 
internet.  
 
2.3.2. Personal propensity for the commission of cybercrimes 
 
According to current literature, cybercriminals might justify the commission of their offences 
via cognitive scripts called neutralisation techniques, which Sykes and Matza (1957) explain 
serve as a “protection from the self-blame and the blame of other after the act” (p. 666). 
These cognitive scripts stem from the idea that the offender does not belong to a particular 
subculture of wrongdoers: “if there existed in fact a delinquent subculture such that the 
delinquent viewed his illegal behavior as morally correct, we could reasonably suppose that he 
would exhibit no feelings of guilt or shame at detection or confinement” (Sykes & Matza, p. 
664).  
 
The idea of neutralisation techniques will be developed in further paragraphs of this chapter 
and they will be used to explain why “law abiding” citizens can resort to law-breaking practices 
(for example, illegal downloading). In addition, some types of crimes might require a specific 
set of personality traits (for example, hacking or cyberfrauds) as already pointed out by 
Grabosky (2001), and Grabosky and Smith (2001). According to the authors (Grabosky, 2001; 
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Grabosky & Smith, 2001; see also KPMG, 2007, 2011) in relation to frauds, those personality 
traits can be: lust, hatred, and ego challenge. However, it is not entirely clear how those traits 
can be extrapolated to a general population of cybercriminals.  One could argue that the 
personal propensity for the commission of cyberfrauds or cyberbullying is the same as the one 
for the commission of “traditional” forms of fraud and/or bullying, with a mere addition of an 
opportunistic element (see Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 1987; Miró Llinares, 2011; Newman & 
Clarke, 2003; Yar, 2005).  
 
The propensity variable in SAT was used in SAT-RI as the set of moral rules pertaining to the 
individual. Also, the ideas of situational self-control will play the same fundamental part in 
SAT-RI it does in SAT (but connected to a different environment altogether).  What is being 
proposed and explored in this thesis is that individuals have a specific propensity to the 
commission of cybercrimes, in general terms. Also, the SAT-RI explores the use of 
neutralisation techniques by individuals when committing cybercrimes in order to justify their 
actions. 
 
The triptych that defines the SAT-RI would, therefore, be: 
 
Individual Cybercrime Propensity (P) X Exposure (E) to the internet (understood as a 
criminogenic setting per se) x Neutralisation (N) techniques after a process of moral 
deliberation (mediated by self-control) might result in the commission of a specific cybercrime 
(CC) or P x E x N=CC. 
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Figure 6 summarises the SAT-RI elements. The Figure depicts cybercrime as the product of the 
concurrence of external and internal elements. The internal elements are cybercrime 
propensity, and the use of neutralisation techniques. The external element is the coming into 
contact with the internet. Finally, self-control mediates between the internal and external 
elements, as it does in SAT. 
 
Figure 6. The triangle of cybercrime 
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2.4. Neutralisation Techniques 
 
2.4.1. Neutralisation techniques: Sykes and Matza 
 
The concept of neutralisation techniques was proposed by Sykes and Matza in 1957. The 
theory stems from the idea that “The difficulties in viewing delinquent behaviour as springing 
from a set of deviant values and norms … are both empirical and theoretical” (Sykes & Matza, 
1957, p. 664) and contradict (or, at least, steer away from) paradigms, such us Sutherland’s (as 
mentioned, for example, in Sutherland, 1983) that understand criminal subculture as acquired 
by social contagion.  
 
As indicated by the Sykes and Matza (1957), “it is doubtful if many juvenile delinquents are 
totally immune from the demands for conformity made by the dominant social order”, p. 665) 
meaning that delinquents may ascribe their moral codes to conventional moral values, instead 
of deviant ones: 
 The juvenile delinquent would appear to be at least partially committed to the 
dominant social order in that he frequently exhibits guilt or shame when he violates its 
proscriptions, accords approval to certain conforming figures, and distinguishes 
between appropriate and inappropriate targets for his deviance. (Sykes & Matza, 1957, 
p. 666) 
In order to cope with the moral conflict, the delinquent was able to develop justifications for 
his actions. Scripts that were able to rationalize what he/she had done and act, as indicated 
earlier, as “a protection from the self-blame and the blame of other after the act” (p.666).  
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These scripts were divided into five categories by Sykes and Matza (1957, pp. 667-669):  
 
a) Denial of Responsibility: where deviant acts were considered either accidents or 
resulting from exogenous overwhelming forces. In these cases, the delinquent must 
use a narrative such us “it is not my fault” or “it was them drugs” (for a very interesting 
account of personal retroactive narratives, see Maruna, 2001). 
 
b) Denial of Injury: in this case, the delinquent may justify him/herself by indicating that 
acts were not expressly prohibited and did not cause great harm. This is extremely 
important in terms of cybercrime, when for example, individuals claim that 
cyberbullying is just a mere prank or illegal downloading is justified because “it is not 
like it is stealing”.  
 
c) Denial of the Victim: whereby the delinquent may accept the blame, but justify that 
the injury is not real in relation to the victim, or even an act of retaliation. As Sykes and 
Matza (1957) reasoned “by a subtle alchemy the delinquent moves himself into the 
position of an avenger and the victim is transformed into a wrong-doer” (p. 668). Also, 
the victim can be vague or abstract. This is extremely relevant when talking about 
different cyberfrauds where the victim can be understood as guilty of being so greedy 
(as in Nigerian scams, for example, see Delio, 2002), or simply diffuse or inexistent.  
 
d) The Condemnation of the Condemners:  in this case “the delinquent shifts the focus of 
attention from his own deviant acts to the motives and behavior of those who 
disapprove of his violation” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 668). As an example, a student 
may have copied in an exam, but he/she justifies it because his/her teacher is an 
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extremely vile person who wanted all the class to fail. This can result in “bitter 
cynicism” (1957, p. 668) against establishments of social control such as the police, the 
education system of even parents.  
 
e) The Appeal to Higher Loyalties: the delinquent is conflicted as he or she is obliged to 
neutralise by “sacrificing the demands of the larger society for the demands of the 
smaller social groups to which the delinquent may belong such as the sibling pair, the 
gang, or the friendship clique” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 669). In this case, the 
delinquent may refer to concepts such as the sense of “brotherhood” in order to 
neutralise the commission of anti-social acts. But also to concepts such as justice, 
fairness, religion, ethics or politics.  
 
These were the five key types of neutralisation techniques mentioned by Sykes and Matza; 
however this is not the final list. Owing to the development of criminological science and the 
passing of time, new techniques have been added. These techniques are identified in the 
below discussions of the relationship between neutralisation techniques and cybercrime.  
 
Syke and Matza’s theory was pioneering because it normalised the idea of delinquency. 
Before, in positive criminology, the delinquent is viewed as a “monster”, a genetic anomaly or 
a product of social malaise. However, Syke and Matza’s conception, of delinquents belonging 
to the same moral pool as non-delinquents contradicted the construction of the criminal as 
socially alien. The juvenile delinquent, following neutralisation theory, does not understand 
himself/herself as a delinquent. Criticism has, though, arisen recently in relation to this theory. 
Christensen (2010) argued that: 
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(1) Analysts using the neutralization concept construct an interpretive framework that 
frames the motives and desires of those being studied in a way that directs us toward 
interpreting speech as a neutralization; (2) By constructing people and actions in this 
way, analysts subtly ‘take the side’ of those who condemn the behavior in question; and 
(3) In applying the neutralization concept analysts engage in what Mills (1940) refers to 
as ‘motive mongering’. (p. 554) 
Christensen’s study is very relevant for researchers, as they might feel tempted to mark mere 
explanations by offenders as neutralisation techniques. Also, by “mongering motives” he 
referred to researchers who “claim to have insight into why their subjects ‘really’ explained 
their behaviour in this manner” (Christensen, 2010, p.564). Christensen warns about the 
subjective interpretation of neutralisation techniques by researchers, and also about how 
researchers may act as agents of “conventional morality” (p. 570). This could happen if 
researchers use these techniques as a way of judging the individuals they are researching or 
the acts these individuals commit. However, this is not solely a thesis exploring how offenders 
use neutralisation techniques to justify their behaviour in light of conventional morality, but of 
how neutralisation techniques occur on the internet (conceived as a criminogenic setting in 
itself) and are also linked with the propensity variable in order to result in acts of crime online.  
 
Also, it must be noted that, neutralisation techniques are extremely useful in understanding 
the commission of the majority of cybercrimes. Many cybercriminals will opt for the use of 
these techniques, stemming from the very architecture of cyberspace and the distance 
between the victim and the offender. On the internet, many crimes are not committed (or 
more important are not viewed as committed, as it is theorised) against a particular victim, 
due to the lack of social cues, personal presence and time-compression. On the other hand, 
not all cybercrimes are victimless (for example, cyberbullying), but offenders are able to justify 
64 
 
their offences owing to the distance between themselves and their victims. As mentioned 
above, the lack of social cues and the architecture of the internet allow the offender, at least, 
to act anonymously. 
 
2.4.2. Neutralisation techniques on the Internet 
 
There are numerous studies on the topics of cybercriminals and neutralisation techniques that 
would serve the purpose of exemplifying how the internet facilitates the use of said narratives 
and scripts. Delio (2002), in a feature in Wired magazine, quotes a Nigerian cybercriminal: 
“Others have come up with ways to justify it. They say Nko? (So what?). It is not our fault 
foreigners are so greedy." and "You would (be) shock(ed) at how many wad (rich people) want 
something more for nothing”. There is, in this feature, a very clear example of the script: denial 
of victim. The victim becomes even guiltier than the criminal, in fact all the blame is placed on 
his/her greed (the whites’ greed, the foreigner’s greed). It can even be seen as an act of just 
retaliation against “those greedy foreigners”. 
 
A study on hackers by Turgeman-Goldschmit (2011) discovered several narratives that can be 
incardinated within neutralisation techniques. Some hackers indicated that “it’s the way to a 
better world, not letting companies like Microsoft control the market” (p. 39) and “much of my 
religious life still remains in me with respect to values. The fact that I’ve never committed a 
crime may be related to this. I’m a good boy, in whom the good side survived.” (p. 39) or even 
“I see myself the state’s guardian. If the government isn’t doing anything, I feel I should, and I 
do something.” (p. 41). Hackers did not see hacking as a crime, but as some quixotic crusade 
against dominant corporations and they recognise their ascription to conventional (and even 
religious) morality. What motivates them, according to Turgeman-Goldschmit, seems to be, in 
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general terms, the quest for prestige, thrill or technical challenge. In relation to online child 
pornography users, one study concluded that 
 Internet child pornography consumers may understand that engaging in this behavior is 
socially illegal, but they may not believe that it is ‘wrong’ for them personally, compared 
with non–child pornography users who believe it is morally wrong both at the social and 
the individual level. (Seigfried-Spellar, Lovely, & Rogers, 2011, p. 74)  
This is because, as the authors indicated “a person’s internal values are not determined by 
society’s laws or regulations but are instead a private, moral choice” (p.74.) Thus,  offenders 
might understand that some action is regulated as a crime or is simply considered morally 
wrong, but that these rules  do not apply to them personally. In Seigfried-Spellar et al.’s study, 
child pornography consumers understood their actions as illegal but they decided to engage in 
them no matter what.  
 
Neutralisation techniques have also been examined in the context of studies of internet-based 
music piracy. Higgins, Wolfe, and Marcum (2011), for example, explain that “the findings of the 
present study indicated that individuals will take a ‘holiday’ from social controls to allow 
themselves to pirate music without developing a pirating identity” (p. 204) and concluded that 
“Participants in music piracy are often misguided about their perceptions of the harm that is 
caused through participation in this behavior—as well as the responsibility that resides with 
them” (p.205). In regards to digital file sharing, Moore (2011) mentioned the use of more 
neutralisation techniques already discussed by scholars: “The metaphor of the ledger  whereby 
an individual argues that unacceptable behavior was acceptable because the person had built 
up a reserve of good deeds” (Moore, 2011, p. 214, citing Klockars, 1974) and “Coleman (1994) 
proposed three additional neutralization techniques: denial of the necessity of the law, the 
claim that ‘everybody else is doing it’, and the claim of entitlement” (Moore, 2011, p. 214). 
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Finally, “Minor (1981) also proposed an additional neutralization technique known as the 
defense of necessity: this technique claims that although an individual’s behavior may be 
inappropriate, it was necessary in order to prevent an even greater criminal or delinquent act.” 
(Moore, 2011, p. 215). These newer developments of neutralisation techniques did not 
contradict the five mentioned by Sykes and Matza (1957) but completed the catalogue with 
variations on the classical ones (although they can easily fit as sub-categories of the five key 
techniques). Moore (2011) continued by indicating that “Participants in this study provided 
evidence of the use of 6 of the 10 techniques of neutralization when justifying their digital file-
sharing behaviors.” (p. 216).  To summarise, the complete list of neutralisation techniques that 
occur in cybercrimes are, according to literature, as follows: 
 a) Denial of Responsibility 
b) Denial of Injury  
c) Denial of the Victim  
d) The Condemnation of the Condemners  
e) The Appeal to Higher Loyalties 
f)           The metaphor of the ledger   
g)          Denial of the necessity of the law 
h)         Claim of entitlement 
i)         Everyone else is doing it 
j)         Defense of necessity  
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Some interesting examples from participants in Moore’s (2011) study are: 
Recording artists are not victimized by this type of activity. I only download music CDs 
from artists who are no longer a part of the top 100. These individuals aren’t selling CDs 
anymore, so they are not harmed when I download their music. (p. 218) 
And, 
Almost everyone I know downloads music. If it were truly wrong then why would so 
many people be allowed to get away with it?... I pay my monthly Internet bill. Whatever 
I can get for $29.95 is what I believe that I have a right to download. It may be illegal, 
but it shouldn’t be available to me if they don’t want me to have it. (pp. 119-220) 
 
Hinduja has also studied neutralisation techniques empirically in regards to music piracy 
(Hinduja, 2007; Ingram & Hinduja, 2008) He also mentioned a more comprehensive catalogue 
of neutralisation techniques including the “the metaphor of the ledger” or the claim or 
normalcy (Hinduja, 2007, p. 190).He reminded readers that “these nine techniques of 
neutralization are utilized by individuals to be freed from moral, ethical, and legal bindings and 
to rationalize participation in some form of wrongdoing.” (2007, p. 190) and concluded that “In 
the current work – and consonant with previous studies – respondents generally did not view 
software piracy as morally reprehensible. This may be the reason that only four out of nine 
neutralization techniques were significantly related to the criterion measure” (Hinduja, 2007, 
p. 197). Another study of university students and illegal downloading of music, carried out  by 
Ingram and Hinduja (2008), seemed to validate the aforementioned affirmations: “the findings 
suggest that neutralization theory can be a useful framework for understanding online piracy 
and bear important policy and theoretical implications for efforts to address this behavior, 
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especially Neutralizing Music Piracy within university settings” (pp. 357-358). More specifically, 
they pointed out that: 
The results indicated that greater acceptance of the techniques associated with denial of 
responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, and appeals to higher loyalty were 
significant predictors of moderate levels of piracy participation (e.g., downloading 101-
1,000 MP3s). Greater acceptance of these techniques substantially increased the 
probabilities of moderate participation. Furthermore, greater acceptance of the higher 
loyalty technique was also a significant predictor of high participation levels (e.g., 
downloading >1,000 MP3s). (Ingram & Hinduja, 2008, p. 356) 
 
Also, a study by Moore and McMullan (2009) on Digital Piracy concluded that: 
 the individuals who utilize P2P file sharing software may be completely law-abiding 
citizens on every level except for when it comes to downloading music and movies from 
P2P networks … these relatively law-abiding citizens may consider no longer downloading 
or utilizing P2P networks if they were more certain of the likelihood of their being caught 
and charged with a criminal or civil offense. (p. 449) 
The internet has become the perfect environment for the usage of neutralisation techniques. 
Victims are removed from sight, fuzzy, abstract or quasi-nonexistent; cyber-fraudsters do not 
know who will contact them or do not tailor scams to specific people (with the exception of 
“spear phishing” a newer form of phishing designed for a specific user, see Wall (2013, p. 439)). 
As discussed previously, in some other cases companies may be victims of crimes such as 
hacking or online piracy. In these situations, offenders view themselves as heroes, fighting 
against dominant and shady mega-corporations. Overall, illegal downloading seems to be the 
crime that offers the richest catalogue of techniques, especially those involving the absence of 
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a “real crime”: “I’m not doing anything wrong, it’s not like I am killing someone” or the claim of 
normalcy: “everyone is doing it”.  
 
It is theorised, in this thesis, that neutralisation techniques are so profoundly embedded in the 
fabric of internet crime that they have become a prominent feature of it.  The architecture of 
the internet facilitates the use of many neutralisation techniques for all the reasons that have 
been mentioned in earlier paragraphs (anonymity, global reach, asynchrony, infinity, absence 
of capable guardians, eternity, as examples.). It is also theorised that these techniques are used 
in all types of cybercrimes, be they violent, sexual or economic in nature. 
 
2.5. Summary of SAT-RI and Research Questions 
 
As has been discussed through this chapter, the aim of this study is to update existing 
criminological theory in order to explain the commission of cybercrimes. In order to do so, 
Wikström’s SAT essential formulation (propensity x exposure mediated by self-control= crime) 
is updated into what has been named SAT-RI, by adding neutralisation techniques to the 
propensity x exposure x neutralisation techniques mediated by self-control= cybercrime). 
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Also, SAT-RI is theorised under the following postulates: 
1) It is a theory that serves as an explanation of cybercrimes only (albeit all types of 
cybercrime). 
2) It operates under a broader definition of cybercrime, which was presented in this 
chapter, and includes deviant cyberbehaviour. 
3) It considers that that the mere exposure to the internet is criminogenic in itself, 
therefore exposure will be treated as constant (in the propensity x exposure x 
neutralisation model). On the other hand, self-control, cybercrime propensity and the 
use of neutralisation techniques are going to be measured.  
4) It does not pay attention to the device the internet is accessed from (computers, 
wearables and smart phones, for example). 
5) It considers the whole of the internet as the setting and does not make any 
distinctions as to whether the user is accessing the surface internet or the darknet (or 
deep web). 
6) It tries to consider the impact of the advent of digital technologies on human nature, 
behaviour and identity. 
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The research questions (RQ) formulated are: 
RQ1. What is the role of self-control in cybercrime causation? 
RQ2. What is the role of personal propensity (morality and engagement) in cybercrime 
causation? 
RQ3. What is the role of neutralisation techniques on cybercrime causation? 
RQ4. What is the relationship between morality, self-control and neutralisation 
techniques in cybercrime causation? 
RQ5. What are the general population’s views and attitudes towards cybercrime? 
RQ6. How do law enforcement agents investigate and tackle the issue of cybercrime and 
cybercriminals? 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.1. Aims and Objectives 
 
The main objectives of this study were to explain why people commit cybercrimes and how 
they are able to cope with the consequences of online rule-breaking activities and to upgrade 
criminological theory relation to the still relatively new, and developing, phenomenon of 
cybercrime.  
 
The original SAT, developed by Per-Olof Wikström (Wikström et al., 2013) is a moral-based 
crime theory that understands crime as being a result of process of moral deliberation. This 
process takes into consideration the criminal propensity of the deliberator and the moral rules 
of the environment. Both variables (exposure and the propensity) are moderated by the idea 
of self-control, which is conceived as a situational concept, depending on the intersection 
between environment (external variable) and moral structure of the would-be offender 
(internal variable), rather than the static personality trait theorised by Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990); a trait that develops in infancy and becomes fixated at a certain age. 
 
As discussed above, cybercrime is a novel and mutating phenomenon, and one that is very 
difficult to explain with current criminological theory, as it involves interactions that differ 
profoundly from those happening in “real life”. SAT theory is able to explain this situational 
concept (the coming together of personal traits and environmental traits) up to a point, as 
both variables exist when committing cybercrimes. Propensity refers to the tendency of the 
agent to engage in different acts of cybercrime (understood as a new species of crime rather 
than a specialty of traditional forms of crime), whereas exposure takes for granted that contact 
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with the internet is criminogenic to some extent. As explained in the literature review, 
criminogenic places attract and generate crime (Wikström et al., 2013). After having studied 
current literature on cybercrime and its different manifestations, one recurring idea appeared 
fundamental: neutralisation techniques. Research provides a rich catalogue of cognitive scripts 
that are used by cyber-criminals to protect themselves from their own blame or the blame of 
others. This is the reason why Situational Action Theory-Revised for the Internet (SAT-RI) was 
formulated; to explain that cybercrime is the result of a moral process of deliberation that 
results from the relationship between the individual’s own criminal propensity, the exposure 
to a criminogenic setting (that is taken for granted, as the internet was considered as 
criminogenic in itself for this study) and the application of a successful neutralisation 
technique. 
 
The following methodology tested this relationship, between propensity, exposure and 
neutralisation techniques, and it also sought to ascertain the general amount of self-control 
the sample exhibited.  In addition, it endeavoured to understand which neutralisation 
techniques are used by cybercriminals.  
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The general objectives (GO) of this thesis are: 
GO1. The updating of criminological theory 
GO2. The understanding of the aetiology of cybercrime 
 
Specific objectives (SO), on the other hand, are: 
SO1. To test the proposed SAT-RI theory by using mixed methods research 
SO2. To understand the role of self-control, propensity and neutralisations in cyber-
crime causation 
SO3. To understand the motivations and justifications behind the behaviours of 
individuals committing cyber-crime 
SO4. To study how cybercrime is investigated and how cybercriminals are perceived by 
law enforcement agents 
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3.2. Research Approach 
 
3.2.1. A mixed methods study 
 
This work used mixed methods research, as defined by Creswell (2015): 
An approach to research in the social, behavioral, and health sciences in which the 
investigator gathers both quantitative (closed-ended) and qualitative (open-ended) 
data, integrates the two, and then draws interpretations based on the combined 
strengths of both sets of data to understand research problems. (p.2) 
Testing a theory usually implies a more positivistic approach based on the use of quantitative 
research methods (Gibbs, 2014). In relation to this, a part of the SAT-RI can be measured using 
scales (for example, self-control) but other elements (like perceptions of morality or the use of 
neutralisation techniques) are based on subjective realities. Although that inherent subjectivity 
was also numerically measured, via an online survey, there was a need “to hear the voices” of 
the cybercriminals (or at least, those committed to investigating and pursuing them). Following 
that approach, a broader understanding of the cybercrime phenomenon could be obtained. 
According to Creswell (2015), the use of mixed methods can be useful “when the use of 
quantitative research or qualitative research alone is insufficient for gaining an understanding 
of the problem” (p.14). The main reason for using mixed methods in this study was to measure 
the variables of the SAT-RI formula: cybercrime propensity, neutralisation and self-control. A 
quantitative approach was more suited for measuring self-control by using a scale. On the 
other hand, as cybercrime propensity and neutralisations relate to perceptions and 
behaviours, quantitative and qualitative approaches complemented each other.  
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In terms of the design, and following Creswell’s (2015) categorization, the researcher opted for 
a convergent design: one that implies a parallel use of methodologies (not only in terms of 
time and space) but in this case in terms of testing a new theory. That is the reason why, in 
some instances, the qualitative and quantitative data collection took place simultaneously (for 
example, during June 2014 some interviews were carried out and the online survey was still 
available via social networks). In addition, three different analyses and discussions took place 
during the study: one dedicated to analysing the quantitative results using statistical tests, 
another one dedicated to analysing the qualitative results, including a discourse analysis; and 
finally, one last chapter dedicated to integrating both “strands of data” (Creswell, 2015), not 
by simply comparing or juxtaposing them, but by applying them to the proposed theoretical 
framework (SAT-RI). According to Leech and Onwuegbuzie’s (2009) classification, the study at 
hand could be classified as a “partially mixed concurrent equal status design”: 
A partially mixed concurrent equal status design involves conducting a study that has 
two phases that occur concurrently such that the quantitative and qualitative phases 
have approximately equal weight. (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, p. 268) 
 
The SAT-RI data was obtained from different sources, not in an absolutely simultaneous 
manner, as the quantitative data was collected during May 2014 and June 2014, whereas the 
qualitative data collection started in June 2014 and finished in December 2014. After being 
discussed separately in two different chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), both strands of data were 
finally integrated (Chapter 6). Both strands of data aimed to test the theory from different and 
complimentary angles.  Chapter 6 also served to answer the research questions and relate the 
findings from Chapters 4 and 5 to the formulation of the SAT-RI from the Literature Review 
(Chapter 2). This methodological design is explained in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Diagram of the mixed methods design of the SAT-RI study 
 
 
The core of the research was to demonstrate the aforementioned co-existence of 
neutralisation techniques (as used in respect of internet crime) and personal traits conducive 
to the commission of online crimes. In addition to this, self-control was considered as the 
arbiter in between the inner world of the offender and his/her external reality. The external 
variable (the architecture of the internet as a criminogenic setting) was not measured - given 
that, as explained in previous paragraphs, the internet will be assumed as a criminogenic 
setting – in accordance with current literature. In other words, this work aims to measure the 
variables propensity, self-control and neutralisation techniques in relation to cybercrimes. In 
order to do that, an online survey was designed and administered, containing a self-control 
scale and a series of vignettes that aimed to understand participants’ propensity towards 
cybercrime and their use of neutralisation techniques. Also, interviews with law enforcement 
agents were carried out to provide information (in the form of case studies) about the 
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motivations and justifications of offenders, as perceived by police officers, and the 
manifestations of cybercrime in Spain.    
 
Having said this, it has to be borne in mind that this work related to the perceptions of 
offenders or potential offenders; neutralisation techniques, propensity and self-control are, 
therefore, subjective constructs. Neutralisation techniques are cognitive scripts, protecting 
oneself from self-blame and the blame of others, whereas propensity refers to the moral 
compass of the offender and its flexible interaction with the environment. Self-control, as the 
ability to postpone satisfaction and pleasure depending on the situation, is also embedded in 
the subjectivity of the individual´s narrative. All of concepts called for a subjective approach, a 
“hearing of the voices” of cybercriminals and the general public in relation to cybercrime, and 
at the same time, a (theoretically) more objective approach: the testing of a theory by using 
quantifiable variables. This is the reason why a convergent mixed methods study was judged to 
be better suited for addressing the general and specific objectives of the study, as well as 
answering the research questions. Both the quantitative and qualitative strands relate to 
perceptions and subjective constructions of the world or personal traits (for example, self-
control). This is one of the reasons why the study is not epistemologically conflicting and why a 
threefold analysis of the data was performed: the analysis and discussion of quantitative data, 
the analysis and discussion of qualitative data, and the integration, analysis and discussion of 
both strands.  
     
The approach chosen for this research was one that was indirect, testimonial and online-
based. The use of “second-hand” (testimony) knowledge became fundamental to the 
interviews, as the researcher tried to understand the perceptions of cybercriminals by using 
police officers as “proxies” for them. The researcher assumed that (specialised) police officers 
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would be a valuable source of data and that the nature of their work would place them in an 
advantageous position for accessing the world of the cybercriminal, as they investigate 
cybercrime as part of their job.  The possible existence of a police culture (Reiner, 2010), a 
police discourse and an ideological standpoint had to be addressed. The police interview 
chapter (Chapter 5) dealt with all these issues and provided a narrative analysis of data 
stemming from police interviews. Also, Chapter 6 approached the reality of the possible 
existence of a police discourse. 
 
Several police officers, from different Corps and Units, were invited to take part in interviews. 
Individuals working for the private sector were also invited to take part in interviews, in order 
that a wider picture of cybercrime and cybercriminals could be obtained. In relation to law 
enforcement agencies, access is a very complex issue in Spain. Access was negotiated for 
almost two years. Guardia Civil and Private Security experts were very eager to collaborate. 
However, Spanish National Police has a very opaque structure in terms of relations with 
academia. After two years of correspondence through formal channels an opportunity to gain 
access to a police gatekeeper arose.   
 
As indicated before, the research approach was indirect, testimonial and online-based. By 
indirect, it is meant that the research methods used (in this case the online questionnaire) 
were not used to measure actual offender’s points of view but the general population’s views 
on morality and cyber-offending. Projective (indirect questioning) techniques are very 
common in marketing and other social sciences (Fisher, 1993) and thanks to the use of 
snowballing, via social networks; they can offer a very interesting view on how cybercrime is 
perceived by internet users in Spain. Some of the respondents will have committed one or 
more of the cybercrimes depicted in the scenarios, while others will not have done so. 
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However, this will hold no relevance to the study, as what will be taken into consideration is 
the relationship between the variables morality (perception of), self-control and neutralisation. 
  
Finally, the questionnaires were administered online. There were no hard copies of the 
questionnaires and they were posted in different social networks (Twitter, Facebook, Google+ 
and Linkedin) in order to be snowballed. That way, the researcher was able to reach as many 
respondents as possible, as the only pre-requisite for answering was having access to the 
internet. In addition, one of the advantages of online administration was that processing and 
analysing data was quicker and easier.  
 
3.2.2. Epistemology 
 
Summarising, the fundamental aims of the study were to: 
1. Develop existing theory – SAT- to better explain cybercrime 
2. Explain attitudes among both the “general public” and offenders towards cybercrime  
 
The present study used a mixed methods approach that integrated qualitative and quantitative 
data under a convergent design where both strands tended to have equal weight. The 
quantitative data represented morality, self-control and neutralisations among a sample of 
internet users, whilst the qualitative data originated from law enforcement agents, serving as 
proxies for the “worlds” of the cybercriminal. 
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Usually, deductive approaches tend to be linked to an essentially positivistic epistemology and 
quantitative methodologies (Gibbs, 2014).  In contrast, qualitative methodologies (like the 
interviews with law enforcement agents) tend to relate to inductive approaches and 
interpretivistic epistemologies (Gibbs, 2014). However, and following Bryman’s (2012) 
discussion on mixed methodologies, Gibbs (2014) recognised that researchers often collect 
data that “span those philosophies”. 
 
These are the main epistemological issues that arise in mixed methods research: the 
opposition between quantitative and qualitative approaches. Bryman (2012, pp. 613-652) and 
Creswell (2011, pp. 269-283) talk about controversies in mixed method research or the 
quantitative/qualitative divide. Creswell discussed the idea of “bilingual” research (Creswell, p. 
278). Similarly, Bryman elaborates how the distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
can be understood as somewhat artificial and how quantitative research can be understood 
from a qualitative standpoint and vice-versa (2012, pp. 619-626). 
 
As shown in the outline of the research design in Figure 7, the quantitative data collection 
started before the qualitative data collection, yet both were run simultaneously for a period of 
time. This did not indicate a hierarchy between the two stages. Both the survey data and the 
interview data were discussed separately in different chapters and finally integrated in an 
overall analysis and testing of the theory.  
 
The idea of theory testing, points to the fact, epistemologically, that the present work is mostly 
positivistic, employing deductive approaches  In contrast, and following Bryman’s (2012) 
discourse on the “divide” (pp. 614-626), this chapter has elaborated a methodology that is 
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more in tune with qualitative research methods. Or at least, qualitative methods in a 
“quantitative carcass”. 
 
First, the self-control scale and the vignettes were instruments used to measure attitudes. 
Even though they were presented in a numeric fashion, the use of Likert scales, artificial 
scenarios (vignettes) and more importantly the use of variables, such as morality or 
neutralisation techniques, demonstrate a powerful qualitative inclination. Respondents were 
not asked about how many days a week they use the internet or whether or not they view 
online pornography. They were asked about how they rate themselves in attitudinal scales, or 
whether they perceive certain situations as moral or immoral. This qualitative approach, in a 
“quantitative carcass”, permitted the creation of a much bigger sample and profited the viral 
capabilities of the internet. 
 
Secondly, interviews related to the perceptions of police officers about the motivations and 
justifications of offenders. By following “the proxy approach” an insight into police culture was 
obtained. It must be strongly affirmed that this is not a cultural study, but certain elements of 
police culture might have been interwoven with the interviews. How do police officers 
construct the idea of the criminal? How do they ascribe moral judgement to them? Is the 
cybercriminal a real entity in itself or is it a narrative designed by a common cultural 
framework? Are interviewees talking from ‘their own experience’ or the ‘collective corps 
experience’? This called for extreme care at the data analysis phase of the study, as a critical 
approach to what is being said or taken for granted was also necessary. 
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In summary, the study at hand used a deductive approach in order to test new criminological 
theory. In order to do so, a mixed methods study design was used. Although, the study 
comprised a quantitative stage (adhering to positivism) and a qualitative stage (adhering to 
interpretivism), the underlying spirit of the study was qualitative and called for a more critical 
interpretivistic epistemology.  
 
3.2.2. PADS+ as a methodological example of applying SAT 
 
In order to measure self-control and propensity, and test SAT longitudinally, Wikström et al. 
(2013), via PADS+, used an approach that offered post-hoc validation of some of the 
methodological decisions in this thesis, albeit with some differences. It must be borne in mind 
that the design of the methodology of this study was carried out before the publication of the 
PADS+. 
 
In order to measure crime propensity, the PADS+ used a generalized morality scale (p. 132) 
asking participants to rate the wrongfulness of several items (depicting actions) measured with 
Likert scales from 0 to 3 (being 0 nothing wrong at all and 3 very wrong). On the other hand, in 
order to measure self-control the PADS+ used a modified version the Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, 
and Arneklev (1993) self-control matrix using only eight of the twenty four original items (pp-
135-137). 
 
The decision to use the self-control matrix designed by Grasmick et al. (1993), in order to 
develop Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) self-control theory, both in the PADS+ and the SAT-
RI, should be explained. As has been shown above, Wikström’s SAT’s vision of self-control is 
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situational, whereas Gottfredson and Hirschi’s self-control is understood as static by the 
authors. Grasmick et al. (1993) indicated when talking about Gottfredson and Hirschi’s work 
“their focus is on early childhood socialization in the family, which can produce an enduring 
criminal predisposition called low self-control” (p. 6). In other words, once low self-control is 
developed, it becomes fixated as a personality trait. Contrarily, Wikström et al. (2013) 
theorised that “a person’s ability to exercise self-control only comes into play when the moral 
norms of the setting encourage him or her to break a rule of conduct but his or her moral rules 
discourage doing so in response to a motivation” (p.26) and: 
A person’s ability to exercise self-control depends on his or her executive functions 
(general cognitive abilities) but also on temporary personal factors like intoxication or 
extreme stress or emotion (Wikström et al. 2013, p. 28; citing Wikström & Treiber, 2007) 
Therefore, within SAT, self-control is situational. However, when explaining the use of the 
modified Grasmick scale for the PADS+ there was some recognition of the stability of low self-
control through age (taking into consideration that the study focused on young people) and 
the possibility of self-control having a genetic component is considered  (Wikström et al., 2013, 
p. 137). 
 
Crime propensity was measured by merging the z-scores of the scales of “weak morality and 
poor self-control” (p. 137) thus creating a “composite measure” (p. 137). Participants were 
then divided into groups of low, medium and high crime propensity for analysis. This division 
was performed by using the means of crime propensity; according to the authors “these are, of 
course, somewhat arbitrary cut-off points” (p. 139) but illustrative of the differences between 
low, medium and high propensity, nonetheless. 
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Finally, scenarios were used in the PADS+ in order to test how participants would act “if they 
were the protagonists in specific hypothetical scenarios” (p. 367). The researchers in the 
PADS+ aimed for clarity in the scenarios, but also for familiarity and realism (pp. 370-373) for 
adolescents growing up in the UK. One of the key features of the scenario approach – and one 
that was fundamental in the present study - is, according to Wikström et al.,  that “it is 
plausible for participants to form judgements about how they would act in situations they 
have never encountered by applying attitudes to, and past experiences of, familiar situations” 
(p. 371). 
 
3.3. Online Survey on Attitudes Towards Cybercrime 
 
The questionnaire (see Annex 1) was designed and stored via Google Drive and consists of 
three parts. The questionnaire survey was launched on the 24th May 2014 and was closed on 
10th June 2014. It was uploaded into the researcher’s personal accounts on the following social 
networks: Twitter, Facebook, Linkedin and Google+.  
 
Before being administered in the main study, the questionnaire was piloted on four occasions 
with the same group of ten people that comprised students from several universities, lecturers 
and lawyers, and friends who had no professional interest in criminology. Their comments on 
clarity, wording and timing were extremely helpful and were incorporated into the 
questionnaire. One of the most important comments related to perspective, as some of the 
piloting respondents were confused as to the point of view from which they should answer the 
vignettes. This resulted in the following line being added to all the neutralisation questions: “In 
the case of doing it (place yourself in Jill’s shoes)” (as an example from the illegal downloading 
86 
 
case questions) also, in the morality and engagement questions the researcher asked 
participants about the wrongfulness of the acts a specific character had performed or if they 
would engage in behaviour similar to that of a specific character. Following the illegal 
downloading example, respondents were asked: “Would you do what Jill did?” and “How 
morally wrong do you think Jill’s actions are?”. The first question aimed to measure (by using a 
Likert scale) whether or not respondents would engage in the acts depicted in the scenario 
(the engagement variable), whilst the second one aimed to measure the perception of 
morality of the act (also using a Likert scale). Both variables (engagement and morality) are 
part of cybercrime propensity. The piloting also discovered some spelling mistakes that were 
corrected. It also demonstrated that the survey took much less time to fill in than it was 
anticipated (less than 20 minutes). 
 
3.3.1. Sample 
 
The questionnaire was posted in four social networks with the intention of obtaining as large a 
sample of internet users as possible.  The sampling, therefore, was a non-probability sample 
(Bryman, 2012, pp. 201-204) by snowballing and it did not follow any randomisation 
procedure. The idea was for it to expand organically through the social networking sites. 
Whoever wanted to open the link and answer the survey questions was able to do it without 
any restrictions.  Bryman (2012) mentions the difficulties of using probability sampling on the 
internet (p. 674). In addition to the sampling issues mentioned, according to Hooley, Marriott, 
and Wellens (2012): 
The key sampling issues are, however, whether the population that can be accessed 
using an online survey is different to that which can be reached using other survey 
approaches (sample bias), and whether respondents behave in a different way because 
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they are participating online as compared to another survey method (measurement 
error) (Hooley, Marriott, & Wellens, 2012, p. 43) 
Yet Hooley et al. (2012) invite researchers to “to continue to innovate in the methodologies 
that they use in order to continue to address and respond to these changes” (p. 43). The use of 
an online survey seemed to be intertwined with the idea of accessing internet users in order to 
gather data.  
 
At the very same time, access to the researcher’s colleagues’ classes was negotiated, as 
another means of administering the online survey that had previously been uploaded into 
MOODLE (Virtual Campus). Six classes were finally approached (three from the Criminology 
Degree and three from Law). Students were informed as to the aims of the research and all 
other aspects of the study, in person, by the researcher. Students ranged from Year 1 to Year 4 
students11. In the end, a sample of N= 709 respondents was obtained.  
 
One of the most important characteristics of the sample, in terms of measuring propensity and 
self-control, was that internet access was needed. According to official Spanish statistics from 
the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, National Statistics Institute), 96.2 % of people who 
have used internet at least once a week in the last three months are aged 16-24 years, 
whereas 89.9% percent of individuals who have used internet at least once a week in the last 
three months are 25-34 years of age (INE, 2015a). Also, 98.2 % of the users who have used the 
Internet at least once a week in the last three months are students (it is not specified whether 
they are school and/or university students) (INE, 2015c). 
 
11
 The Criminology and Law Degrees at Universidad Europea de Madrid are four-years degrees  
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Having said that, in relation to the questionnaire, the following sampling procedures were 
followed: 
• Captive audiences: the researcher used several classes from the Universidad Europea 
de Madrid, in order to solve eventual response ratio issues12 that might have arisen 
during the online survey; respondents were used from his students and whole classes 
were asked to complete the questionnaires; and no discrimination between bachelor 
students, in terms of the subject they were studying, was going to be made at first but 
the researcher failed to gain access to students from disciplines other than law and 
criminology. This sample was expected to have an estimated size of 200-300. Students 
at this (private) university have a similar economic and cultural background to one 
another and this might have created a discrete socio-demographic. Private universities 
in Spain do not receive public funding; therefore enrolment fees are much higher. In 
addition, Universidad Europea de Madrid ranks as one of the most expensive 
universities in Spain. The sample is, therefore, probably unrepresentative, in terms of 
sociodemographic characteristics, of university students and young adults more 
generally in Spain (not to mention the general population). It is likely that the sample 
was made up of, for example, a disproportionate number of, affluent individuals and 
those who had an upper-middle class upbringing. 
 
• Snowball online sampling: in order to obtain a bigger sample, the questionnaires were 
distributed via Facebook, Linkedin, Twitter and Google+. The researcher is very active 
in social networks and asked followers and contacts to answer the questionnaire and 
share it. This helped the snowball effect due to the viral nature of information 
travelling through social networks. Also, the study was distributed via the Universidad 
12
 These issues could mean individuals deciding not to take part in an online survey posted in social 
networks, they might be not feel entirely comfortable with answering some questions by using an 
internet questionnaire or they might forget to answer if not reminded in person. 
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Europea de Madrid MOODLE (online platform) to other lecturers in order for them to 
use with their students and/social networks. A total sample of N=709 was obtained 
(including those respondents from captive audiences).  
 
 
One could also argue that there occurred selection bias because of the lack of 
randomization procedures, the majority of respondents are related to the researcher’s 
profession or field of studies and are part of collectives that are deemed to have 
specific cultural standpoints regarding, for example, police culture. 
 
3.3.2. Instrument 
 
3.3.2.1. Information, consent and demographics 
 
The first part of the questionnaire comprised an information and consent form for the 
respondents with all the necessary background information about the study including the 
ethical procedures that would be followed and the researcher’s contact details. No signature 
was required for the consent form. Respondents were, instead, asked to tick different boxes 
indicating that they had read and understood each of the different aspects of the consent and 
information form. If respondents did not complete  the tick boxes, then they could not 
continue to the questionnaire. They also had the option, at any time, to close the webpage 
without submitting any information. The respondents were informed of the possibility of 
withdrawing consent at any time and the necessity of ticking the boxes, should they wish to 
proceed to the questionnaire, was explained to them. In order to ensure participants received 
the most adequate and appropriate information, the researcher used the University of 
Huddersfield’s set of standard project information sheets available and translated them into 
90 
 
Spanish, after adapting the content to the present study. This meant that participants were 
sufficient aware of the ethical procedures to be utilised in the research, such as informed 
consent and their right to withdraw. . This initial section of the questionnaire also addressed 
the issues of anonymity and confidentiality, which are guaranteed by the architecture of the 
Google Drive questionnaire facility. Moreover, Google Drive questionnaires store information 
automatically as a data-sheet in the Google Drive cloud service that can be accessed only by a 
combination of user name and password. These data-sheets contained no participant 
identification information, with the exception of demographics (for example, age and 
occupation). Google Drive added a timestamp to every line of answers indicating the exact day 
and time they were submitted. These timestamps were deleted when uploading the data-
sheet into SPSS. 
 
In terms of demographic data on the questionnaire, the following information was collected: 
gender, nationality, occupation and whether the participant (or someone close to him or her) 
had been a victim of crime or not in the last year. In terms of nationality, the variable was 
disregarded given the lack of representativeness of the non-Spanish population.  Occupations 
were codified following a selection of the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO-08, from the International Labour Organization (ILO)) groups and sub-groups (ILO, 2004). 
Finally, in terms of demographic information, the “victim of crime” variable was derived from 
the question: “Have you (or someone from your kin or close acquaintances) been a victim of or 
subject to a crime (in any of its manifestations or forms) in the last year?” The rationale for this 
question was to facilitate an analysis as to whether or not people who have been victimized or 
have people close to them who have been victimised had a different perception of the 
morality or immorality relating to cybercrimes or different levels of self-control.  
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3.3.2.2. Self-control scale 
 
The second part of the questionnaire consisted of a self-control matrix, as developed by 
Grasmick et al. (1993). This scale aims to measure Gottfredson and Hirschi’s self-control by 
taking into account the elements of the construct identified by the authors and developing a 
matrix of questions with different items. The following are the six elements of low self-control 
(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, pp. 89-91): 
1) A here and now orientation: impulsivity (as opposed to the capacity of deferring 
pleasure and satisfaction) 
2) Preference for simple tasks 
3) Risk-seeking 
4) Preference for physical activity 
5) Self-centeredness 
6) Minimal tolerance for frustration and inability to respond to conflict verbally rather 
than physically 
 
The Grasmick scale contained four items per element (i.e.  24 items in total) and all questions 
can be answered with: 
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree Somewhat 
(3) Agree Somewhat 
(4) Strongly Agree 
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High scores (3 or 4) indicate low self-control. This is extremely important; as questions in the 
original scale are formulated as indicators of low self-control (not of high-self-control) (e.g. “I 
often act on the spur of the moment”). Respondents that are in agreement with the items of 
the scale (those who had picked 3 or 4 as responses) had lower levels of self-control as they 
would agree to being impatient and self-centred individuals with a low tolerance for 
frustration, risk-seeking tendencies and a liking for physical activities (rather than mental ones) 
and simple tasks (rather than complex ones) (Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993). 
Following Grasmick et al. (1993) “A high score, therefore, indicates low self-control” (p. 16). 
Table 2 is an example of the type of questions contained in the Grasmick scale. 
 
Table 2. Impulsivity items (Grasmick et al., 1993, p.14) 
 
 
In order to use the scale in Spain, Universidad Santiago de Compostela was contacted and the 
researcher was given a translation of the scale that had been piloted and tested by Romero, 
Gómez-Fraguela, Luengo, and Sobral (2003). This scale had been used in several Spanish 
studies and was translated following academic procedures designed to guarantee reliability 
and validity (see Carou, Romero, & Luengo, 2013). The order of the Grasmick questions was 
changed by Romero et al. (2003) and that exact same Spanish questionnaire (same wording 
and question order) was used in this study (See Annex 1). According to Romero et al. (2003) 
“The scales were translated to Spanish by two translators who translated the items 
independently, then compared results and negotiated complete agreement” (p. 65). 
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3.3.2.3. Cybercrime vignettes 
 
The third part of the questionnaire consisted of several cases (vignettes) in which the 
respondent was invited to consider several situations involving cybercrime. These vignettes 
were another means by which the researcher was able to assess individuals’ propensity and 
their use of neutralisation techniques. 
 
Given that morality is a critical feature within SAT, it is important to measure baseline morality 
in relation to cybercrime. The above vignettes were based upon those used by Schoepfer and 
Piquero’s (2006) in their study of morality and self-control. They used scenarios depicting 
actions that could be considered morally reproachable and criminal (one, for example, 
involving a pub brawl and another one about a student stealing batteries) and “after reading 
each scenario, respondents were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would behave as 
the character in the scenario had acted” (Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006, p. 59). This was 
incorporated in the SAT-RI study, as the “engagement variable” and was measured likewise 
using a 0-10 Likert scale. Actions were presented in a way young adults (university students, 
for example) could relate to. Wikström et al. (2013) also used vignettes to assess decision 
making processes, in their case those of adolescents and young adults.  
 
In order to import Schopefer and Piquero’s (2006) methods into this present study, seven 
vignettes were designed, each representing a particular cybercrime. These vignettes were 
drafted in Spanish and translated into English in the subsequent data analysis stage.  
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The cybercrimes chosen for the vignettes were those considered by the researcher to be 
crimes that the sample could most readily understand and relate to (especially, taking into 
consideration that the definition of cybercrime in this thesis includes crime and deviant 
behaviour). Online child abuse offences and hacking offences were deliberately omitted and 
left for the law enforcement interviews, as they are not frequently part of the general 
population’s daily lives13.  These scenarios tried to guarantee a high response rate and gather 
as much data as possible in order to form a clearer picture of general attitudes towards 
cybercrime.  
 
Finally, the scenarios selected were: 
(1) Illegal downloading  
(2) Revenge porn14 
(3) Cyber-bullying 
(4) Sexting (in the vignette depicted as a minor sending erotic images to an adult) 
(5) Cyber-fraud (Russian bride) 
(6) Cyber-stalking 
(7) “Stealing” Wi-Fi signal 
 
 
 
13
 Child abuse offences, for example, are likely committed by very few people whereas other offences 
e.g. illegally downloading music are much more common (and accessible). 
 
14
 Misuse of erotic imagery by scorned romantic partners as punishment for break-up or infidelity (i.e. 
indiscriminate sharing and posting of photographs or sex videos). 
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The whole list of vignettes and questions can be found in Annex 2. The following, used as an 
explanatory example, is the illegal downloading vignette: 
 Jill wants to watch the recently released movie The Wolverine, but she prefers to stay at 
home, also the cinema is £6 which she finds very expensive. Jill decides to download a pirate 
copy of the movie and watch it at home 
a) Would you do what Jill did? 0-10 scale (being 0 absolutely disagree and 10 absolutely 
agree) 
b) How morally wrong do you think Jill’s actions are? 0-10 scale (being 0 Not Immoral and 
10 Absolutely Immoral) 
c) In the case of doing it (place yourself in Jill’s shoes), what would you tell yourself or 
others to justify what you have done?  
(1)  It’s not justifiable 
(2) I haven’t done anything wrong/I haven’t committed any crime 
(3) It’s not my fault/It’s someone else’s fault 
(4) It’s the victim’s fault (the person or company wronged by the crime)/He or she 
deserves it 
(5) Everyone else is doing it 
(6) I had no other choice 
(7) It’s my right to do so 
(8) Nothing happens, if from time to time, I do something bad/wrong/illegal 
 
In the sexting vignette, participants were asked to rate the case from the young girl’s 
perspective, not the adult’s. In the Spanish legal system, sending naked pictures of oneself is 
not a crime, even if the one sending them is a minor. This vignette was included on account 
that sexting is becoming a common practice and the researcher wanted to understand the 
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general population’s views on sexting (Curnutt, 2012; INTECO & Orange, 2010; McAfee, 2014; 
Ringrose, Gill, Livingstone, & Harvey 2012). However, the definition of cybercrime used in this 
study does not only understand acts against criminal law as cybercrimes. In a study by the 
company McAfee: 
Seventy percent of 18 - 24 year olds receive sexually suggestive content from 
someone…. More men are likely to use their mobile device to send and receive similar 
content (61% men vs. 48% women). Forty-five percent of U.S. adults say they stored 
intimate content that they have received in comparison to 40% who store risqué photos, 
videos or messages they have sent. Of those who have sent intimate or racy content, 
77% have sent this content to their significant other, while 1 in 10 individuals have sent 
similar content to a total stranger (2014) 
The above study used online questionnaires to collect data in the US and pointed towards a 
normalisation of sexting practices “while 98% of respondents use their mobile device to take 
photos, 54% send or receive intimate content” (McAfee, 2014). Ringrose, Gill, Livingstone, and 
Harvey (2012) carried out a study, in the UK, into sexting, for the National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC). They found that digital technology had amplified 
the problem of sexting and that ever younger children were being affected (Ringrose, Gill, 
Livingstone, & Harvey, 2012, p. 8). It is evident that sexting has become a widespread practice 
amongst adults and it is starting to affect children (more children are sending indecent images, 
and more children are receiving them). 
 
Going back to the vignettes used in the SAT-RI study, questions a) and b) (see previous pages) 
served as measures of propensity in a projective way (would I do something similar and would 
I rate it as morally wrong?) by using Likert scales.  The first resulting variable was named 
“engagement”, whilst the second resulting variable was named “morality”.  These two 
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variables “morality” and “engagement” were used to measure the propensity for the 
commission of cybercrimes. 
 
Finally, question c) measured the variable neutralisation (seven different neutralisation 
techniques and one null choice were codified). It is important to indicate that question c) was a 
multiple choice answer, therefore the respondent could choose as many as he/she deemed 
necessary (from the eight that were available). In order to analyse data appropriately, with 
SPSS, each neutralisation technique was treated as a different variable. This produced a total 
of 56 variables. A further 8 neutralisation variables were coded, adding the prefix “SUM”, in 
order to measure total scores. Creating a “SUM” variable for each neutralisation technique 
allowed the researcher to understand which techniques had been chosen the most (from all 
the vignettes) and which techniques had been chosen the least. It also allowed the researcher 
to perform ANOVA’s with neutralisation techniques as the resulting SUM variables were 
categorical polytomous variables. 
 
It was expected, during the design of the study, that the selection of the “unjustified” option 
would mean the exclusion of any other choice. In other words, theoretically, respondents that 
find actions unjustified should not need to use any neutralisation techniques. However, once 
the data were collected, two patterns that had not been anticipated by the researcher 
emerged: first, some respondents who picked the “unjustified” variable also chose other 
neutralisation techniques; secondly, some respondents did not pick any neutralisation 
techniques. This finding will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
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3.3.3. Procedure 
 
The Internet is an integral part of this study, not only because the study tried to update 
criminological theory for the explanation of cybercrime but also because the study utilised 
specific features of internet architecture to execute the research. Currently, academics tend to 
differentiate between research “about the Internet” (it becomes the object of study) as 
opposed to research “with the Internet” (it is part of the data collection process) (Bryman, 
2012; pp. 654-682; Hooley et al., 2012, p. 14). Research about the Internet could refer to 
content analysis (not only webpages but also social networks, such as Twitter, or used-created 
content like blogs or education platforms). As an example of this trend, in Spain, criminologist 
José Servera has published several blog articles on the study of the internet and social 
networks from a criminological perspective (Servera, 2014a, 2014b). In one article, he 
discusses the power of aggregated conceptual data from Twitter as a means of crime 
prevention (Servera, 2014a; citing Featherstone, 2013 and Gerber, 2014). In a second article, 
he discusses the paradigm shift that social networks have brought upon law enforcement (like 
Augmented Reality being used to analyse and prevent crime) and the challenges that new 
technological developments pose for the criminal justice system, society and criminology 
(Servera, 2014b). In relation to methods, Hooley et al. talk about a growing acquiescence 
between authors about the specialities of online research: “it is possible to construct a 
rationale … for seeing online research methods as a field in its own right” (2012, p.15). 
 
In the present study, the internet was both the object of study and the vehicle for the study. 
This is the reason why the current author has reflected upon the architecture of the internet 
and its qualities, but more importantly, on the interaction of individuals with the virtual world. 
In terms of the theoretical approach, this nexus and its criminological consequences were key 
to the research. At the very same time, the internet serves as a tool for the study, with the 
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online questionnaire being used to collect online data. The questionnaire survey was 
administered through many social networks, and consequently benefited from several online 
qualities, such as asynchronous communication, easy access, anonymity and memetism. 
According to Bryman (2012) and Hooley et al. (2012), online surveys (as opposed to postal 
surveys) have a number of the advantages (and disadvantages) (see Tables 3 and 4 
respectively). 
 
Table 3. Advantages and disadvantages of online surveys (Bryman 2012, pp. 676-677) 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Low Cost Low response rate 
Faster Response Restricted to online population 
Attractive formats Requires motivation 
Mixed administration Confidentiality and anonymity issues: in 
relation to surveys sent by e-mail 
Unrestricted Compass Multiple replies 
Fewer unanswered questions  
Better response to open questions  
Better data accuracy  
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 Table 4. Advantages and disadvantages of online surveys (Hooley, Marriott & Wellens; 2012, 
pp. 33 and 43 (citing Cantrell & Lupinacci, 2007, 2008; Fleming & Bowden, 2009; Madge et al. 
2006)) 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Speed and volume of data Sample bias 
Saving in costs Measurement error 
Flexible design Non-response bias 
Data accuracy Length, response and drop out rates 
Access to research populations Technical problems  
Anonymity Ethical Issues 
Respondent acceptability  
 
It is worth noting that the online questionnaire benefitted from many of the advantages 
mentioned in Table 3 and Table 4. The questionnaire itself was quick and easy to design, 
launch and edit with the Google Drive platform, and it proved to be an extremely effective 
instrument, which was important given the limitations of resources in this study. The major 
advantage is that the online questionnaire allowed the researcher to gather large quantities of 
data quite fast. Considerable effort was invested in the design of the questionnaire, trying to 
make it interesting, attractive, and easy to understand and complete.  The careful piloting 
process may have been fundamental in achieving the aforementioned qualities. According to 
Madge, O'Connor, Wellens, Hooley, and Shaw (2006, p. 51), cited in Hooley et al. (2012), the 
following procedures should be followed to improve response rates: 
1. Send introductory letter outlining project and estimated time needed to complete the questionnaire. 
2. Include an institutional/official website to help validate researchers’ identity. 
3. Provide clear instructions on how to complete the questionnaire. 
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4. Request personal information at the start of the questionnaire rather than the end. 
5. Use simple questionnaire format and avoid unnecessary graphics. 
6. Avoid grid questions, open-ended questions and requests for email addresses. 
7. Design the survey so that it takes approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
8. Do not include more than 15 questions. 
9. Send one or two follow-up reminders. 
10. Include ‘social presence’ (information to increase trust in the researchers) or missing data messages 
(thanking participants for completing the survey and informing them about their progress within it) to 
reduce item non-response. 
11. Emphasise confidentiality. 
The majority of these items were taken into consideration during the data collection process, 
with the obvious exception of including ‘less than 15 questions’, as the Gramsick scale itself 
consisted of 24 different items.  
 
The number of completed questionnaires submitted and the speed at which they were 
submitted surpassed the researcher’s initial expectations. This outcome was due in part, it is 
believed, to the researcher’s the monitoring of the process. The researcher took a quite active 
role in the survey, which included motivating, thanking and encouraging respondents. This was 
done by posting several messages in Twitter, Linkedin, Facebook and Google+, reminding 
potential respondents of its availability and inviting people to participate, as well as thanking 
those who replied and sharing messages of encouragement from other respondents.  
 
In addition to this, and in order to guarantee further responses, the online questionnaire was 
administered onsite (via MOODLE) to several classes. They survey was administered to these 
students in their classes as it had been previously uploaded to the Virtual Campus. Students 
had access to the internet; they were informed viva voce by the researcher about the nature 
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of the research and all relevant ethical issues including consent. Students could opt-out at any 
moment by closing the questionnaire, but they did not have to leave the classroom. 
Approximately, 150 students were recruited this way. That process enabled the respondents 
to have direct contact with the researcher, and thereby raise and have addressed any doubts 
they might have. Given the process by which the online questionnaire was administered, 
anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed, with replies being automatically saved on a 
spreadsheet stored in Google Drive.  
 
3.3.4. Reliability, validity and generalizability 
 
3.3.4.1. Reliability 
 
Bryman (2012) defined reliability as the “consistency of a measure or concept” (p.169). In 
relation to reliability, Bryman (2012) talked about “stability”, “internal reliability” and “Inter-
observer consistency” (p. 168-170). Stability refers to the measure being stable over time.  The 
self-control scale has been used in several studies, through time, and has proven to be a stable 
instrument (including via the PADS+ study by Wikström et al. (2013)). In regards to internal 
reliability or consistency, the Grasmick scale has been tested and has satisfied that criterion 
(Grasmick et al, 1993; Romero et al., 2003). This includes the Spanish translation as explained 
before.  Reliability tests were conducted on the self-control scale. Cronbach’s α for the 
aggregated self-control variable= .85, indicating very good reliability. However, if we apply the 
test to the different factors of self-control, Cronbach’s α shows good, yet somewhat lower 
reliability (temper= .72, egotism= .63, physical activities= .68, risk-seeking= .72, simple tasks= 
.67, impulsivity= .58). This is consistent with Grasmick et al.’s (1993) indication that the ‘six 
components … appear to coalesce into a single personality trait’ (p.17) and their suggestion to 
use the aggregated measure of self-control (p.17). 
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Vignettes, on the other hand, could not satisfy these criteria as they ask about independent 
scenarios and situations, and they do not form a ‘multi-item measure’ (Bryman, 2012, p.170) 
(unlike the Grasmick scale). 
 
Finally, “inter-observer consistency” (Bryman, 2012, p. 169) is a factor that should not be 
considered, as it comes into play when more than two or more observers are coding data. In 
this study, most of the categories were based upon earlier studies and other theoretical 
approaches, yet the data was coded by the present researcher only. 
 
3.3.4.2. Validity 
 
As already indicated, both the original Gasmick scale and its Spanish translation (by the 
Universidad de Santiago de Compostela), have featured in criminological research for quite a 
long time.  
 
In order to test validity (in this case face validity - see Bryman, 2012, p. 171), the online 
questionnaire was piloted four times by the same group of people (including criminologists, 
lawyers, students and people from unrelated fields). Various issues, including grammar, 
spelling, clarity, timing, and comprehension of vignettes and questions, were examined. All 
recommendations were acknowledged and the text underwent several revisions before being 
published. One of the major issues that arose during the piloting was the perspective from 
which the vignettes should be evaluated, as respondents were asked to rate actions from a 
moral standpoint that needed to be expressed clearly. 
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Vignettes were based upon easy to understand cybercrimes that implied a certain sense of 
familiarity, on the part of the respondent, with certain activities involving the use of new 
technologies or even with cybercrimes themselves. Especially technical cybercrimes (such as 
hacking) were ruled out, as were those involving child abuse. Respondents might have 
experienced illegal downloading, sexting or cyberbullying in more ways than they might have 
experienced child abuse (for example). This proximity might refer to respondents being actors, 
victims, or someone close to them being either. 
 
The vignette technique for measuring morality has been used and tested by Schoepfer and 
Piquero (2006) and by Wikström et al. (2013). This study tried to draw from that research 
experience, using the same approach and measuring items (morality) by using the same scales, 
thereby profiting from already established and proven instruments.  
 
3.3.4.3. Generalizability 
 
The sample, as indicated before, was non-probabilistic and was derived mainly from social 
networks interactions (for example re-tweets and shares). On the one hand, the intention of 
obtaining a general view on attitudes towards cybercrime amongst internet users was partially 
satisfied, as the sample was comprised mostly of young university students.  
 
All in all, obtaining a representative sample in online research it’s extremely problematic as the 
number of people using the internet grows every day. In Spain, there were 35,010,273 internet 
users in 2014, whereas worldwide the number of users in 2014 reached 2,925,249,355 
(Internet Live Stats, 2015). According to the International Communication Union (ITU, 2014)), 
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in their report Measuring the Information Society “by end 2014, almost 3 billion people will be 
using the Internet” (p. 15) and “Internet usage is growing steadily, at 6.6 per cent in 2014 – 3.3 
per cent in developed countries and 8.7 per cent in developing countries” (p. 15). Therefore, a 
social and cultural divide existed between developing and developed countries. As  the 
International Communication Union (ITU, 2014) has pointed out: “more than three out of four 
people are online in the developed countries, one out of three is online in the developing 
world” (p. 15). As indicated before, the majority of frequent internet users in Spain, according 
to official statistics (INE, 2014), are within the 16-24 and the 25-34 year age groups. However, 
there are no studies and statistics as to the characteristics of users of social networking sites in 
Spain. All in all, young people/adults dominate internet use in Spain, therefore a university 
sample can provide a good insight into the views of “people in general” regarding their 
internet use. 
 
3.3.5. Analysis 
 
In order to analyse the quantitative strand of data, SPSS 20 (IBM, 2015) was used. The Google 
Drive data-sheet, with all the replies, was uploaded into the programme and the variables 
were then recoded. The timestamp was deleted before the upload. As indicated, the 
neutralisation technique replies were coded into dummy variables.15 
 
After the coding process, a total number of 126 variables had been created. These covered 
participant socio-demographics, Grasmick scale items, morality and engagement variables, and 
neutralisation variables. Other variables were then computed (for example, the aggregated 
15
 Dichotomous categorical variables that only contained values 0 and 1. 0 indicated that the respondent 
did not pick that specific technique in that specific scenario , whereas 1 indicated the respondent had 
picked that technique in that scenario. 
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self-control measure). Several statistical tests were performed to find patterns and 
relationships between different variables, following what was theorised about the SAT-RI. The 
tests performed were T-Tests, ANOVA, chi square tests and regressions for statistical 
hypothesis testing.   
 
3.4. Interviews with Law Enforcement Agents 
 
3.4.1. Sample 
 
While a general idea on the “baseline morality” relating to the Internet was being collected via 
the questionnaire survey, a series of interviews took place in order to obtain information on 
cybercriminals’ thoughts. As discussed previously, contacting cybercriminals raised major 
ethical and access issues that could have hindered the adequate and timely development of 
this research.  
 
As a result, a decision was taken to use police offers as “proxies” in order to understand the 
motivations and neutralisations behind the actions of cybercriminals. In Spain, two national 
police corps co-exist (Guardia Civil and Spanish National Police) both of them with specialised 
cybercrime Units. After solving major access issues, five interviews took place: one Guardia 
Civil, three National Police Officers and one former National Police officer now working for the 
private sector. The intention was to obtain different perspectives and approaches to 
cybercrime and the thought process of the cybercriminal, also a more varied catalogue of 
crime cases.   
 
107 
 
In terms of sampling procedure, this was a non-probabilistic, convenience sample, as only 
those volunteering were interviewed. Considering that Cybercrime Units are highly specialised 
police corps, comprised of a small number of members, the population from where the sample 
stems is very small.  
 
After negotiating access with the respective law enforcement agencies, the sample ended up 
being limited to those volunteering to take part, and those officials who had sufficient 
knowledge of cybercrime and professional experience in the field. The fact the study 
comprised five interviews is not a matter of major concern as the case study approach (three 
or more cybercrime cases discussed per person) resulted in the  generation a sample of a 20 
cybercrime cases. Finally, a gatekeeper from the National Police was approached and the 
researcher gained access to three Unit Chief Inspectors (From the Open Networks Division, the 
Logic Defence Division and the Child Protection Division) from Policía Nacional.  Interviewees 
and their professional roles are coded as indicated Table 5. 
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 Table 5: List of pseudonyms for law enforcement agents 
Expert List Affiliation Professional Experience 
GCEX Guardia Civil (GDT) 17 years 
PSEX Private Company (Former 
National Police) 
13 years National Police + 5 
years Private Sector  
NPEX1 National Police (Open 
Networks) 
4 years 
NPEX2 National Police (Logic 
Defence) 
5 years 
NPEX3 National Police (Child 
Protection) 
14 years 
 
Table 5 is a good indicator of the expertise amassed by the experience in the fields of 
cybercrime. Interviewees had varied length of experience and quite diverse positions 
currently, therefore having different perspectives in terms of investigation cybercrime. The 
experience described does not refer to their general police experience, but to their experience 
in the cybercrime field.  NPEX 1 is in charge of the Open Networks Division16 of the National 
Police, NPEX2 is in charge of the Logic Defence Division17 of the National Police, whereas 
NPEX3 is in charge of the Child Protection Division, all of them within the Cybercrime Unit. 
GCEX, on the other hand, is a sergeant at the Guardia Civil18 working for the Guardia Civil 
16
This Division investigates crimes committed in social networks and crimes that are not investigated by 
the other Cybercrime Divisions of the National Police (for example, cyberfrauds). 
 
17
 This Division investigates the commission of hacking offences or the creation and dissemination of 
virus or malware. 
 
18
 In Spain, the Guardia Civil has a militarized structure therefore agents hold military ranks. Contrarily, 
The National Police is a purely civilian public institution.  
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Cybercrime Unit. PSEX is currently working as a security consultant, for a private firm, but 
he/she has several years of experience as a police officer in the cybercrime field.  
 
Once the coding took place a list of 20 cases was produced. The qualitative analysis sample is 
based on these case studies, it can be indicated that the sample is big enough and diverse to 
work with, cases represented a variety of crimes such as scams and frauds, hacking, malware 
offences, child sex pornography, child grooming and sextortion and industrial espionage. 
According to the Internet Crime Complaint Centre’s 2014 Internet Crime Report, frequently 
reported crimes were essentially scams and frauds like “Auto Fraud” (a cyber Fraud involving 
the scam sale of a car) (IC3, 2014, p. 10), Government Impersonation E-mail Scam (a form a 
phishing) (p. 11), Intimidation and Extortion (p. 12), Real State Fraud (p. 13) and Romance 
Scam (p. 14). Official statistics on other type of cybercrimes are very difficult to find, given the 
dark figure of crime that likely applies to such a complex criminal phenomenon. The 
Cybercrime Unit from the Guardia Civil publishes tips and news on recent and new forms of 
cyber-crime in order to raise public awareness, as an example: “Holiday apartment rent scam” 
(GDT, 2015), “The Police Porn Virus” (GDT, 2014) or “Cryptolocker” (GDT, 2013). CEOP 
recognizes that the key threat children face in the UK are “the proliferation of indecent images 
of children” (2013b, pp. 8-9), “online child sexual exploitation” (pp. 10-13), “transnational child 
sexual abuse” (pp. 14-17) and “contact child sexual abuse” (pp. 18-21). 
 
However, two cases were ruled out from the matrix, because they did not satisfy the 
theoretical criterion established in the theoretical framework in order to be considered 
cybercrimes. Invalid cases were C5 “The Solitaire” and C6 “The Kid with the katana”, narrated 
by PSEX. C5 talked about the entrepreneur of a well-known thief that, according to the 
interviewee, used the computer in order to plan escape routes or disguises. C6 was another 
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relevant Spanish case about a minor with psychological problems who killed his family with a 
katana (allegedly inspired by The Final Fantasy videogame). The reason PSEX to considered it a 
cybercrime was owing to the offender writing a letter on a computer explaining his situation.  
In both cases, the use of computers is extremely incidental and not instrumental. There   was 
not a profound rapport between the offence and the internet (or the machine), and 
consequently no relationship with the variables examined in the present study. Finally, C12 
“Nitro”, identified by NPEX1 is only partially valid as it presents a very interesting case in 
relation to vanity, ego, social networks and crime (from the point of view of the offender), but 
the case, about illegal races uploaded onto Youtube, was judged, by the present author, not to 
satisfy the cybercrime criterion. The final sample analyses for this part of the research 
comprised 17.5 cases.  Case categories were “Child Abuse and Pornography” (referring to 
Cases C2, C4, C18 and C19), “Cyber Fraud” (C3, C8, C10 and C11), “Hacking” (C1, C7, C9, C16 
and C17), “Child Grooming” (C20), “Hacktivism” (C15), “Malware” (C13 and C14) and 
“Unclassified” (C12). 
 
It is worth mentioning that the cases were extremely heterogeneous and they talked about the 
major types of cybercrime. Furthermore, some of the cases (for example Anonymous, Police 
Porn Virus and Siglo XXI) are extremely recent, therefore investigations are fresh and the 
interviewees were professionally involved in them. Also, the “Nannysex” Case (C4 by PSEX and 
C18 by NPEX3) was discussed by two interviewees. However, and given the relevance of the 
case and impact on Spanish culture, both reports were used. Finally, when prompted by the 
researcher PSEX talked about his/her general views on cybercrime and society after the case 
analysis had ended. That led to what the present researcher felt were extremely interesting 
perceptions, which were coded as “no case”. 
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 3.4.2. Instrument 
 
The interviews that were conducted with law enforcement agents served as good examples of 
research about the internet conducted using offline techniques. The researcher wanted to 
have direct contact with the interviewees in order to encourage them to have more trust in 
him, as a result of which they would provide more information and more accurate information. 
As mentioned in previous paragraphs, the interviews took place in the Universidad Europea de 
Madrid and the Spanish National Police Headquarters. Interviewees were asked about the 
types of crime they investigated, and were allowed to offer as much technical and procedural 
information as they wanted. However, they tried to use an accessible language, colloquial in 
some aspects and not extremely academic. Some of them also commented on certain features 
of the internet that have changed social patterns, values or even the very concept of family or 
romantic relationships. 
 
Interviews were semi-structured and were undertaken as “case studies”. The aim was to 
obtain a variety of cybercrimes investigated by the law enforcement agents, the researcher 
asked interviewees to elaborate on three (or more) cases they had investigated explaining the 
investigation procedure, the results of the investigation and all possible information about the 
offender.  
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 The initial procedure was the same for all interviewees. Before the sessions took place, 
interviewees received an e-mail with the information and consent forms (with the latter 
having to be signed), and a list of the topics to be discussed. The questions put to interviewees 
covered four major areas and were as follows: 
- Experience in the field of cybercrime 
- Crime: What happened? What crime was committed, how was it investigated and 
what was the outcome? 
- Offender: Who was the offender? What did he/she do, how did he/she perceived 
his/her actions? How did he/she justify what he/she did? 
- Special Circumstances: Were minors involved? Was there and international 
component? What were the social and media repercussions of the case? 
 
3.4.3. Procedure 
 
Interviews took place on 6/06/2014, 16/06/2014, 12/09/2014 and 4/12/2014; two of them 
took place at the Universidad Europea de Madrid Campus, Villaviciosa de Odón (Madrid), and 
the rest at the National Police Headquarters in Madrid. All interviews were voice recorded and 
notes were also taken in order to facilitate coding. All interviews were transcribed and all 
transcriptions were stored safely under a password protected platform and on several hard-
drives. After all the interviews were transcribed and uploaded into the NVivo software, original 
audio files were deleted. For the transcription procedure, a research assistant was recruited to 
the project. 
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 Just before the interview commenced, the researcher reminded participants of the matters 
covered by the information and consent forms, and obtained written consent from them, once 
the interview commenced the interviewer explained again the information and obtained 
verbal consent that was recorded. After that, interviewees were reminded of the overall 
structure of the interview and were given three cards with all the questions as visual aids in 
order to help them organise their thoughts.  
 
During the interviews, the researcher explained to participants that although they were being 
asked about specific cases and to a set structure, this was not rigid and interviewees were 
welcome to add whatever information they desired. Also, different questions were added by 
the researcher through the interviews as prompts or probes, whilst allowing the interviewee to 
navigate the information as they preferred.  
 
In relation to translations, Spanish transcriptions were imported into NVivo and were coded in 
English. Relevant passages have been translated into English by the researcher in order to be 
used as in-text resources. The researcher has comprehensive experience in working with 
English and Spanish texts, simultaneously, in the fields of social sciences, more specially law 
and criminology. This follows on from his experience both as criminology and a law lecturer, 
and a legal practitioner in Spain and in the UK. 
 
 
 
114 
 
 3.4.4. Reliability, validity and generalizability 
 
According to Bryman (2012, pp. 390-394, citing Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Guba and Lincoln 
(1994)), qualitative research can be evaluated according to different criteria, such as: 
trustworthiness (comprising credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability) and 
authenticity. Yardley (2000), cited in Bryman (2012, p.393-394) mentions the criteria of 
sensitivity to context, commitment and rigour, transparency and coherence, impact and 
importance. These are the qualities that the researcher endeavoured to follow in the present 
study. 
 
Interviewees were asked about their experience in the field. All of them had the necessary 
education, training and experience to offer relevant and critical approaches to cybercrime. 
Moreover, all of them had experience in dealing with offenders at some point in their careers 
and some of them were in charge of different operational groups. The experience of police 
officers served as an indication of the rigour of their narrative, but also of their commitment to 
law enforcement and their trustworthiness. In many of the criminal cases that were discussed, 
the interviewees shared materials - such as photographs, videos , court reports, investigative 
diagrams, webpages and features from different newspapers - with the researcher (NPEX1, 
NPEX2, and NPEX3 used these materials in all of the cases they discussed). 
 
In addition, even though all the cases discussed contained sensitive and confidential 
information, law enforcement agents tried to back up their discourse up with media sources 
(for example material from TV, You Tube and newspapers), legal documents, and photographic 
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and forensic evidence, thus helping to triangulate their data (Bryman, 2012, p 392; Silverman, 
2010, p. 277). It is worth remembering that although the sample could be viewed as small, in 
terms of the number of interviewees, the data was collected on “a case study basis”.  
 
Each interviewee was asked about three different cybercrime cases he/she had been involved 
in (some of the interviewees talked about more cases). In other words, interviewees 
constituted part of the sample (the source of data), and the cases they discussed the part used 
for testing the theory. That is the reason why interviewees were asked to provide varied cases 
- if possible - in order to obtain a broader picture of the investigation of cybercrime.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that the researcher tried to obtain the most unadulterated form of 
data from the interviewees, including factual information and personal opinion, letting 
interviews talk as much as they wanted, and allowing them to add or address any related 
issues. In order to achieve this, the idea of semi-structured interviewing was emphasised to 
participants, so that they considered certain specific topics but also had the opportunity  for 
wider discussion. In the case of PSEX, for example, the case study was explained quite quickly, 
so the researcher asked follow-up questions, before the interview ended, in order to obtain 
more information. This led PSEX to discuss certain social issues and social changes fostered by 
the ubiquity of digital technologies. This final part of PSEX’s interview did not relate to any 
particular case and was labelled “PSEX’s diatribe”. 
 
A critical approach was taken in terms of analysing the data to understand what approaches 
derived from a police culture, and which are either professional or personal opinions. Police 
culture can be extremely binary in terms of its conception of morality (for example, the idea of 
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‘good’ versus ‘evil’ or ‘US’ against ‘THEM’, which can stem from their constructed ideology 
(Reiner, 2010). However, individuals from the sample demonstrated social sensitivity and a 
profound empathic capacity in relation to the understanding of criminal aetiology and context, 
possibly developed through years of field and investigation work, and from their education in 
law, criminology, psychology or science.   
 
3.4.5. Analysis 
 
For the analysis of the qualitative strand of data, NVivo 10 (QSR International, 2015) was used. 
All of the transcriptions were uploaded into the programme for coding (a summary of all the 
cases and relevant information about them is contained in Annex X). 
 
For the main analysis the information was coded following Grounded Theory (Gibbs, 2010a, 
2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2010f, 2010g, 2010h). As subsidiary analysis, a narrative 
discourse analysis of the police discourse data was also carried out (following Foucauldian 
approaches (Gibbs, 2015)) and along with narrative analysis (following Esin, Fathi, & Squire’s 
(2014) constructionist approach). Police culture was analysed, and the researcher tried to 
understand how it affected the interview data, and the law enforcers’ personal creation of the 
cybercriminal and their understanding of criminal motivations. The narrative analysis and the 
ideology of police culture (Reiner, 2010), mentioned here will be explained in more detail in 
the qualitative analysis chapter. After the analysis, two essential categories emerged: offender 
morality and neutralisation techniques. No discourse on self-control was found (as expected) 
in the case studies. At the same time, new codes, which were not contemplated or predicted 
in the theoretical framework, emerged and were later considered for the qualitative analysis 
and the integrated analysis. 
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Finally, during the analysis, care was taken in analyzing the meaning of language. That is the 
reason why during the translation phase, the current researcher tried to respect the essence of 
the original Spanish texts regarding slang words and the personality of the interviewees. The 
researcher saw this as an essential task, in order to disentangle the possible cultural bias and 
to discuss the reliability of the accounts. All of the translations used in this work (from Spanish 
into English) were done by the researcher.  
 
A core issue relating to the analysis was the use of second-handed testimonials. McMyler 
discusses the epistemological issues that the idea of “knowing at second hand” (2007) can rise. 
Firstly, “an item of knowledge is testimonial if and only if it is secondhand in the demanding 
sense of being justified by the authority of the speaker” (p. 520), the idea of “authority” 
becomes therefore central to his discussion on how can we perceive reality through others, yet 
said authority can be accepted or challenged at some point: 
 The epistemic authority with which a knower thinks and speaks about her knowledge 
gained from a particular epistemic source has to do with the kind of justification 
appropriate to knowledge based on the source” (McMyler, 2007, p. 523) … an epistemic 
authority that entitles the audience to defer challenges to its testimonial knowledge 
back to the original speaker (McMyler, 2007, p. 527) 
At the same time, audiences are to be cautious and judgmental in relation to the authority of 
the speaker and the testimonial (that becoming a responsibility of sorts) but not being entirely 
untrustworthy (p. 534). In terms of authoritative knowledge, higher ranking law enforcement 
agents with plenty of experience in the fields they are speaking about, and having in addition a 
good level of education in the fields of crime control, are worthy of trust (Ministerio del 
Interior [Ministry of Interior], 2006). On the other hand, their extensive experience might have 
cemented certain views, in their minds, through time and an institutionalization may have 
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taken place in which a caricature of the criminal is formulated. In order to identify and address 
those issues, narrative analysis was employed in analysing the data. 
 
In relation to the narratives underlying the interviews, a constructionist approach to narrative 
analysis takes into consideration not only “the linguistic minutiae of the construction of a story 
between speaker and listener” (Esin et al., 2013, p. 203), but also broader social issues. The 
audience becomes extremely important, but power relationships and context also play a 
fundamental role (p. 205-206). Power relationships are transmitted in the way the 
cybercriminal is constructed as according to law enforcement agents, in terms of how 
interviewees value and rate the morality of offenders or explain their role as agents of a 
benign social order. Other relevant issues in terms of narratives are those relating to 
translation (Esin et al., 2013, p. 208).  
 
A similar approach to narrative analysis is “Critical Discourse Analysis”, orientated towards the 
understanding and critique of social issues inherent in discourse (Gibbs, 2015; Lê & Lê, 2009). 
Social change, inequality or the abuse of social control are important social issues that relate 
to crime and law enforcement, and which should be discussed when analysing the 
interviewees’ discourse, along linguistics, power and the construction of meaning (Lê & Lê, 
2009) and ideology as presuppositions, cliché or implicature (Lê & Lê, 2009, p. 12). In this 
thesis a Narrative/Discourse Analysis was adopted but this did not incorporate in-depth critical 
discourse analysis. This is due to the fact that policing is not the focus of the thesis. The main 
issues that were addressed were language (essentially translation), ideology (as police culture) 
and power relationships embedded in the discourse.  
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Finally, second-hand police narratives, acting as “proxies” offenders’ accounts, are inherently 
subjective as any narratives or discourses would be, a ragbag of visions can be found. This is 
because these narratives involved, first, the police officer’s view (personal or professional); 
secondly, the offender’s view; and thirdly, the academic or theoretical view assumed by the 
police as an institution. Ideally, these three distinct perspectives should be separated from one 
another in the course of the narrative analysis.  
 
3.5. Ethics 
 
The study gained ethical approval from the School Research Ethics Panel (School of Human and 
Health Sciences, University of Huddersfield).  The main ethical issues to be considered were: 
-  Safety and Risk: The study posed no significant risk, either to the researcher or the 
respondents.  The questionnaire was launched online for respondents to answer at 
their own discretion. Thus, the researcher did not need to travel in order to collect 
data. In relation to “captive” audiences (the use of students during classes), the data 
collection procedure took place during lectures and in lecture rooms at the Villaviciosa 
Campus of the Universidad Europea de Madrid. In addition, interviews with law 
enforcement agents took place at the aforementioned campus and at the Spanish 
National Police Headquarters. Both of these venues were considered safe 
environments. 
 
- Information and consent: Participants were informed of the aims of the study by using 
appropriately modified versions of the University of Huddersfield information and 
consent sheet templates. For the questionnaire, this information was uploaded online 
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and appeared in the first page of the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to tick all 
relevant boxes if they wanted to proceed to the main body of the questionnaire. 
Students were also informed in person, during classes and by the researcher of: the 
purpose of the study, anonymity, confidentiality and the voluntary nature of the study. 
If students wished to ask questions during the survey these were addressed and 
resolved by the researcher.  
 
For law enforcement agents, copies of the documents (consent and information forms) 
were sent by e-mail, and the copies for the researcher were collected before the 
interviews took place. Interviewees also kept a copy of their signed documents. Verbal 
information was given about the purposes of the study and relevant ethical issues such 
as anonymity and confidentiality even though the interviewee was already informed 
via the consent forms.  Consent was, therefore, obtained in written and spoken form. 
 
-Anonymity and confidentiality:  The Google Drive web-based questionnaire facility 
stores all submitted information in a data-sheet, making it impossible to determine the 
identity of the respondent. This information was subsequently analysed in SPSS as 
aggregated data. 
 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed with pseudonyms were used in place of 
interviewees names. The research assistant in charge of transcriptions signed a “non-
disclosure” contract and he did not have access to any personal information relating to 
interviewees. After the transcriptions were made, the audio recordings were deleted. 
 
Data was securely stored under password-protected “cloud” storage as well as in three 
different hard-drives. Hard copies are safely guarded by the researcher.  
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 - Harm and Distress: Respondents were not asked to reveal sensitive or distressing 
information during the data collection process. All questions could be left unanswered 
should the respondent have desired to do so. Interviewees were asked questions 
relating to their jobs and daily experiences (law enforcement). They were allowed to 
elaborate as much as they desired on the topics at hand. The researcher tried to create 
a relaxed and confidential atmosphere, given the delicate nature of some of the 
information dealt with. 
 
3.5.1. Ethics in an online environment 
 
Online research presents particular ethical issues and some of these had to be addressed in 
the course of this research. Some of these have been covered in previous sections of this 
chapter. According to Hooley et al. (2012, pp. 25-38), the main ethical issues in online research 
are: privacy, informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality, legal issues and participant 
vulnerability.  
 
In relation to privacy, Hooley et al. (2012) explain the existence of: 
a blurring of the boundary between what is public and private data on the web, and puts 
researchers in a difficult position where they have to consider whether users’ 
perceptions of their own privacy align with the “public” nature of the interface they are 
utilizing. (p. 31) 
In this case of the present study, the data obtained from the survey was not collected from 
public forums (like messages boards or social networks), but was provided willingly by 
respondents by means of the anonymous online questionnaire, accessible only if the link 
122 
 
provided by the researcher was clicked.  On the other hand, some of the law enforcement 
agents used videos found in YouTube (for example NPEX1), which had been subject to police 
investigations, to illustrate the points that were being presented by him/her. In these 
situations, the videos remained between the researcher and the interviewee, and did not 
feature as ancillary data (despite the fact that they are public). Other interviewees like NPEX3 
and NPEX2, used webpages during the interviews to illustrate their points (for example, pages 
where hackers boasted of their deeds) their comments on that pages and recoded but no 
webpages an annexed.   
 
In relation to informed consent, Hooley et al. (2012) indicated that “the online nature of the 
interaction between the researcher and potential participant, especially if text-based and 
asynchronous, can make it more difficult to ensure that the participant has sufficient 
information” (pp-33-34). That is the reason why a not inconsiderable amount of effort was 
invested in ensuring that the informed consent obtained in relation to the online survey, was 
valid. Clear and comprehensive Information about the survey was presented before the online 
questionnaire commenced and participants were invited to tick various boxes to ensure that 
they had been adequately informed and that they consented to all the conditions of the 
research. When questionnaires were administered in classes, this information was provided 
verbally, by the researcher, to the students before they commenced the survey. Anonymity 
and confidentiality have been discussed in this chapter in detail. 
 
Finally, no legal issues arose as no personal data was obtained from personal sites (like social 
networks or communities) and no illegal sites were consulted. And in relation to participant 
vulnerability, no sensitive groups were approached and no sensitive online data was accessed. 
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It has to be borne in mind, once again, that the questionnaire was designed as indirect 
questioning in order to avoid self-reporting crimes from participants.  
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Chapter 4: Findings - Online Survey on Attitudes Towards Cybercrime 
 
4.1. Demographics  
 
The sample was 43. 4 % (N=308) male and 56.6 % female (N=401). This does not seem to 
represent any major imbalance, gender-wise, in the sample. This gender mix was probably a 
reflection, in part, of the gender bias amongst University students and also the general 
population in Spain.  
 
According to INE (2005b), in 2010-2011, of the 905,229 students enrolled in higher education, 
483,203 (53.38 %) were women. Similarly, the population in Spain, in 2014, comprised 51.31% 
females and 48.69 % males. Therefore, a higher number of female respondents to the survey 
could have been was expected.  
 
The gender variable can offer an interesting insight into how crime may be perceived 
differently by women and by men, and how their levels of self-control might vary. This is 
analysed later in this chapter.  
 
The mean age of the sample (N= 706) was 28.36 (SD= 10.02) and the mode 23 years. It is 
evident, then, that the sample was comprised largely of young adults. Interestingly, although 
the majority of participants fall within the category of university students, 28 and 23 years do 
not fall within the usual age frame for university students in Spain. Degrees are 4 years long 
and students usually enter university at 18, usually finishing at 21/22. However, this is just the 
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typical case and it is not mandated. In addition, the sample may have contained (older) 
Masters and Doctoral students, as these groups were also invited to take part in the survey. In 
terms of outliers, the ages of 16 and 17 or 60, 64, 67, 69 appeared in the sample. Older 
generations are, therefore, underrepresented in the sample, as are adolescents. 
 
In terms of occupation (N=709), the majority of the survey sample comprised “University 
Students” (56.8 %). Relatively small proportions of respondents were draw from a variety of 
other occupational groups. These were as follows: “Education, Research and Languages” 
(7.9%), “Public and Private Security Corps and Military” (6.9 %), “Legal” (6.1%), “Unemployed” 
(4.1%), “Clerical and Administration” (3.8%), “Information, Communication and Finance” 
(3.7%), and “Health and Wellbeing” (3.4%). The rest of the occupations were not deemed to be 
representative as numbers were very small: “Other” (7.3%), yet it must be taken into 
consideration that 16 occupations were coded in total, following international normalised 
standards of occupations (ILO, 2004), as explained in Chapter 3. This over-representation of 
university students is easily explained when account is taken of the fact that the researcher is a 
lecturer, and part of the data collection process took place at Universidad Europea de Madrid, 
during classes. In addition, the questionnaire was posted on Twitter, Facebook, Linkedin and 
Google+.  
 
In terms of nationality (N=709), 91.1 % of the participants were Spanish. The remaining 8.9 % 
were mostly from Spanish speaking countries (like Mexico, Peru and, Venezuela) and a very 
small number European from countries (like Portugal, Holland, Switzerland, France, and Italy). 
This variable was, therefore, left out of the analysis, because of the vast majority of the sample 
being Spanish. 
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 Over two-thirds (68.7%) of the sample (N=709) reported that they had been the victim of a 
crime in the last year, with 31.2% stating that they had not.  One respondent chose “yes” and 
“no” in answering this question, and so this individual has been left out of the study. As this 
thesis is focused upon perceptions of morality of criminal behaviour, it was felt to be 
particularly important to examine the influence of criminal victimisation and in particular the 
ratings of crime as morally noxious. A chi-square test was performed and showed no 
significant statistical difference between males and females with regards to whether they had 
been a victim of crime or not X2(1, N = 708) = 0.40, p >0.05. 
 
Therefore it can be assumed that being a victim of crime is not distributed according to gender 
within the sample.  
 
4.2. Self-Control Scale 
 
The self-control scale was based upon Grasmick et al. (1993), who tried to measure self-control 
drawing on Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) work A General Theory of Crime. The scale is 
comprised of 24 items that can be grouped into the six theorised elements of self-control.  
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Grasmick et al.  suggested that the scale should be used to measure a composite trait (self-
control): 
A single, unidimensional personality trait is expected to predict involvement in all 
varieties of crime, as well as academic performance, labor force outcomes, success in 
marriage, various ‘imprudent’ behaviors such as smoking and drinking and even the 
likelihood of being involved in accidents. (p. 9) 
After empirically studying the six elements of self-control, using their own scale, Grasmick et 
al.  arrived to the following conclusion: 
Instead, from an empirical perspective, the strongest case can be made for a one-factor 
unidimensional model …. Our conclusion is that the six components we have identified 
as Gottfredson and Hirschi’s definition of low self-control appear to coalesce into a 
single personality trait. (p. 17) 
 
However, in this thesis, when analysing the data, in order to find an overall pattern of self-
control, the six elements of self-control were treated separately in terms of descriptive 
statistics and compared to the engagement and morality variables. Finally, high levels of self-
control were found in the sample and the decision was made to use only the aggregated 
“coalescent” self-control variable in the present study.  
 
The self-control variable therefore played an important role in this study. It is important to 
make clear that the scale used in this study is not the original one from the Grasmick study, but 
a translation into Spanish by Romero et al. (2003). It differs from the Grasmick et al.’s scale 
only in the order of the questions. Despite this difference, the Romero et al. /Spanish scale 
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Cronbach’s α for the 24 item matrix = .85 indicating very good reliability (as mentioned in the 
methodology chapter). In addition, correlations were tested between all 24 items in the scale, 
indicating very significant correlations. The majority of variables correlated positively. 
 
The values for the answers were: 1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree somewhat; 3= Agree 
somewhat; and 4=Strongly agree. It must be borne in mind that low scores indicate high self-
control.  
 
The highest rated item (GrasmickItem3: “I like to test myself every now and then by doing 
something a little risky”) had a mean of 2.63 and a Mode of 3, being the question that leans 
most towards low self-control. No other item had a mean higher than 3 or a mode equal to 4. 
The lowest mean (1.59) can be found in GrasmickItem23 (“I will try to get the things I want 
even when I know it’s causing problems for other people”). In addition, 14 items had a mean 
lower than 2; whereas 10 items had a mean higher than 2 but lower than 3. At first sight, this 
seems to indicate that the sample had high levels of self-control (scores less than 3 range). As 
indicated in the theoretical framework, high levels of self-control (following Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990), would mean that the sample is able to postpone pleasure and deal with 
frustration, therefore not likely to engage in acts of crime. 
 
Once the self-control items had been measured, items were grouped into six different 
elements - as theorised by Grasmick et al. (1993), following on from the work of Gottfredson & 
Hirschi (1990). These elements of self-control and the grouping of items can be seen in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the Grasmick scale items 
 Content of element Descriptive statistics 
Impulsivity GrasmickItem1 ( “I often act on the spur of the 
moment without stopping to think”) 
GrasmickItem7 ( “I don’t devote much thought or 
effort to preparing for the future”) 
GrasmickItem13 ( “I often do whatever brings me 
pleasure here and now, even at the cost of some 
distant goal”) 
GrasmickItem19 ( “I’m more concerned to what 
happens to me in the short sun than in the long run”) 
GrasmickItem1: M= 2.13; Mode= 2; S.D.= .88 
GrasmickItem7: M=1.74; Mode=1; S.D= .85 
GrasmickItem13: M= 1.73; Mode=1; S.D.= .83 
GrasmickItem19: M=2.16; Mode=2; S.D.= .88 
 
Impulsivity: M=4.77; Mode=5.00; S.D.=2.28 
 
Simple Tasks GrasmickItem2 ( “I frequently try to avoid projects 
that I know will be difficult”) 
GrasmickItem8 ( “When things get complicated I tend 
to quit or withdraw”) 
GrasmickItem20 ( “The things in life that are easiest 
to do bring me the most pleasure”) 
GrasmickItem14 ( “I dislike really hard tasks that 
stretch my abilities to the limit”) 
GrasmickItem2: M= 1.79: Mode =1;S.D.= .82 
GrasmickItem8: M=1.68; Mode=1; S.D.= .79 
GrasmickItem20: M=2.01; Mode=2; S.D.=.84 
GrasmickItem14: M= 1.77; Mode= 1; S.D.= .78 
 
Simple Tasks: M=4.25; Mode=4.00; S.D.=2.23 
Risk Seek GrasmickItem3 ( “I like to test myself every now and 
then by doing something a little risky”) 
GrasmickItem9 ( “Sometimes I will take a risk just for 
the fun of it”) 
GrasmickItem21 ( “I sometimes find it exciting to do 
things for which I might get in trouble”) 
GrasmickItem15 ( “Excitement and adventure are 
more important to me than security”) 
GrasmickItem3: M= 2.63; Mode =3; S.D.= .86 
GrasmickItem9: M = 1.79; Mode=1; S.D.= .87 
GrasmickItem21:M= 1.68; Mode= 1; S.D.= .82 
GrasmickItem15: M= 1. 75; Mode=1; S.D.= .79 
 
Risk-Seek: M=4.85; Mode=4.00; S.D.=2.46 
Physical Activities GrasmickItem4 ( “If I had a choice, I would almost 
rather do something physical that something 
mental”) 
GrasmickItem10 ( “I almost always feel better when I 
am on the move than when I am sitting or thinking) 
GrasmickItem16 ( “I like to get out and do things 
more than I like to read or contemplate ideas”) 
GrasmickItem22 ( “I seem to have a greater energy 
and a greater need for activity than most other 
people my age”) 
GrasmickItem4: M= 2.05; Mode = 2; S.D.= .87 
GrasmickItem10: M=2.24; Mode=2; S.D.= .89 
GrasmickItem16: M= 2.31; Mode=2; S.D.= .90 
GrasmickItem22: M= 1.78; Mode= 1; S.D.= .92 
 
Physical Activities: M=5.37;Mode=5.00; S.D.=2.55 
Egotism GrasmickItem5 ( “I try to look out for myself, even if it 
means making things difficult for other people”) 
GrasmickItem11 ( “I’m not very sympathetic to other 
people when they are having problems”) 
GrasmickItem17 ( “If things I do upset other people, 
its’ their problem not mine”) 
GrasmickItem23 ( “I will try to get the things I want 
even when I know it’s causing problems for other 
people”) 
GrasmickItem5: M= 2.08; Mode=2; S.D.= .92 
GrasmickItem11: M= 1.47 ; Mode= 1;  S.D.= .77 
GrasmickItem17: M= 1.83; Mode=1; S.D.= .86 
GrasmickItem23: M=1. 59; Mode= 1; S.D.= .72 
 
Egotism: M=3.97; Mode=2.00; S.D-=2.25 
Temper GrasmickItem6 ( “I lose my temper pretty easily”) 
GrasmickItem12 ( “Often, when I am angry at people, 
I feel more like hurting them than talking to them 
about why I am angry”) 
GrasmickItem18 ( “When I’m really angry, other 
people better stay away from me”) 
GrasmickItem24 (“When I’m in serious disagreement 
with someone, it’s usually hard for me to talk calmly 
about it without getting upset.”) 
GrasmickItem6: M=1.80; Mode=1; S.D.= .86 
GrasmickItem12: M= 1.62; Mode=1; S.D.= .83 
GrasmickItem18: M=2.36; Mode=2; S.D.= 1.00 
GrasmickItem24:M=2.05; Mode=2; S.D.= .91 
 
Temper: M=4.82; Mode=4.00; S.D.=2.65 
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These new resulting variables ranged from 1 to 13 in terms of scores with, again, low scores 
indicating high self-control. It is worth mentioning how the mean for egotism equalled 3.97, 
with such a low score seeming to indicate that the sample had a very low tendency for self-
centeredness. On the other hand, the trait relating to the preference for physical activities 
showed the highest score (M= 5.36). The results of several T-Tests are explained, below, 
comparing the means between the vignette results (variables of engagement and morality) 
and each of the abovementioned six elements of self-control. 
 
In addition, all the other results (the rest of the self-control elements: impulsivity, simple tasks, 
risk seek, and temper) expressed a somewhat normal distribution and pointed to a sample 
with high levels of self-control, who were able to postpone immediate satisfaction and cope 
with frustration.  
 
All these different elements of self-control were aggregated into a new variable called self-
control, as suggested by Grasmick et al. (computed by summing the variables impulsivity, 
simple tasks, physical activity, risk-seek, egotism, and temper). This allowed the current 
researcher to understand the overall levels of self-control in the sample and relate them to 
other variables, such as propensity or neutralisations. The resulting variable (N=662) ranged 
from 1 to 73 (Self-control: M=22.95; Mode=17.00; S.D. =9.65). It must be mentioned once 
again that the sample demonstrated generally high levels of self-control (M=23, and mode= 
17). Also, self-control leaned towards a normal distribution, albeit somehow leptokurtic as 
shown in Figure 8. It is also worth mentioning that was “outlier” occurred, with one 
respondent scoring 73, this being the lowest measure of self-control within the sample. 
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 Figure 8. Distribution of self-control 
 
 
 
In order to work in a dichotomous manner with the self-control results, facilitate groupings in 
comparisons and use them for the completion of chi-square tests and T-Tests from another 
perspective (by grouping respondents in groups of high or low self-control), a categorical value 
was computed.  The new variable was called SelfControl_HighLow. This new variable classified 
as high self-control results ranging from 1 to 36 from the original interval self-control variable, 
and as low self-control results ranging from 37 to 73 from the original interval self-control 
variable. A score of 36 was used as the threshold for two reasons. First, it represented the 
“half” of the frequencies of the original interval variable and secondly because it marked the 
general decrease in the frequencies (the highest densities can be found in the 30-31 scores). It 
must be borne in mind that it does not equal the median or the mean. 
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Table 7. Frequency table and graph for the SelfControl_HighLow variable 
 Frequency Percentage 
 
 
 
 
High 604 85.2% 
Low 58 8.2% 
 
 
As it can be seen in Table 7, high self-control was found in 85.2 % of the sample, whereas low 
self-control occurred in 8.2% of the sample. This is consistent with the idea of a sample with 
high levels of self-control.  
 
In order to understand how self-control was distributed amongst the sample, several chi-
square tests and T-Tests were performed. The first Cross Tabulation compared Self-control 
between gender, in order to find significant differences in the distribution of the two levels of 
self-control between males and females. According to the test, 86.6 % of males scored high in 
self-control, whereas 13.4 % of males scored low. In contrast, 94.7 % of women scored high in 
self-control, as opposed to 5.3 % who scored low. This indicates that women show higher 
scores of high self-control and lower scores of low self-control than men. A chi-square test was 
performed and it revealed a significant statistical difference between males and females with 
regards to high or low self-control X2(1, N = 662) = 13.46, p <0.001. 
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 It is evident, then, that high self-control was distributed differentially according to gender 
within the sample. Also, a T-Test, which compared the aggregated self-control variable means, 
depending on gender, demonstrated that females had higher levels of self-control (as their 
means were lower) t (660) =2.79, p <0.01. 
 
A further chi-square test showed no significant statistical difference (X2 (1, N = 612) = 0.04, 
p >0.05) between individuals’ levels of self-control (high or low) and whether they had been a 
victim or crime (or not).  For example, 91.5 % of the individuals who had been victims of crime, 
ranked high in self-control. However, 91.1 % of the individuals who had not been a victim of 
crime also ranked high in self-control. In addition, a T-Test using the variable victim of crime as 
the grouping variable, showed no significant differences between the means of both self-
control samples (t(659)=0.62, p<0.05). 
 
In conclusion, women seem to have higher levels of self-control than men, but there are no 
significant differences, in levels of self-control, by victimisation status.  
  
4.3. Vignettes 
 
Vignettes served to measure propensity (for the commission of cybercrimes) in the proposed 
SAT-RI . Two variables were taken into account: engagement and morality. Engagement was 
assessed through the question “Would you do it?” and morality was assessed through the 
question “How morally wrong do you think this is?”- The third question referred to 
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neutralisation techniques and this will be discussed later. The vignettes that were presented to 
participants can be seen, in full, in Annex 2. 
 
Taking into account that the SAT-RI is based on the morality of the individual and his/her 
interaction with the morality of any given environment, it was very important to consider 
whether the individual might engage in cybercrimes eventually, and his/her perception of 
morality and immorality regarding the proposed actions.  
 
It was also important to consider whether or not the vignette matrix correlated, therefore a 
correlation analysis on all 14 questions was performed, comparing the engagement questions 
and the morality questions on a case by case basis (comparing the engagement variable with 
the morality variable for the illegal downloading case and so on) as can be seen in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Correlations between engagement and morality on a case by case scenario 
 Correlations between 
engagement and morality 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Illegal Downloading r= -0.33***  
 
Morality: α= 0.71 
Engagement: α=0.56 
Revenge Porn r= -0.39*** 
Cyberbullying r = -0.35*** 
Sexting r= -0.22*** 
Cyberfraud r= -0.21*** 
Cyberstalking r= -0.16*** 
Wi-Fi stealing r= -0.44*** 
Legend: *** p<0.001 
 
The correlations depicted in Table 8 seem consistent with what has been theorised about the 
idea of cybercrime propensity. Individuals that would not engage in cybercrime (those leaning 
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towards the 0 in the engagement question) might understand cybercrime as morally wrong 
(those leaning towards the 10 in the morality question) and vice-versa, those that would 
engage in cybercrime might understand it as morally acceptable. The morality questions’ α= 
0.706, indicated good reliability, on the other hand the engagement questions’ α=0.562, being 
less reliable. 
 
These negative correlations between pairs can be best seen in a graphic representation in 
Annex 3 and in Figure 9 and Figure 10. 
 
Figure 9. Distribution of Cyberbullying Engagement 
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Figure 10. Distribution of Cyberbullying Morality 
 
 
 
In Figures 9 and 10 relating to cyberbullying (see Annex 3 for graphs of each vignette) an 
almost symmetrical distribution is portrayed. The general pattern that emerged from the 
elements of propensity (morality and engagement) is that participants that rated a scenario as 
morally repulsive would not engage in that scenario. Figure 9 demonstrates how individuals 
lean towards the 0, implying low tendencies to engage in said act).Figure 10 demonstrates that 
participants understood cybercrime as extremely morally reproachable, as the results lean 
towards the 10. 
  
4.3.1. Morality 
 
 In terms of correlation, all morality questions correlated positively as seen in Table 9:
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Table 9. Morality correlations 
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The strongest correlations were found: 
- Revenge Porn vignette:  Cyberbullying (r=0.56), Cyberfraud (r=0.53), Cyberstalking 
(r=0.56).  
- Cyberbullying vignette: Cyberfraud (r=0.55), Cyberstalking (r=0.54). 
- Cyberfraud vignette:  Cyberstalking (r=0.53). 
 
All of these correlations were significant at p<0.01. The cut-off point used for marking a strong 
correlation point was those higher to r=0.50.  
 
These correlations seemed to indicate coherence between participant’s responses and 
apparent reliability in the vignettes questions. Participants who have given high scores in a 
certain vignette (a score of 10 would indicate that they understand the depicted actions as 
absolutely immoral), would tend to give high scores in some of the others. In other words, 
there seemed to exist a consensus of sorts in terms of the perception of morality (or more 
specifically, immorality). Figure 11 might help explaining this tendency. 
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Figure 11. Distribution of Revenge Porn morality 
 
 
 
In the vignettes of Revenge Porn (Figure 11) , Cyberbullying, Cyberfraud and Cyberstalking 
distributions were extremely negatively skewed (see also Annex 3), forming a “precipice of 
morality” as participants tend to situate themselves at score 10 and regard these behaviours 
as absolutely immoral. In fact, as it can be observed the mode of all the cases was 10, 
therefore a very high number of respondents have used the highest scores.  For the Revenge 
Porn vignette, M =9.20; For the Cyberbullying vignette, M= 9.03; For the Cyberfraud vignette, 
M= 8.91; For the Cyberstalking vignette, M=8.74.  
 
In contrast, in the Illegal Downloading vignette (Figure 12), the Sexting vignette (Figure 13) and 
the Wi-Fi Stealing vignette (Figure 14) this pattern of the distribution became more erratic. The 
consensus was, therefore, broken and moral positioning became extremely divergent.  
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Figure 12. Distribution of Illegal Downloading Morality 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Distribution of Sexting Morality 
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 Figure 14. Distribution of Wi-Fi Stealing Morality  
 
 
 
For the Illegal Downloading vignette (Fig. 13), for example, the mode = 0, indicating that the 
majority of people tended to believe that there is nothing immoral in this behaviour. The mean 
morality score for this hypothetical scenario was 3.40. Therefore, this behavior obtained a 
moral “pass”. On the other hand, sexting (Fig. 14) was more fluctuating, as the mode =10, the 
M=5.51 and S.D. = 3.48 (the highest of all different scenarios in terms of morality).  Finally, Wi-
Fi (Fig. 15) stealing showed mode=5, mean=4.32, and S.D. =3.02 (the second highest 
deviation).  
 
In relation to the victim of crime variable, several T-Tests demonstrated that there was not a 
statistically significant relationship between whether or not the participant had been a victim 
of crime and the perceptions of morality. In the case of illegal downloading, the means for the 
victim and non-victim group were both 3. 40. In this case the alpha value was almost equal to 
1, therefore there is strong evidence to validate the null hypothesis, relating to the 
142 
 
independence of the variables. In other vignettes, like Revenge Porn and Cyberbullying, alpha 
was also extremely close to 1. 
 
Table 10. Morality questions means’ comparisons by gender and victimhood 
 Gender Victim of Crime 
Illegal Downloading Morality t(705)=2.07* t(704)=-0.00 
Revenge Porn Morality t(704)=-3.50*** t(703)=0.22 
Cyberbullying Morality t(699)=-2.85** t(698)=0.20 
Sexting Morality t(704)=-1.12 t(703)=-0.67 
Cyberfraud Morality t(703)=-1.98* t(702)=0.66 
Cyberstalking Morality t(706)=-0.31 t(705)=-0.61 
Wi-Fi stealing  Morality t(706)=-1.74 t(705)=-1.66 
Legend: * p<0.05/ ** p<0.01/*** p<0.001 
 
In relation to gender, it was shown previously that there is a significant relationship between 
perceptions of morality and gender in the Revenge Porn vinette (p<0.001, being the negative t-
value the highest of them all). Also, the Cyberbullying Case (t (699) = -2.85, p<0.01); the Illegal 
Downloading vignette and the Cyberfraud vignette showed p<0.05. However, the Sexting 
vignette, the Wi-Fi Stealing vignette and the Cyberstalking vignette showed no statistical 
significance after the T-Tests were performed (all cases p>0.05; for the Cyberstalking Case, 
p=0.76). Even though, the means for women were slightly higher than the means for men 
(with the exception of illegal downloading where said trend is reversed). It is worth mentioning 
that women rated the scenarios as more morally reproachable than men, with the exception 
of  Illegal Downloading, that was understood as more morally reproachable by men (women, 
n=400 , M=3.21;  men, n=307, M=3.64).  
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The six different elements of self-control (Impulsivity, Simple Tasks, Risk Seeking, Physical 
activities, Egotism, Temper) were analysed in relation to the perceptions of morality in the 
different scenarios. After this, the results of several T-Tests were also analysed in relation to 
the aggregated self-control variable and the different perceptions of morality, scenario by 
scenario. 
 
In order to compare the means between perceptions of morality and self-control (not being 
dichotomous variables), two groups within the morality variables were created for T-Testing. 
The “precipice” of morality was taken into account (the majority of answers lean towards the 
10, producing an extremely steep curve). T-Tests were performed with two new independent 
samples utilizing a cut point: comparing the means of the participants who scored 10 against 
those who scored less than 10. Table 11 shows the results of these T-Tests.
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 Table 11. The six elements of self-control mean's comparisons by perceptions of morality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: * p<0.05/ **p<0.01/*** p<.001 
 
 
 
 
Illegal Downloading Revenge Porn Cyberbullying Sexting Cyber Fraud Cyber Stalking Wi-Fi stealing 
Impulsivity t(696)=1.07 t(695)=-2.97** t(690)=-3.80*** t(695)= 0.35 t(694)=-3.35** t(697)=-2.87** t(697)=-1.07 
Simple Tasks t(697)=-0.56 t(696)=-5.29*** t(691)=-4.52*** t(696)=-1.15 t(695)=-3.56*** t(698)=-4.16*** t(698)=-2.60** 
Risk Seek t(697)=-2.21* t(696)=-4.29*** t(691)=-5.54*** t(696)=-2.12* t(695)=-5.20*** t(698)=-3.89*** t(698)=-2.49* 
Physical Activities t(691)=0.70 t(689)=-0.93 t(684)=-0.94 t(690)=1.68 t(688)=-1.28 t(691)=0.80 t(691)=-0.59 
Egotism t(692)=1.13 t(690)=-5.16*** t(685)=-5.75*** t(691)=-0.51 t(689)=-5.86*** t(692)=-3.18** t(692)=-2.48* 
Temper t(698)=-0.02 t(697)=-3.06** t(692)=-2.63** t(697)=-0.47 t(696)=-2.30* t(699)=-2.45* t(699)=-0.98 
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 One of the problems that arose when considering the results of the T-Tests, is that sample 
sizes were extremely unbalanced in the Wi-Fi Stealing and the Illegal Downloading vignettes. 
This is due to the fact that few participants chose 10 (the absolute moral reproachability score) 
for these cases, with the vast majority giving rankings less than 10.  
 
After comparing the means, the physical activities element (variable) showed no statistical 
significance in relation to any of the cybercrime vignettes (see Table 12). It seemed that the 
liking for physical activities amongst the sample was not related to their perceptions of 
morality. The reason for this might lie in the fact that cybercrime requires almost no physical 
effort (beyond clicking buttons and  writing e-mails, for example) as opposed to other types of 
crimes (such burglaries, robberies and assaults), which require more intense physical 
engagement. However, this element should be considered in the aggregated measures of self-
control, even though it seems to hold no meaning if considered in itself.  
 
On the other hand, perceptions of morality for Revenge Porn, Cyberbullying, Cyberfraud and 
Cyberstalking demonstrated statistical significance in relation to the all of the other five 
elements (except physical activities). In other words, people that rated these vignettes with a 
score of 10 (absolutely immoral), showed lower means of impulsivity, egotism, risk seeking 
traits, temperamental attitudes and preference for simple tasks.  
 
Two exceptions to the overall trend emerged: Sexting and Illegal Downloading. The morality 
variable of the Sexting vignette was only significant in relation to risk seeking tendencies, 
demonstrating that the sample that rated sexting as absolutely immoral had lower means of 
risk seeking tendencies. This could be explained on the basis of the way in which the case was 
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formulated (a younger girl starting a relationship with an older man hiding behind a false 
identity) as it could imply the idea of risk-taking and somewhat reckless behaviour on the part 
of the victim. The very same pattern occurred with illegal downloading and risk-seek, as the 
only significant comparison between means indicates that the sample that rated Illegal 
Downloading as absolutely immoral, scored lower in the risk-seeking mean (see Table 11). 
Should, therefore, illegal downloading be conceived as a risk-based activity? There does not 
seems to be enough data to support this premise, especially given that the group which rated 
illegal downloading as absolutely immoral is very small compared to the group which rated 
illegal downloading as moral. These unbalanced distributions of samples could breach the 
assumptions of normality within the T-Test and produce biased results (Field, 2009, p.345; 
citing Wilcox, 2005). 
 
Finally, a comparison between the means of the perceptions of morality for each vignette and 
the aggregated self-control interval variable and self-control dichotomous variable was carried 
out (Table 12). These findings are key to the theoretical model being developed in this thesis; a 
model that seeks to relate self-control to propensity and the use of neutralisation techniques. 
Once again, in order to compare the means, two independent samples were created one for 
morality scores equal to 10 (absolutely immoral) and another one for morality scores below 10 
(below absolutely immoral). All negative t-values were significant at p<0.01 and p<0.001 with 
the exception of the sexting and illegal downloading scenarios. The group that tended to rate 
the vignettes as absolutely immoral, demonstrated lower means of self-control (indicating, 
therefore, higher levels of self-control). 
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Table 12. Self-control means' comparisons by morality questions 
 Self-Control 
(Morality=10/Morality <10) 
Self-Control (High/Low) 
Illegal Downloading t (659) = -0.40 t (659) = 2.17* 
Revenge Porn t (657) = -4.86*** t (657) = 4.20*** 
Cyberbullying  t (652) = -5.596*** t (652) = 3.46** 
Sexting t (658) = -0.43 t (658) = -0.32 
Cyber Fraud t (656) = -5.19*** t (656) = 4.29*** 
Cyber Stalking t (659) = -3.70*** t (659) = 1.60 
Wi-Fi Stealing t( 659)= -2.79** t (659) = 2.53* 
Legend: * p<0.05/ ** p<0.01/ *** p<0.001 
 
For the Sexting vignettes, the means were similar, indicating that self-control does not play a 
part in rating the sexting case morally. Something similar emerged in regards to the Illegal 
Downloading vignette, bearing in mind that only n=13, as opposed to n=648, rated this 
behavior as absolutely immoral. Illegal downloading seemed to be embedded in the habitus of 
the sample, something so utterly natural in today’s society that is not regarded as immoral.  
 
Another set of T-Tests were performed (from a different perspective, see also Table 12), using 
Self-Control (High/Low) as the grouping variable and the perceptions of morality as variables 
for contrasting, in order to compare the means for morality. All t-values were positive and 
statistically significant, with the exception of the sexting case that showed the lowest negative 
t-values and the cyberstalking case that had a low positive t-value. For every vignette, the High 
Self-Control Sample showed higher means of perceptions of morality (for them the vignettes 
were more immoral) than the Low Self-Control Sample. In the sexting case both means were 
extremely similar (morally “lukewarm”) and in the Cyberstalking vignette were means were 
extremely similar (moral “fail”). This seemed to demonstrate that higher scores of self-control 
are related to higher scores of morality (leaning towards the moral “fail”). Therefore, 
participants with high self-control understood cybercrimes as more immoral, than participants 
with low self-control. This rule is, once again, proven wrong for the sexting case which is 
understood as morally indifferent, regardless of the level of self-control 
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 The reason why the Cyberstalking means were similar between both samples of low and high 
self-control is unclear, yet it shows a similar pattern to the one encountered when using 
gender as the grouping variable. It must be noted that even though high self-control was found 
more in women than men, the means for the Cyberstalking vignette were similar regardless of 
gender. Both men and women, and people with high and low self-control rated Cyberstalking 
above 8 in terms of morality (moral “fail”).  
 
In terms of correlations between the morality and engagement questions, they generally 
correlated. The following (marked in darker colour in Table 13) are the ones that did not 
correlate (only referring to not correlating between the engagement and the morality 
questions, not the morality questions with the morality questions or the engagement 
questions with the engagement questions). 
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Table 13. Engagement and morality correlations 
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 Once again, the Illegal Downloading vignette, the Sexting vignette and the Wi-Fi Stealing 
vignette did not generally follow the overall patterns that emerged from the data. The majority 
of participants rated vignettes by using extreme scores, thus creating a precipice of morality 
and engagement in terms of their distribution. However, for Illegal Downloading, Sexting or 
Wi-Fi Stealing this tendency is different or even reversed, as participants seemed to present 
different and contrasting moral views or indicated the likelihood of committing these actions 
(which might not be understood as cybercriminal by the sample). 
 
4.3.2. Engagement 
 
This variable was formatted as a “Would you do what someone did?” question. Morality and 
engagement measure the propensity of the individual for the commission of cybercrime, and 
were correlates with one another as indicated above. Someone understanding certain 
behaviour as morally wrong would not engage (theoretically) in said behaviour. It is important 
to take into consideration that the questionnaire measured propensity in a projective way, 
meaning that it is not a self-report questionnaire on whether or not participants had 
committed any anti-normative cyber-activity. Therefore, perceptions of morality and 
engagement should form a consistent moral framework for the measure of propensity within 
the sample. 
 
In terms of correlations between the different engagement questions see Table 14. 
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 Table 14. Engagement questions correlations 
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The Illegal Downloading vignette did not correlate significantly with any other vignette except 
Wi-Fi stealing. Moreover, the correlation between Illegal Downloading and Wi-Fi Stealing was 
the strongest (r=0.44) of all. Similarly, the Wi-Fi stealing vignette did not correlate significantly 
with the Cyberbullying vignette or the Cyberstalking vignette. 
 
Figure 15. Distribution of engagement in Illegal Downloading 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Distribution of engagement in Wi-Fi Stealing 
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In order to understand these correlations, an analysis of each scenario was needed. In Figures 
15 and 16, the similarities of between the distribution of the illegal Downloading vignette and 
the Wi-Fi Stealing vignette can be easily observed. In the Illegal Downloading vignette ((N=702) 
M=7.71, mode=10 and S.D. =3.03) and Wi-Fi Stealing vignette ((N=709), M= 7, mode=10 and 
S.D.=3.31) the means were high, indicating that participants would engage in the behaviours 
depicted .  Both cases were negatively skewed and form another “precipice” similar to the one 
found in the majority of morality cases, yet different to all other engagement distributions. 
Both cases have also shown the highest dispersion and break the “consensus” that occurred 
around the other scenarios. In other words, the majority of participants would engage in Illegal 
Downloading and Wi-Fi Stealing. It should be noted  that the mode was situated in 10, 
therefore the majority of participants were in absolute agreement with the idea of committing 
these cybercrimes. However, this does not mean they would necessarily have done so but 
rather that there was a high likely that they would do so. At the very same time, both vignettes 
have obtained a moral “pass”. The study of neutralisation techniques became crucial to 
understanding this phenomenon. 
 
In relation to all the other vignettes (Annex 3) the “precipice” was inverted and positively 
skewed. All of the modes=0, the means were less than 1 and the S.D. lower than they were for 
the Illegal Downloading and the Wi-Fi Stealing scenarios. The majority of participants would 
not do what is depicted in any of the other vignettes (Revenge Porn, Cyberbullying, 
Cyberfraud, Cyberstalking and Sexting). All of the remaining scenarios, with the exception of 
sexting, referred to situations of abuse and victimization that are also criminal in the Spanish 
legal system. A sample with high levels of self-control should not accept crime as a viable 
alternative. It was not possible, however, to ascertain whether or not participants have 
engaged in any of these activities (not even the Illegal Downloading or Wi-Fi stealing ones) or 
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whether or not a social desirability bias has occurred. The idea of participants answering in a 
hypothetical fashion might have shielded the questionnaire against the occurrence of said bias.  
 
 
Figure 17. Distribution of engagement in Revenge Porn 
 
 
 
It is important to mention that, as theorized, there was  coherence and congruency between 
measures of propensity (engagement and morality), as generally speaking participants would 
only engage in acts that they deem as morally appropriate or acceptable. The only exception 
was the Sexting vignette (M = 0.90; mode=0, S.D. =2.08). First, it is the third scenario with the 
highest dispersion (after Illegal Downloading and the Wi-Fi Stealing one). Secondly, 
participants tended to be in absolute disagreement with the idea of engaging in Sexting yet 
they have rated it as morally “lukewarm” (in terms of morality, mode =10, M=5.51 and S.D. = 
3.48). Sexting was the exception again, as it was the only case where, even though participants 
had very mixed views on its morality, and it was not really rated as right or wrong, they would 
not engage in it. It must said once again that engagement and morality correlated negatively 
(r= -0.22, p<0.001) in the Sexting vignette. 
 
155 
 
 As indicated in previous paragraphs, participants who rated sexting as morally reproachable, 
exhibited a lower mean for risk-seeking tendencies. In contrast (and this is explained, in detail, 
below) those who were less likely to engage in Sexting, showed a lower mean for risk-seeking 
tendencies. Both results were statistically significant. 
 
In relation to the victimization status variable, several T-Tests demonstrated that there was no 
statistically significant relationship between whether or not the participant has been a victim 
of crime and the engagement variable. The sole exception was the Sexting vignette (t (702) 
=3.09, p<0.01). The victimisation status did not show any statistical significance after 
performing T-Tests and chi-square tests, and it did not seem to have any relationship with, 
gender self-control measures, morality and now the engagement variable. The results of the T-
Tests can be seen in Table 15. 
 
Table 15. Engagement means' comparisons by gender and victimhood.  
 Gender Victim of Crime 
Illegal Downloading 
Engagement 
t(705)=-1.10 t(704)=0.63 
Revenge Porn Engagement t(702)=4.63*** t(701)=-0.38 
Cyberbullying  Engagement t(705)=3.46** t(704)=0.19 
Sexting  Engagement t(703)=4.80*** t(702)=3.09** 
Cyber Fraud Engagement t(704)=2.53* t(703)=1.52 
Cyber Stalking Engagement t(704)=3.10** t(703)=1.57 
Wi-Fi stealing Engagement t(707)=-0.67 t(706)=1.76 
Legend: * p<0.05/ ** p<0.01/ *** p<0.001 
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In relation to the Sexting vignette, the means were not very different from one another 
(respondents answering Yes: n=220, mean=1.26; respondents answering No: n= 484, 
mean=0.74) as both would not engage in sexting activities, although the ones that have been 
victimized were, in contrast, slightly more prone to take part in Sexting. 
 
In terms of gender the relationship was statistically significant, with the exception of the Illegal 
Downloading and the Wi-Fi Stealing vignette. In the Revenge Porn vignette, Cyberbullying 
vignette, Sexting vignette and Cyberstalking vignette all p<0.01 and p<0.001 with positive t- 
values, whilst the Cyberfraud vignette p<0.05. Males showed higher means in the engagement 
variable than women, meaning than men were more likely to engage in said acts. Male 
participants tended to rate vignette as less morally reproachable than women, with the 
exception of Illegal Downloading and Wi-Fi Stealing where the tendency was inverted. 
(However, Illegal Downloading and Wi-Fi Stealing  showed no statistical significance in relation 
to morality means by gender). Recalling the findings that men also had lower levels of self-
control, it appears that there was congruent relationship between self-control, morality and 
engagement, and that men demonstrated more propensity towards cybercrime. What needs 
to be addressed is the reason why both males and females rated sexting as morally 
“lukewarm”, without any significant differences in their means, yet males were significantly 
more likely to engage in sexting. This could be because men are more prone to risk-seeking 
activities, as opposed to women who exercise more self-control. In a T-Test that used gender 
as the grouping variable, to compare the risk-seeking means, the results demonstrated that 
men score higher in risk-seeking tendencies (t (699) =4.98; p<0.001). Sexting engagement is 
very significantly linked to the risk-seeking element of self-control. 
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In the Illegal Downloading vignette and the Wi-Fi vignette where p>0.05, the t-values were 
negative and the mean comparison indicated inversely that women were slightly more likely to 
engage in Illegal Downloading or Wi-Fi Stealing. 
 
The six different elements of self-control were analysed and subsequently the self-control 
aggregated interval variable and the self-control (High/Low) dichotomous variable. In order to 
compare the elements of self-control, two samples were created from the engagement 
variable. Using a similar (yet inverse) pattern to the one from the morality variable epigraph, 
two independent self-control sub-samples were generated by using a cut point that separated 
those ranking the “would you do it?” questions with a naught score and those that ranked 
higher. Note that the mode of the engagement cases was usually equal to naught.  
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Table 16. The six elements of self-control mean's comparisons by engagement 
 Illegal 
Downloading 
Revenge Porn Cyberbullying Sexting Cyberfraud Cyberstalking Wi-Fi stealing 
Impulsivity t(696)=2.88** t(693)=4.84*** t(696)=4.80*** t(694)=4.10*** t(695)=4.33*** t(695)=5.71*** t(698)=2.10* 
Simple Tasks t(607)=2.26* t(694)=5.87*** t(697)=4.12*** t(695)=2.83** t(696)=5.12*** t(696)=5.09*** t(699)=3.11** 
Risk Seek t(697)=1.59 t(694)=6.74*** t(697)=4.87*** t(695)=5.74*** t(696)=5.97*** t(697)=4.74*** t(699)=2.86** 
Physical 
Activities 
t(690)=1.97* t(688)=4.17*** t(690)=2.62** t(689)=0.80 t(690)=3.24** t(689)=1.61 t(692)=0.81 
Egotism t(691)=0.73 t(689)=6.88*** t(691)=5.74*** t(690)=4.48*** t(690)=6.95*** t(690)=4.99*** t(693)=1.50 
Temper t(698)=3.39** t(695)=5.34*** t(698)=3.90*** t(696)=1.24 t(697)=3.87*** t(697)=4.44*** t(700)=2.27* 
Legend: * p<0.05/ **p<0.01/*** p<.001 
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 In these T-Tests (Table 16), the Illegal Downloading vignette was not statistically significant in 
relation to the Egotism and the Risk-Seeking elements. On the other hand, Sexting was not 
significant only in relation to Temper and Physical Activities. Subsequently, it was found that 
the engagement variable seemed to be more profoundly related to the different elements of 
self-control than the perceptions of morality. These six elements seemed, therefore, crucial in 
determining whether or not people would engage in the cybercriminal activities presented in 
the questionnaire. Also, even though the Physical Activity element played (see Table 11) no 
part in the perceptions of morality, there was a significant statistical relationship with Illegal 
Downloading, Revenge Porn, Cyberbullying and Cyberfraud. 
 
If the aggregated self-control variable (Table 17) is taken into consideration (by using it as 
grouping variable with two sub-samples), this statistical significance became more apparent. 
Given that all of the engagement variables had demonstrated a significant relationship with 
self-control. 
 
Table 17. Self-control means' comparisons by engagement questions 
 Self-Control 
(Engagement=0/Engagement <0) 
Self-Control (High/Low) 
Illegal Downloading t(658)= 3.10** t (658)= -2.91** 
Revenge Porn t(656) = 8.14*** t (656)= -5.02*** 
Cyberbullying t(658) =6.00*** t (658)= -3.90*** 
Sexting t(657) = 4.36*** t (657)= -1.44 
Cyberfraud t(658)= 6.91*** t (658) = -5.59*** 
Cyberstalking t(658)= 5.94*** t(658)= -2.56* 
Wi-Fi Stealing t(660)= 3.09** (660)= -3.05** 
Legend: * p<0.05/ **p<0.01/*** p<.001 
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The process used for carrying out the T-Tests, was not dissimilar to the one used for the 
perceptions of morality. Two independent samples were created from each engagement 
variable, taking into consideration the “precipice” distribution. Given that all of the modes=0 
and the means were less than 1, with the exceptions of the Illegal Downloading vignette and 
the Wi-Fi Stealing vignette. In order to T-Test each, for each vignette, two sub-samples were 
created: those scoring 0 and sample 2: those scoring more than 0. Self-control proved to be 
statistically significant for every single case, with high positive t-values (for example, 
Cyberstalking=5.94; Cyberfraud= 6.91; Cyberbullying=5.94; Revenge Porn=8.14). 
 
In terms of means, the samples that rated engagement with 0 (meaning that they would never 
partake in such an activity) showed lower means of self-control (therefore they displayed 
higher levels of self-control), whereas participants that rated engagement with more than 0 
showed higher mean of self-control (therefore displaying lower levels of self-control). One of 
the major problems that arose during the comparison was the imbalance of the two 
independent samples: 
- Revenge Porn: Sample 1: n=566,  Sample 2: n=92 
- Cyberbullying: Sample 1: n=575, Sample 2: n=85 
- Sexting: Sample 1: n=514, Sample 2: n=145 
- Cyberfraud: Sample 1: n=578, Sample 2: n=82 
- Cyberstalking: Sample 1: n=567, Sample 2: n=93 
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In contrast, the Illegal Downloading and the Wi-Fi Stealing cases were imbalanced in a 
different fashion due to the fact that the majority of participants were in favour of said 
activities.  
- Illegal Downloading: Sample 1: n=30, Sample 2: n= 630 
- Wi-Fi Stealing: Sample 1: n= 55, Sample 2: n=607 
 
When the SelfControl_HighLow (also in Table 17) categorical variable was considered as a 
grouping variable, and all of the engagement questions’ means compared by using a T-Test, 
the following was found: all the t-values are negative. People with low self-control considered 
themselves as more likely to engage in acts of cybercrime. In all of these cases, the samples 
were also imbalanced as the majority of respondents were members of the High Self-Control 
sample. 
 
Both systems of T-Testing (by using SelfControlHighLow as the grouping variable or by creating 
two independent samples in the engagement variables by means of a cut point) gave identical 
results with the exception of the Sexting vignette (a similar incongruence was also found when 
analysing the morality variables). 
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4.3.3. Neutralisation techniques 
 
The questionnaire was designed for participants to pick as many neutralisations as they 
deemed necessary for each case, in order to constrain them as less as possible. However, the 
possibility of participants picking “It’s not justifiable” plus any other neutralisation was not 
forestalled. Given that the researcher designed the questionnaire by understanding 
“unjustifiable” as the complete absence of neutralisations. Some other participants did not 
pick any neutralisation technique at all. After some discussion with the PhD supervisors, it was 
decided that all the respondents that picked “unjustifiable” and other neutralisations, and all 
the respondents that did not pick any neutralisation, were retained in order to fully 
understand the psychological makeup of the sample. Some reliability issue may have arisen. 
Table 18 is a summary of the inconsistencies found in the neutralisation techniques variables. 
 
Table 18. Inconsistencies found when coding neutralisation techniques answers 
 No neutralisation 
techniques picked 
Unjustified+ other 
neutralisation techniques  
Illegal Downloading 6 18 
Revenge Porn 7 32 
Cyberbullying  11 18 
Sexting  6 16 
Cyberfraud 6 24 
Cyberstalking 5 14 
Wi-Fi Stealing 2 14 
 
For example, as can be seen in Table 18, 32 respondents picked the “it’s not justified” 
technique and other techniques in the Revenge Porn vignette. This vignette is the one where 
this inconstancy appeared most. On the other hand, 11 respondents did not pick any 
neutralisation techniques in the Cyberbullying vignette. 
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In Table 19, the frequencies of all the neutralisation techniques on a case by case scenario are 
explained. For each vignette, the three most frequent techniques have been coloured.  The 
choices changed between vignettes, however, “it’s not justifiable” and “nothing wrong” 
appeared quite frequently. 
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 Table 19. Frequencies of neutralisation techniques 
 
 
Unjustifiable Nothing 
Wrong 
Not 
My 
Fault 
Victim’s 
Fault 
Everyone No 
Other Choice 
It’s 
My 
Right 
Ledger 
Illegal Downloading 17.3 % 21.4% 4.5 % 8.6 % 34.4 % 19 % 11. 6% 8% 
Revenge Porn 68.7% 1.4% 2% 30% 0.4 % 2.1 % 5.1 % 1 % 
Cyberbullying 71. 7 % 10. 7% 2.3% 5. 9 % 10.9 % 0.7% 3.8% 6.8% 
Sexting 25.7% 43 % 2.5 % 1.8 % 6.3% 1.8% 40.8% 2.5 % 
Cyberfraud 65.9 % 3.8 % 6.6 % 11. 8 % 2.1 % 12.4 % 4.1 % 6.8 % 
Cyberstalking 66.4% 19.9% 3 % 4.5 % 1.3 % 4.7 % 8.3 % 5.1 % 
Wi-Fi Stealing 18.2% 30.7 % 6.8 % 12.8% 30.5 % 21. 9% 4.1 % 13.8% 
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 For the Revenge Porn, the Cyberbullying, the Cyber Fraud and the Cyberstalking case, the most 
selected option was “it’s not justifiable”. That choice seemed to be consistent with the pattern 
that has been discussed before in terms of a high self-control sample, and a tendency to rate 
vignettes as morally unacceptable and not engage in the acts depicted in them. Illegal 
Downloading, Sexting and Wi-Fi stealing were understood as more justifiable according to the 
frequencies seen in Table 19. 
 
In relation to the victim of crime (Yes or No) variable, a chi-square test demonstrated that in 
the Illegal Downloading vignette, only the “I didn’t have any other choice” technique showed a 
distribution of frequencies statistically significant p<0.05. The Revenge Porn vignette 
demonstrated no statistical significance in relation to any of its neutralisation techniques. For 
the Cyberbullying vignette, no statistical significance was found. In sexting only the “I haven’t 
done anything wrong” and “everyone else is doing it” were significant at p<0.05. In relation to 
the Cyberfraud vignette, the “I didn’t have any other choice” technique was statistically 
significant at p<0.05. For the Cyberstalking vignette the ledger technique was significant at 
p<0.05, whereas in Wi-Fi Stealing the “it’s not justifiable” narrative was statistically significant 
at p<0.05. There is not enough data to explain why these very specific or particular techniques 
might be related to the victim of crime variable that has proven to bear no statistical 
significance in terms of the tests performed with the theoretical construct.  
 
In terms of gender, more chi-square tests were run, cross-tabulating every single neutralisation 
technique. All of the neutralisation techniques that were part of the Illegal Downloading 
vignette were not statistically significant in terms of gender. Also, the techniques connected to 
the Revenge Porn, Cyberbullying and Sexting vignettes were not statistically significant either. 
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In the case of Cyber Fraud, the “It’s not justified”, “I didn’t have any other choice” and 
“everyone else is doing it” techniques were statistically significant at p<0.05. In relation to all 
the Cyberstalking neutralisation techniques, no statistical significance was found. Finally, in 
relation to the Wi-Fi stealing case, the “everyone else is doing it” and “It is my right to do so” 
were significant at p<0.05. 
 
In relation to self-control, firstly, the analysis was carried out for the “It’s not justifiable” 
neutralisation technique, by using a T-Test comparing the self-control means. The “unjustified” 
technique was used as the grouping variable, dividing the sample between those who thought 
the vignettes were not justifiable and those who thought it was. The t-values were negative: 
respondents who picked the unjustified technique had lower means of self-control (therefore 
higher levels of self-control) than those who did not pick it). This is the trend that was going to 
be repeated in these set of measures with two exceptions (Table 20). 
 
Table 20. Self-control means by unjustified (Yes or No) and distribution of unjustified 
amongst self-control groups 
 Self-Control (Unjustifiable: 
Yes/No) 
Self-Control(High/Low) 
Illegal Downloading t(660) =-5.20*** X2(1, N = 662) = 6.12 * 
Revenge Porn t (660)= -3.00*** X2(1, N = 662) = 8.73** 
Cyberbullying t(660) = -1.10 X2(1, N = 662) = 1.04 
Sexting t(660)= -0.87 X2(1, N = 662) = 0.15 
Cyberfraud t(660) =- 2.41* X2(1, N = 662) = 3.43 
Cyberstalking t(660) =-2.21* X2(1, N = 662) 1.83 
Wi-Fi Stealing t(660)= -4.34*** X2(1, N = 662) = 2.43 
Legend * p<0.05/ ** p<0.01/ *** p<0.001 
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Secondly, chi-square tests were used when cross-tabulating the categorical dichotomous 
variable SelfControl(High/Low) with all the Unjustifiable dummy variables. 
 
By using this procedure, only Illegal Downloading and Revenge Porn were statistically 
significant (Table 20). It appears that, even though the people who picked the “Unjustifiable” 
neutralisation technique had higher levels of self-control overall than those who did not. It 
does not really mean that those who picked this neutralisation tended to have high self-
control.  
 
Finally, in order to test all of the respondents who picked the neutralisation technique 
unjustifiable (instead of performing tests on a case by case scenario), and compare them with 
the self-control interval variable, a new variable was computed called SUM_Unjustified. This 
variable comprised all the cases that had answered the Unjustifiable technique. Each of the 
eight options from the neutralisation techniques questions were coded into dummy variables 
(whose data were either 1 for “picked” or 0 for “not picked”). This resulted in 7 (Cases 1-7) 
different dichotomous variables for the “it’s not justified” script (as well as seven other 
variables for “Nothing wrong”, plus other seven for “It’s not my fault” and subsequently for all 
the others. Given the importance of the “it’s not justified” script (as it supposed the absence of 
neutralisations), the newly computed Sum_Unjustified categorical variable contained the 
seven cases’ unjustified variables. 
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Table 21. Frequency table for Sum_Unjustified 
Sum_Unjustified 
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
0 105 14.8 
1 57 8.0 
2 63 8.9 
3 100 14.1 
4 161 22.7 
5 130 18.3 
6 61 8.6 
7 32 4.5 
Total 709 100,0 
 
The variable ranges from 0 – 7 (Table 21) meaning that 105 respondents (14.8%) did not pick 
the technique “it’s not justifiable” in any situation, 7 would mean that only 32 respondents 
(4.5%) picked “it’s not justifiable” in all of the seven cases.  The Mode was 4, meaning that 161 
respondents (22.7%) had picked “it’s not justifiable” in four cases. Theoretically, individuals 
that tend to understand most of the cases as unjustifiable would demonstrate higher levels of 
self-control and ought to demonstrate less crime propensity. Hence, it would be necessary to 
compare the self-control means of these different 8 groups. An ANOVA was carried out using 
Sum_Unjustified as the factor and self-control as the dependent variable. The result was F (7, 
654) =4.51, p<0.001. What the result indicated is that participants who had picked 
“unjustified” more times, tended to have lower means of self-control (higher levels of self-
control). The ANOVA results seemed to be congruent with those from the T-Tests. Therefore, it 
seemed that there was a significant relationship between self-control and the use of a negative 
neutralisation technique. The necessity of not justifying a criminal action was, therefore, linked 
with higher levels of self-control. Also, a chi-square Test compared the distribution of the 8 
“unjustified” groups in the Self_Control(High/Low) dichotomous variable and resulted in 
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X2(7)=15.26, p<0.05, this seemed to indicate that there were more members of the high self-
control group amongst those who picked the “unjustified” justification more times.  
 
Figure 18. Means plot for self-control and Sum_Unjustified 
 
 
In order to analyse the other seven types of neutralisation technique and their relationship 
with self-control, T-Tests were performed by using each of the neutralisation techniques as the 
grouping variables thereby creating two sub-samples in terms of self-control means. 
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Table 22. Comparison of self-control means by all neutralisation techniques and distribution 
of those who picked neutralisations techniques by Self-Control High_Low (only statistically 
significant portrayed) 
 Self-control Self-control High_Low 
Illegal Downloading Not my fault: t(660)=2.54 * - 
Revenge Porn Victim’s fault: t(660)=3.21** Nothing wrong: 
X2(1,N=662)=6.89 ** 
Not my fault: X2(1, 
N=662)=4.79* 
Victim’s fault:X2(1, 
N=662)=9.84* 
Cyberbullying Everyone else is doing it: 
t(660)=2.22* 
- 
Sexting Not my fault: t(660)=3.00** 
No other choice: t(660)=3.18** 
Not my fault X2:(1, 
N=662) = 10.37** 
No other choice: X2(1, 
N=662)=4.03* 
Cyberfraud Nothing wrong: t(660)=2.97** 
Not my fault: t(660)=2.80** 
It’s my right to do so: 
t(660)=2.01* 
Not my fault : X2(1, 
N=662)= 8.06** 
Cyberstalking Victim’s fault: t(660)=2.73** victim’s fault (1, N=662) = 
8.35** 
Wi-Fi stealing Not my fault: t(660)=3.13**  
No other choice: t(660)=2.32* 
It’s my right to do so: 
t(660)=3.12** 
It’s my right to do so: X2 
(1, N=662)= 6.38* 
Legend *p<0.05/** p<0.01 
 
All of the results shown in Table 22 were statistically significant, meaning that only the 
differences in self-control means were relevant. For example, in Revenge Porn (the highest t-
value) those who chose “victim’s fault” demonstrated lower levels of self-control to those who 
did not. The same pattern applied to the other techniques. The number of results that have 
proven to be statistically significant is twelve and only one two or three per case, a very small 
number taking into account that there were seven techniques per vignette (not counting the 
“unjustified” technique). 
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Table 22 also depicted the significant distributions of Self-Control High and Low, amongst 
those who picked a certain neutralisation techniques and those who did not. The statistically 
significant distributions showed the groups of High Self_Control group are usually found 
among those individuals not picking neutralisation techniques.   
 
In sum, participants who picked neutralisations techniques demonstrated lower levels of self-
control. However, the number of neutralisition techniques found significant is small (taking 
into account that there are seven techniques per vignette, and a total of 49 different choices, 
without counting the “unjustified” technique). In Table 22, the statistically relevant results that 
coincided in the interval self-control variable and the dichotomous self-control variable 
(High_Low) have been highlighted in darker colour.  
 
In relation to neutralisation techniques, the analysis commenced with T-Tests, comparing the 
morality means of independent samples using the “unjustified” categorical dichotomous 
variable as the grouping variable. For Case 1, the “unjustified” variable that was used was 
Case1_Unjustified, for Case 2 it was Case2_Unjustified, and so on. Finally, ANOVAs were also 
performed with aggregated neutralisation variables. The participants who picked “unjustified” 
as a neutralisation technique for a given case, demonstrated higher means for the morality 
variable regarding  the case in hand (they rated it as more morally unacceptable than those 
who did not  pick the unjustified technique for the case). This can be seen in Table 23. 
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Table 23.  Morality means' comparison by “Unjustified” neutralisation technique 
 Unjustified  
Illegal Downloading Morality 
 
t(705)=7.22*** 
Revenge Porn Morality 
 
t(704)=4.87*** 
Cyberbullying Morality t(699)=4.36*** 
Sexting Morality t(704)=15.05*** 
Cyberfraud Morality t(703)=5.86*** 
 
Cyberstalking Morality 
 
t(706)=6.70*** 
Wi-Fi Stealing Morality t(706)=11.65*** 
Legend: *** p<0.001 
 
All of the t-values were positive and statistically significant at p<0.001. The t-values were very 
high, yet much higher for the sexting and Wi-Fi Stealing cases (Table 23). For example, in the 
Wi-Fi Stealing vignettes the morality means of those who picked unjustified=6.89 and the ones 
who did not pick unjustified=3.75. Similarly, for the Sexting vignette (t (704) =15.05, p<0.001), 
those who picked unjustified cases showed morality means= 8.42 as opposed who did not pick 
unjustifiable whose means=4.50. The differences were also notable for the Illegal Downloading 
vignette, although they were not as dissimilar as in the sexting and Wi-Fi stealing vignettes. 
 
This was consistent with the theorised model and the patterns that have been established in 
the present study. Respondents who rated a certain case as morally adverse were more likely 
to understand that very same case as unjustifiable when confronted with the neutralisation 
question. This is more apparent in the engagement questions as individuals who would not 
engage in cybercrime case might not feel the hypothetical need to justify it in order to protect 
themselves from blame.It is very noticeable how people that understood Sexting as 
173 
 
unjustifiable have rated it with a high moral fail, whilst those who did not pick the unjustifiable 
option rated it with moral neutrality or ambivalence. Sexting was the vignette that generated 
the most dispersion in terms of moral views and that seemed to be mirrored in this situation. 
 
In all the cases, it seemed that the morality of a case determined the need for not justifying it 
and using a neutralisation technique. Therefore, there existed a significant relationship 
between perceptions of morality and the absence of neutralisation techniques. 
 
Finally, ANOVAs were performed using Sum_Unjustified as the factor and being the dependent 
variables the perceptions of morality questions. Results are displayed in Table 24. 
 
Table 24. ANOVAs using Sum_Unjustified as factor and morality questions as dependent 
variables 
 ANOVA (Sum_Unjustified) 
Illegal Downloading Morality F (7, 699) =9.99*** 
Revenge Porn Morality F (7, 698) =2.47* 
Cyberbullying  Morality F (7, 693) =1.75 
Sexting  Morality F (7, 698) =13.35*** 
Cyberfraud Morality F (7, 697) =3.82*** 
Cyberstalking Morality F (7, 700) =4.74*** 
Wi-Fi Stealing Morality F (7, 700) =15.43*** 
Legend: * p<0.05/ ***p<0.01  
 
All of these ANOVAs tended to demonstrate that, the more times the “Unjustifiable” variable 
was picked, the perceptions of morality of a scenario became more and more unacceptable. 
Usually, respondents who had picked the unjustified neutralisation technique in all seven 
vignettes demonstrated the higher means in the perceptions of morality (rated the vignettes 
with moral fail). The highest F ratios were found in Sexting and Wi-Fi Stealing (Table 24), being 
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those the cases were the mean difference became much more apparent between respondents 
that hadn’t picked unjustified in any case and those who have in some or all cases. The only 
non-statistically significant case in terms of ANOVA was the cyberbullying case (even though in 
this case, the morality means also tended to increase in the groups that have picked 
unjustifiable more times). 
 
In relation to the other seven neutralisation techniques, T-Tests were performed by using each 
of the neutralisation techniques (applying to each vignette only the neutralisations coded for 
that vignette) as the grouping variables for the creation of two sub-samples of morality means. 
The T-Test showed results that are extremely relevant to the theoretical model. The significant 
neutralisation techniques had negative t-values, therefore those respondents who had picked 
one of them (the ones that have been deemed as statistically significant) showed lower means 
of morality. Neutralisation techniques allowed participants to see cybercrimes in a more 
acceptable way in terms of its immorality, therefore fulfilling one of the key purposes of 
neutralisation techniques, which is protecting oneself from blame and the blame of others by 
resorting to conventional views of morality. 
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Table 25. Comparison of morality means by all neutralisation techniques (only statistically 
significant portrayed) 
 Neutralisations 
Illegal Downloading Morality Nothing wrong: t(705)=-7.92*** 
Not my fault: t(705)=2.45* 
Everyone else is doing it: t(705)=2.28* 
It’s my right to do so: t(705)=-4.99*** 
Revenge Porn Morality  Victim’s fault: t(704)=-2.62** 
It’s my right to do so: t(704)=-3.76*** 
Everyone else is doing it: t(704)=-3.26** 
 
Cyberbullying Morality Nothing wrong: t(699)=-2.06* 
Victim’s fault: t(699)=-2.40* 
Not my fault: t(699)=-4.14*** 
No other choice: t(699)=-2.70** 
It’s my right to do so: t(699)=-3.41** 
Sexting Morality Nothing wrong: t (704)=-8.96*** 
It’s my right to do so: t (704)= -5.69*** 
Cyberfraud Morality Nothing wrong: t(703)=-6.28*** 
Not my fault: t(703)=-4.14*** 
It’s my right to do so: t(703)=-6.70*** 
Victim’s fault: t(703)=-2.08* 
Everyone else is doing it: t(703)=-2.22* 
 
Cyberstalking Morality Nothing wrong: t(706)=-3.95*** 
Not my fault: t(706)=-3.64*** 
Victim’s fault: t(706)=-2.89** 
It’s my right to do so: t(706)=-4.05*** 
Wi-Fi Stealing Morality Nothing wrong: t (706)= -10.05*** 
Victim’s fault: t(706)=-2.53* 
It’s my right to do so: t(706)=-4.20*** 
 
Legend *p<0.05/** p<0.01/p *** <0.001 
 
In Table 25, the first technique that was statistically significant was “nothing wrong” (t (705)= -
7.92, p<0.001). In this case the mean difference was very high and participants who used this 
technique rated illegal downloading M=1.87 (n=150), therefore understanding it as almost not 
immoral at all. By contrast, those who did not pick the technique had a mean of 3. 81 (n=557). 
Something similar occurred with “It’s my right” (t (705) = -4.99, p<0.001). 
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However, an opposite trend emerged for “not my fault” p<0.05 and “everyone else is doing it” 
p<0.05. In these cases, t-values were positive, and those who picked the technique rated illegal 
downloading as more morally inadequate. 
 
Nothing wrong seemed to be the most effective technique in terms of shielding against 
morality, with very high t-values and statistically significant in every vignette in relation to 
morality; with the exception of Revenge Porn vignette. 
 
In relation to the engagement variables and neutralisation variables, the analyses were carried 
out in the same way as for the morality variables, employing T-Tests and ANOVAs. The T-Tests 
used the “Unjustified” variables as the grouping variable in order to compare the means of 
engagement (Following this sequence of comparisons: Case1_Unjustified for Vignette number 
1, Case2_Unjustified for vignette number 2, etc.). All of the t-values were negative and 
statistically significant at p<0.001, with the exception of Cyberstalking that was significant at 
p<0.05. 
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Table 26. Engagement means' comparison by Unjustified neutralisation techniques.  
 Unjustified  
Illegal Downloading Engagement 
 
t(705)= -3.99*** 
Revenge Porn Engagement 
 
t(702)= -5.97*** 
Cyberbullying Engagement t(705)= -7.01*** 
Sexting Engagement t(703)=-5.06*** 
Cyberfraud Engagement t(704)= -5.98*** 
 
Cyberstalking Engagement 
 
t(704)= -2.20* 
Wi-Fi Stealing Engagement  t(707)= -10.342*** 
Legend: *p<0.05/ *** p<0.001 
 
For every single case, the engagement means of respondents who picked the “it’s not 
justifiable” option were lower than those who had not picked this option. This difference, as 
indicated beforehand, was statistically significant for every single case (see Table 26). 
 
The t-value for Wi-Fi Stealing vignette (t(707) =-10.342, p<0.001) was the highest one and 
demonstrated a very profound difference in the means. This might indicate that participants 
who did not understand Wi-Fi Stealing as unjustifiable would almost certainly engage in it (a 
score of 10 demonstrates absolute agreement). All of this is consistent with the theoretical 
model and demonstrated congruency between the engagement variables and the 
neutralisation techniques. 
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The ANOVAs were performed using Sum_Unjustified as the factor and the engagement 
questions as the dependent variables (see Table 27). 
 
Table 27. ANOVAs using Sum_Unjustified as factor and engagement questions as dependent 
variables 
 ANOVA (Sum_Unjustified) 
Illegal Downloading  Engagement F (7, 699) =4.27*** 
Revenge Porn Engagement F (7, 696) =4.17*** 
Cyberbullying  Engagement F (7, 699) =2.64* 
Sexting  Engagement F (7, 697) =1.81 
Cyber Fraud Engagement F (7, 698) =2.80** 
Cyber Stalking Engagement F (7, 698) =0.53 
Wi-Fi stealing Engagement F (7, 701) =15.12*** 
Legend: * p<0.05/** p<0.01/  ***p<0.001 
 
All of the cases were statistically significant, with the exception of sexting and cyberstalking. 
The trend is that respondents who more frequently chose the option “it’s not justifiable” were 
less likely to engage in acts of cybercrime, given that their engagements means were lower. 
Figure 19  is an example of what has been indicated before. 
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Figure 19. Means plot for Illegal Downloading Engagement and Sum_Unjustified 
 
 
All in all, the engagement variables were also statistically significant, in general terms, in 
relation to the use of a null neutralisation technique. 
 
In relation to the other seven neutralisation techniques, the analysis that was carried out by 
using T-Tests to compare the engagement means and the different neutralisation technique 
dummy variables as grouping variables (as seen before, on a vignette by vignette scenario). 
That analysis (see Table 28) demonstrated that participants who picked a neutralisation 
technique are more likely to engage in the cybercriminal acts depicted in the vignettes because 
they show higher engagement means. In these cases, the t-values were positive (as opposed to 
the trend set for the morality values). This became relevant in relation to the theoretical 
model, as neutralisation techniques serve a twofold purpose. Neutralisation techniques shield 
against the moral wrongness of the act and accordingly they give the participant more reasons 
to engage in acts of crime. These tests have therefore proven to be congruent with literature 
on neutralisation techniques. It is worth mentioning that “nothing wrong” was one of the most 
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efficient neutralisation techniques, as it has demonstrated very profound differences in the 
means of some cases and seemed to be favoured by the respondents in general. After 
analysing the role of neutralisation techniques in perceptions of morality and engagement, 
one could argue that “nothing wrong” served as the generic neutralisation technique, which 
allowed for a more abstract modulation of blame. On the other hand, “victim’s fault” was 
extremely efficient in crimes that have an apparent victim (like those relating to abuse), even 
in terms of property crime (Wi-Fi Stealing and Illegal Downloading). Even though there were 
some differences in the techniques that can modulate morality and the ones that can 
modulate engagement.   
 
Finally, it be pointed out that “I didn’t have any other choice” and “It’s my right to do so” have 
shown statistical significance in relation to many of the scenarios. “No other choice” was 
extremely recurrent for the engagement variable (being significant in six of the seven scenarios 
as can be seen in Table 28).  
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Table 28. Comparison of engagement means by all neutralisation techniques (only 
statistically significant portrayed).  
 Neutralisations 
Illegal Downloading Engagement Nothing wrong: t(705)=2.87** 
Victim’s fault: t(705)=2.51* 
No other choice: t(705)=2.08* 
Revenge Porn Engagement  Nothing wrong: t(702)=3.06** 
Victim’s fault: t(702)=4.14*** 
Everyone else is doing it: t(702)=2.94** 
No other choice: t(702)=3.33** 
Cyberbullying Engagement Nothing wrong: t(705)=3.48**  
Not my fault: t(705)=4.04*** 
Victim’s fault: t(705)=2.34* 
Everyone else is doing it: t(705)=2.32* 
No other choice: t(705)=4.58*** 
It’s my right to do so: t(705)=5.74*** 
Ledger: t(705)=2.12* 
Sexting Engagement Nothing wrong: t(703)=3.99*** 
No other choice: t(703)=2.47* 
It’s my right to do so: t(703)=3.17** 
Cyber Fraud Engagement Nothing wrong: t(704)=4.29*** 
Not my fault: t(704)= 3.93*** 
Everyone else is doing it: t(704)=2.14* 
No other choice: t(704)=3.00** 
It’s my right to do so: t(704)=3.05** 
Ledger: t(704)=2.10* 
Cyber stalking Engagement Victim’s fault: t(704)=2.36* 
It’s my right to do so: t(704)=3.03** 
Wi-Fi Stealing Engagement Nothing wrong: t(707)=6.30*** 
Victim’s fault: t(707)=2.58* 
Everyone else is doing it: t(707)=2.71** 
No other choice: t(707)=4.64*** 
Ledger: t(707)=2.24* 
Legend *p<0.05/** p<0.01/p *** <0.001 
 
Several problems must be mentioned in relation to the T-Tests that were used  in Revenge 
Porn. The independent samples compared for “nothing wrong” and “everyone else is doing it”, 
were very imbalanced (for “nothing wrong” (n1=10, n2=694) and for “everyone else is doing it” 
(n1=3, n2=701)). In cyberbullying the same occurred with “no other choice” (n1=5, n2=702). In 
Sexting, “no other choice” was significant at p<0.05 with a positive t-value and an unbalanced 
sample (n1=13, n2=392). 
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Cyberbullying was the vignette that had the most significant neutralisation techniques in terms 
of engagement. This is relevant in social terms and crime prevention terms, but it could also 
provide a discourse educationally and how cyberbullying is understood by the sample as a 
justifiable process. Contrarily, the means of engagement and morality seemed to indicate that 
cyberbullying was seen as repulsive by the sample, maybe needing more neutralisitions in 
order to become palatable. 
 
Table 29 is a summary of all the statistically significant neutralisation techniques discussed in 
this chapter. Columns indicate whether they were significant in relation to the morality 
variable, the self-control variable or the engagement variable. The ones that were statistically 
significant in relation to the three variables have been coloured in order to highlight their 
efficiency and intensity. Also, the cyberbullying engagement cell has been highlighted in dark 
colour in order to show that it is the only case where the seven neutralisations were effective.  
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Table 29. Statistically significant neutralisation techniques in relation to self-control, 
morality and engagement 
 Self-control (interval 
and dichotomous 
variables) 
Morality Engagement 
Illegal Downloading - Nothing wrong 
 
Nothing wrong 
 
Not my fault Not my fault - 
- - Victim’s fault 
- Everyone else is doing it - 
- - No other choice 
- It’s my right to do so - 
- - - 
Revenge Porn Nothing wrong - Nothing wrong 
 
Not my fault - - 
Victim’s fault 
 
Victim’s fault Victim’s fault 
- Everyone else is doing it Everyone else is doing it 
- - No other choice 
- It’s my right to do so - 
- - - 
 Cyberbullying - Nothing wrong 
 
Nothing wrong 
 
- Not my fault Not my fault 
- Victim’s fault Victim’s fault 
Everyone else is doing it - Everyone else is doing it 
- No other choice No other choice 
- It’s my right to do so It’s my right to do so 
- - Ledger 
Sexting  
- 
Nothing wrong 
 
Nothing wrong 
 
Not my fault - - 
- - - 
- - - 
No other choice - No other choice 
- It’s my right to do so It’s my right to do so 
- - - 
Cyber Fraud Nothing wrong 
 
Nothing wrong  
 
Nothing wrong   
 
Not my fault Not my fault Not my fault 
- Victim’s fault - 
- everyone else is doing it Everyone else is doing it 
- - No other choice 
It’s my right to do so It’s my right to do so It’s my right to do so 
- - Ledger 
Cyber stalking - Nothing wrong  
 
- 
- Not my fault - 
Victim’s fault 
 
Victim’s fault Victim’s fault 
- - - 
- - - 
- It’s my right to do so 
 
It’s my right to do so 
 
- - - 
Wi-Fi stealing - Nothing wrong 
 
Nothing wrong 
 
Not my fault - - 
- Victim’s fault Victim’s fault 
- - Everyone else is doing it 
No other choice - No other choice 
It’s my right to do so 
 
It’s my right to do so - 
- - Ledger 
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4.3.4. Regression 
 
Finally, in order to test the strength of some elements of the model, a regression was carried 
out. A linear regression using the stepwise method that tried to predict the interval self-
control aggregated value (dependent variable) by using all morality and engagement questions 
as predictor variables.  
 
Step 7 (R2 = 0.198, F (7, 635) = 22.836, p =0.000), including the variables listed below, predicted 
a significant variance in self-control scores: 
- Revenge Porn Engagement: St β= 0.187, t=5.130, p=0.000 
- Cyber Fraud morality: St β= -0.225, t=-5.740, p=0.000 
- Wi-Fi stealing engagement: St β= 0.141, t=3.454, p=0.001 
- Illegal Downloading Engagement: St β= 0.122, t=2.936, p=0.003 
- Cyberfraud engagement: St β= 0.095, t=2.478, p=0.013 
-  Illegal Downloading morality: St β= - 0.102, t=- 2.625, p=0.009 
- Sexting morality: St β= 0.097, t=2.583, p=0.010 
 
All of these variables significantly predicted self-control, even though some were negative 
values, such as Illegal Downloading morality and Cyberfraud morality. This can be understood 
from the perspective that an increase in the morality variables (the higher the perception of 
moral wrongness) would suppose a decrease in self-control scores. The more morally wrong 
any of these acts is perceived, the higher the degree of self-control respondents have. By 
contrast, engagement variables had positive β values, therefore increases in any of them 
would suppose an increase in the self-control interval variable. In other words, the more likely 
a person is to engage in acts of crime, the less self-control they would have.  
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 Results were consistent with what has been indicated in the previous regression and 
throughout this chapter.  
4.4. Discussion  
 
Even though the presentations of findings originated some immediate discussion, this part of 
the chapter is dedicated to analyzing certain specific issues in more depth, bearing in mind that 
the final chapter of this work contains an integrated discussion of both the quantitative and 
the qualitative results.   
 
4.4.1. Morality 
 
The worst rated vignette, deemed to be almost absolutely immoral, was the Revenge Porn 
vignette, followed by the Cyberbullying vignette. They correlated positively very strongly. Two 
things must be discussed in relation to this: first, whether or not Revenge Porn and 
Cyberbullying are understood taxonomically as two different criminal species or Revenge Porn 
as a subspecies of Cyberbullying; and secondly, whether or not the sexual (be it erotic or 
pornographic) nature of Revenge Porn has been ascribed more intense immoral connotations. 
The Revenge Porn case has been phrased by the present researcher as researcher as:  
“Peter and Adele were going out. Adele used to send Peter suggestive pictures of her 
accompanied by saucy messages. One day Peter discovers Susan is having an affair and he 
decides to take revenge on her by sending her pictures and messages to his friends via social 
networks and e-mail, as well as posting them on the internetx. “ 
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A gender discourse might be of interest in order to understand better this vignette. It could be 
argued that patriarchal structures inform the idea of a man taking revenge on a woman by 
using her own sexuality as a weapon of shame. This issue will be dealt with in more detail in 
Chapter 6. However, a T-Test demonstrated that women (n=398, M=9.42) rated this vignette 
morally worse than men (n=308, M=8.92), t (704) = -3.50, p <0.001. Going back to the four 
“precipice” vignettes (Cyberbullying, Cyberstalking, Cyberfraud and Revenge Porn), these were 
the cases that have shown the strongest correlations between their morality variables as 
indicated in previous paragraphs.  One could argue these were the most extreme situations; 
ones that imply a certain level degree of cruelty or a harassing attitude. These four vignettes 
also imply psychological violence and could be understood as extremely destructive for the 
victims, given the impact they can have upon them. Cyberfraud may be more diffuse in terms 
of its psychological impact, but the sample may have perceived it as having a profound 
victimising impact. In addition, all these behaviours are criminalised in the Criminal Code in 
Spain. (In some cases, like Revenge Porn and Cyberstalking, this was not expressly so until July 
1st 2015 when the criminal Code was amended). Therefore, codified crime (rather than deviant 
behaviour or administrative wrongs) might be regarded as inherently morally wrong by a 
sample with high self-control (that include low levels of egotism). Also, it must be taken into 
account that the sample was comprised mostly of university students (including criminology 
and law students), law enforcement agents, educators and lawyers. In conclusion, most of the 
respondents had an understanding of crime from an ontological and philosophical perspective 
that allowed them to ascribe negative moral labels to different situations that are understood 
as criminal.  
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In the Sexting vignette a gender discourse might also shed some light, given that the question 
was formulated in the following manner:  
“Gena is a 16 year old young girl that thanks to a social network has befriended a 31 year old 
man called Bad_Wolf and started a relationship of sexual undertones. One day Bad_Wolf asks 
Gena to send some naked pictures of her, she agrees and does it”xi.  
In this case, the gender of the main character was deliberate in order to study whether gender 
played a fundamental part in moral rating, from the point of view of the ones rating or the one 
being rated. Following a T-Test, comparing women (n=399, M=5.64) and men (n=307, M=5.34), 
no statistical significance (t (704) = -1.116, p>0.05) was found in the comparison of means 
between males and females rating the morality of the sexting case. This case created several 
divisions in terms of perceptions of morality, but said opinions seemed not to rely on the 
gender of the participants.  The reasons why both men and women tended to rate the Sexting 
and Cyberstalking vignettes similarly raised several gender issues that should be dealt with. 
Men and women positioned themselves in “lukewarm morality” in relation to the Sexting 
vignette. In addition to this, both men and women rated Cyberstalking with a very high “moral 
fail” (men, n=308, M=8.71; women, n=400, M=8.76). The Cyberstalking vignette was depicted 
as follows: 
 “Tom is secretly in love with his work-mate Deborah. On a daily basis he sends her love e-
mails from a fake e-mail account singed as ‘Your secret admirer’. Tom has also created a web-
page called ‘DeborahIwouldDevourYou.com’ where he posts pictures of her taken without 
permission and love letters. Deborah feels very worried and scared about this”xii.  
The narrative portrayed an innocent female victim, falling victim to obsessive predatory 
behaviour from a male colleague. Both male and female participants rated this case very 
similarly, where they have rated other cases (in terms of morality) in a differently. Revenge 
Porn that included a similar situation, whereby a man shares intimate sexual content, to take 
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revenge on his girlfriend, was deemed to be much more wrong (t (704) =-3.50, p<0.001) by 
women. Also, another similar abusive situation like Cyberbullying showed significant 
differences between sexes. On a statistical level, the Revenge Porn vignette and the 
Cyberstalking one were positively correlated at r= 0.55. 
 
One could argue that a chivalry explanation might be behind these differences (men 
constructing women as “damsels in distress”), or a feminist discourse (women being more 
empathic towards abused women) or a combination of both (Juschka, 2009). These issues will 
be brought up again in Chapter 6, when integrating data from the online survey and the 
interviews. The differences in the vignette scores might also lie in the fact that in Revenge 
Porn, no indication of the psychological state of the victim was made, whereas in the 
Cyberstalking vignette the coda “Deborah feels very worried and scared about this” was 
provided. Even so, the Revenge Porn vignette obtained higher ratings from both sexes than the 
cyberstalking one. This is also the first case were the participants we asked to rate the victim 
instead of the perpetrator in order to see whether or not morality and engagement would 
differ from other vignettes. Also,  the perpetrator was named Bad_Wolf to accentuate the 
sense of menace or threat.  
 
It should be recognized that the victim, Gena, in the Sexting scenario, was a 16 year old girl (a 
minor in Spain) who was convinced by an adult to send naked pictures of herself in what 
seemed to be a consenting relationship.  This should have no apparent legal repercussions, 
even though a good knowledge of law would be needed to understand the particularities of 
the case. In other words, the idea was creating a vignette that was to be rated from a non-
legalistic point (not as a crime) of view but a purely moral perspective.  
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 It might be argued that these cases are not understood as immoral, because they are not 
regarded as crimes by the sample (albeit illegal downloading is a crime against intellectual 
property in Spain, as an example). This is a study on perceptions of morality and as such there 
is a focus upon participant’s construction of the world. Illegal Downloading has become part of 
many people’s daily lives, a habit. Also, neutralisation techniques operate in order to protect 
the offender from blame relating, for example, from the music industry. Something similar 
occurred in relation to Wi-Fi Stealing, as it is understood as a normalized pattern of behaviour. 
  
As a summary, the majority of vignettes have been perceived as morally repulsive by 
participants with the exceptions of Sexting (“lukewarm”), Wi-Fi Stealing and Illegal 
Downloading (both acceptable). Also, self-control in itself has proven to be statistically 
significant as those with higher levels of self-control rated the cases as less morally acceptable. 
Women have demonstrated higher levels of self-control and higher means in the perceptions 
of morality in general.  
 
4.4.2. Engagement 
 
In terms of engagement, participants generally demonstrated low tendencies to engage in the 
activities depicted, with the exception of Illegal Downloading and Wi-Fi stealing. This, if 
considered with the morality results, demonstrated that the sample had very low cybercrime 
propensity. 
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Engagement being statistically significant in terms of self-control was consistent with the 
proposed theoretical model and with the overall pattern of results. Individuals with high levels 
of self-control (those with lesser scores in the Grasmick scale) are socio-psychologically fit to 
avoid and postpone immediate pleasure and have stronger cognitive instruments to deal with 
frustration. They are, therefore, not likely to engage in acts of crime. Lack of self-control does 
not only mean being  impulsive, but also to have a here and now mentality with the inability to 
position oneself in the future, the inability to position oneself in the place of others, the dislike 
for complex tasks, the need for taking risks, a liking for physical activities (rather than mental 
ones) and the inability to reason verbally in conflicts (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). As Higgins  
(2001) stated  “the lower an individual’s level of self-control, the more likely they are to 
perform digital piracy and to highly value digital media” (p.148).  Higgins also found 
correlations between shame, value, external sanctions, moral behaviors and low self-control 
with digital piracy (pp. 147-148). 
 
The present study also seemed to indicate that individuals with higher levels of self-control 
would rate cybercrimes as more morally repulsive than those with lesser levels of self-control. 
A high self-control sample like the one in this study shows, in summary, less propensity to the 
commission of cybercrimes.  
 
One case that stands out is the Sexting vignette. Contrary to what has been theorized and 
demonstrated in terms of correlations and measures of engagement and morality, participants 
understood Sexting as not entirely right or not entirely wrong. That being the case, it could be 
argued that participants would not mind engaging in Sexting. However, the sample was not 
keen on performing sexting (in a similar fashion to the other vignettes, with the exception of 
Illegal Downloading and Wi-Fi Stealing). Similarly, all of the vignettes were significant in terms 
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of the relationship between engagement and self-control, but not all of the vignettes were 
significant in terms of the relationship between perceptions of morality and self-control 
(Sexting and Illegal Downloading are not).  
 
The answer to this conundrum might be found in the fact that questions ask about eventual 
involvement in criminal (or pseudo-criminal) activities and, even though, indirect projective 
questioning was approached by using vignettes, asking the participants to “put themselves in 
some else’s shoes” (used for neutralisation techniques) and whether they “would do the same 
someone did on the vignette” in order to avoid becoming a self-report questionnaire. Fisher 
(1993) reviewed several studies based on indirect projective questions, such as the ones found 
in this study but with no criminological undertones. According to Fisher (1993) “The stronger 
the social norms governing the topic under investigation, the more likely social desirability bias 
is to occur” (p. 313). However, Fisher also added “it appears that indirect questions can be 
constructed that are not significantly affected by social desirability bias” (p. 313). Therefore, 
asking about the perceptions of morality of actions that are mostly illegal could produce a 
social desirability bias. Respondents might indicate that they would surely not engage in 
cybercriminal activities. Similarly, Schoepfer and Piquero (2006) used vignettes to measure 
moral beliefs and self-control and carried out a vignette based study that served as inspiration 
for the methodology of this investigation. They indicated that “Although we readily 
acknowledge that the use of hypothetical circumstances is not necessarily equivalent to 
reality; previous research has revealed a strong correlation between intentions and actual 
behavior” (Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006, p. 58; citing, Green 1989; Kim, and Hunter 1993; 
Pogarsky 2004; see also Wikström et al., 2003). After acknowledging the limitations of their 
study, Schoepfer and Piquero (2006) stated that “future research should strive to replicate our 
results using actual behavior” (p. 68).  In a similar fashion, Randall and Fernandes (1991) also 
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researched social desirability bias and concluded that “ethical individuals provide socially 
desirable responses that agree with their behavior” (p. 813) and that “our research 
demonstrated that social desirability bias persists even if the survey is administered in a non-
threatening situation” (p. 813). In accordance, a high self-control sample obtained mostly from 
university students, lecturers, lawyers or police officers might tend to demonstrate ethical 
behavior reflected on the scores (by rating the vignettes as morally unacceptable and not 
engaging in them). However, the fact that most of the data was collected by using an online 
questionnaire that guaranteed real anonymity might have minimized the impact of the bias in 
the responses.   
 
From another perspective, one could argue that some of the differences found between the 
morality and the engagement questions might be understood because of the existence of the 
“fundamental attribution error” or “correspondence bias”, “the correspondence bias is 
sometimes denned as the tendency to underestimate the power of situations” (Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995, p. 27). The reason why the aforementioned bias might occur in this study could 
be grounded in the idea that morality questions might be understood as the ascription of a 
certain general moral makeup to others. The participant, when indicating the moral 
appropriateness of sexting (or any of the other depicted behaviours), was judging the “other” 
or the “average guy”, an abstraction of what he/she understood as the generality of the 
population. It would entail the creation of an idea akin to the “weak abstract other” as 
opposed to the “strong-willed I”: 
Ordinary people seem to believe that others behave as they do because of the kinds of 
others they are and because of the kinds of situations in which their behaviors unfold; 
thus, when a person makes an attribution about another, she or he attempts to 
determine which of these factors— the other person or the other person's situation—
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played the more significant role in shaping the other person's behavior. (Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995, p. 22) 
 
In the Sexting vignette, for example, participants were asked to rate the morality of actions 
carried out by an adolescent girl during the course of an online romantic/sexual relationship. A 
consensus was not reached as participants rated it in very different ways (it must be taken into 
account again that for the case the mode=10, yet M=5.1 and S.D.= 3.47). However, participants 
were not inclined to take part in these activities when they were asked about themselves (For 
this case, morality and engagement correlate negatively r= -0.22, p<0.001). In other words, an 
intersubjective narrative seemed to unravel: even if it seems appropriate, ambivalent or 
repulsive that a seventeen year old girl engages in sexting, it is not something I myself would 
be willing to do.  
 
4.4.3. Neutralisations 
 
The gender or victimhood variable played no role in the picking and using of neutralisation 
techniques. Also, self-control is statistically significant in relation to the picking of the “it’s not 
justified” technique. Respondents with higher levels of self-control tended to opt for it and the 
more they picked the technique, through the survey, the higher their self-control levels. In 
terms of other neutralisation techniques, a few have demonstrated statistical significance in 
relation to the self-control means and also to the distribution of high self-control amongst 
different techniques but no pattern can be identified. Some of the techniques that were 
statistically significant for both self-control variables were “victim’s fault”, “not my fault”, “It is 
my right to do so” and “no other choice”. 
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 Morality and engagement variables have proven to be statistically significant in terms of the 
picking of “unjustified”, but also in relation to other neutralisation techniques that might be 
chosen and served to facilitate engagement and modest perceptions of morality. 
 
For example, in one of the essential “outlier cases” - Illegal Downloading - only 17.3 % of 
respondents defined this behavior as Unjustifiable. In contrast, 34.4% of participants justified 
the act by indicting that “everyone else is doing it”, which is consistent with current literature 
on the matter, followed by “I haven’t done anything wrong” (21.4%) and “It’s my right to do 
so” (11. 6 %).  Ingram and Hinduja (2008), for example, report: 
The results indicated that greater acceptance of the techniques associated with denial of 
responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, and appeals to higher loyalty were 
significant predictors of moderate levels of piracy participation (e.g., downloading 
1011,000 MP3s). (p. 356) 
 
Hinduja (2007) stated that: 
Denial of Injury, Appeal to Higher Loyalties, Denial of Negative Intent, and Claim of 
Relative Acceptability were the only techniques significantly related to having pirated 
software at least once. These four techniques, then, have the ability to release 
individuals from the tethers of conventional behavior (i.e., respecting intellectual 
property) and open up the possibility of pirating software should conducive social or 
situational factors present themselves to encourage the activity. (p. 196) 
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Hinduja (2007), and Ingram and Hinduja (2008) proved that that neutralisation techniques 
played a fundamental part in allowing law-abiding individuals to evade moral norms and 
commit acts of crime (Illegal Downloading) , provided that there is an opportunity for doing so.  
What has been said about individuals downloading music (law-abiding but opportunistic) is 
also consistent with the conceptualisation of criminals (and cybercriminals) as individuals with 
a “limited rationality”, whose criminal acts are precipitated by situational factors (Clarke, 1999; 
Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 1987; Miró Llinares, 2011; Newman & Clarke, 2003; Yar, 2005). 
 
In terms of engagement, the only vignette where the seven justification techniques were 
significant in relation to the engagement variable was Cyberbullying, and the only techniques 
that were statistically significant in terms of morality, engagement and self-control were 
“victim’s fault”, “not my fault”, “nothing wrong” and “it’s my right to do so”. “Nothing wrong” 
was by far the most effective neutralisation technique relating to the highest mean differences 
of perceptions of morality in sexting, illegal downloading and Wi-Fi stealing and the highest 
mean differences in Wi-Fi Stealing engagement. 
 
4.5. Summary 
 
The relationship between self-control, perceptions of morality and engagement have been 
examined to test the new proposed theoretical model; one based upon an interactive process 
between cybercrime propensity (perceptions of morality and cybercrime engagement), the 
exposure to a criminogenic setting (as the internet has been theorised to be) and the 
application of neutralisation techniques. 
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The sample tended to comprise individuals with high self-control, fairly balanced in terms of 
gender, but derived largely from a university population. The lack of probabilistic sampling 
could have generated a socio-demographic imbalance that might account for some moral bias 
in the results owing to occupational values and cultures.  
 
Having been a victim of crime did not have any effect on the model. It might have been 
thought that people who had been victims of crime might have had a harsher view on 
cybercrime. The results, however, pointed in the other direction. On the other hand, gender 
played a significant role in the model, with women tending to show higher levels of self-control 
(more membership of the High self-control groups) than men. Also, women rated cybercrime 
as more morally reproachable and they were less likely to engage in acts of crime. This finding 
provides a link between self-control, and the perceptions of morality and engagement in the 
sample. By contrast, gender seemed to bear no significance in terms of neutralisation 
techniques. 
 
Self-control played a fundamental role in the construct, be it as an aggregated interval scale, a 
dichotomous (High/Low variable) and  in its six constituent elements. However, when all of the 
constituent elements of self-control were analysed, physical activities bore no significance in 
the overall construct; there did not seem to be a modulation of morality perceptions or 
engagement according to this variable. However, self-control was significantly related to 
perceptions of morality and engagement, as generally those with higher levels of self-control 
would not engage in certain acts of crime and rated them as morally repulsive.  Participants 
who were members of the High self-control group showed a similar tendency.  
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When studying perceptions of morality and engagement, the model revealed a high degree of 
correlation between the two measures. Generally, participants exhibited considerable 
consensus between rating cases as morally wrong and indicating that they would not engage in 
them. The fact that some of the depicted cases were crimes might have generated a strong 
sense of repulsion. Even so, the existence of a social desirability bias and correspondence bias 
cannot be overlooked, as the instrument was based on indirect, projective questioning. That 
said, three vignettes stood out in regards to the “symmetry” between morality and 
engagement and are in deserving of further analysis: the Sexting, the Wi-Fi Stealing and Illegal 
Downloading vignettes. Wi-Fi stealing and Illegal Downloading were not really perceived as 
wrong and seemed to be embedded in the daily activities of the respondents. On the other 
hand, Sexting was not really understood as morally wrong or right. Also, some of the vignettes 
might have generated psychological triggers relating to empathy because of the wording or the 
presentation of the case (i.e. Cyberstalking and Sexting) and call also for a gendered analysis. In 
addition, a regression demonstrated that some of the engagement and morality variables from 
certain vignettes had predictive value over the self-control variable.  
 
Finally, it has not been possible to determine the role of self-control in terms of neutralisation 
techniques. It may be that perception of a criminal behaviour as “Unjustifiable” is not related 
to an individual’s level of self-control.  This might suppose a change in the initial formulation of 
the SAT-RI model.  On the other hand, the data pointed to a relationship between 
neutralisation techniques, and perceptions of morality and engagement. Usually, participants 
might not engage in acts they understood as unjustifiable and might rate such acts as morally 
reproachable. In addition, certain specific neutralisation techniques (depending on the 
vignettes) might serve to dulcify the moral perceptions of an act and/or to allow for 
engagement. The narratives that allowed for the understanding of the act as non-criminal and 
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the ones that blame the victim have proven to be extremely efficient in modulating individuals’ 
propensity towards cybercriminal acts. 
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Chapter 5: Findings - Interviews with Law Enforcement Agents 
 
 
The findings that emerged from the interviews with law enforcement agents are divided in: 
offender morality, neutralisation techniques, and police culture. In order to preserve 
anonymity and confidentiality, references to law enforcement agents (from now on) are made 
by using their pseudonyms and the pronoun “he” (regardless of their gender). See Annex 4 for 
a summary of the cases. 
 
5.1. Offender Morality 
 
5.1.1. The professional 
 
In relation to the construction of the cybercriminal from the point of view of law enforcement 
agents, one of the narratives that repeated itself through all the interviews was the idea of the 
“career criminal”. A very high degree of professionalisation was ascribed to cybercriminals by 
all interviewees.  This narrative appeared in cases C1, C3, C10, C11, C13 and C14. It should be 
noted that all of these cases (with the exception of C1) were cyberfrauds, as they had an 
economic purpose and satisfied the legal definition of fraud in many criminal codes or 
legislation. In other cases, the narratives referred to hackers or skilled computer virus 
designers, although an economic motivation was always present.  
Well, what is clear is that they are professionals and they make their living out of that; I 
mean they do not have other activity no, I mean, this is a complement to… No. No, this 
is their way of living. (GCEX, C3xiii) 
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The first quality ascribed to these cybercriminals was computer-prowess. The cybercriminal 
trade requires very high technical competency in order to, for example, design complex 
viruses, make contingency plans19, create bogus web-pages or to navigate through the dark or 
deep web: 
I mean, this is their way of living; you have let’s say good skills, you speak perfectly, in 
this case they spoke three or four languages from Russian, English, Spanish, French, ok? I 
mean, they Eastern European people have a knack for languages. So they have an 
incredible gift for learning, but at the end it is nothing else but a way of living. (GCEX, 
C3xiv) 
The minor had very high computer skills, he is very timid, he lives in a very small village 
in Asturias where what is there are cows. (NPEX2, C17xv, emphasis added) 
 
Another quality that was ascribed to these “professional” cybercriminals was 
entrepreneurship. The majority of them were people born in countries where, according to the 
interviewee accounts, living conditions were more challenging in economic, legal or social 
terms, compared to Spain. Against this backdrop, a life of crime seemed to be one easy and 
logical solution, as well as one of the few life-choices available to them. This is worth 
mentioning as a high degree of empathy (or at least, understanding) seemed to be present 
among many of the interviewees. 
If in your home country you lived in a certain way and you have acquired this knowledge 
with what…When you arrive in here and putting this knowledge to work you are capable 
of having a fast and high economic compensation, having a standard of living you 
19
 They had several back-ups and they were working with redundant servers to guarantee either quick 
recovery or destruction of data in case they were apprehended by the police. 
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couldn’t even imagine in your own country… Well logically you are going to do it. (GCEX, 
C2xvi) 
NPEX2 talked about the creator the “Police Porn Virus” in similar terms: 
It’s a bit of a remote city there in Russia. There weren’t many possibilities, I think that 
not even economic nor anything at all, and then this solution … People that technically 
are good at computing, programming virus and whatnot, well it’s a very profitable 
solution to their skills, because the job it can secure working as an engineer or IT 
consultant there in Russia, or the benefits you can obtain from an enterprise of this 
type, well it has nothing to do. (NPEX2, C13xvii) 
 
However, from a Foucauldian analysis point of view (Gibbs, 2015), certain relevant issues 
might be underlying in terms of power structures and social control: the identification of the 
criminal as alien (as in different and foreign). As was discussed above, in relation to social class, 
this understanding of what “foreigners” are able to do in dire circumstances, can create a 
“developing Europe versus developed Europe discourse”. In a manner of speaking, law 
enforcement agents might be tainting their accounts from their economic and social Spanish 
background. Bauman (2000) explains ideas of antropoemic and anthropophagic strategies in 
dealing with “others”, “otherness” and “foreigners” (p. 101). By antropoemic Lévi-Strauss 
(cited in Bauman, 2000) means strategies devoted to annihilating the “other”, “incurably 
strange and alien” (p. 101) and by anthropophagic he is referring to digesting their 
“otherness’” in order to “metabolize” it (p. 101). In these narratives, a veiled entropoemic 
discourse seemed to unravel, in terms of highlighting the “otherness” of the criminal and 
especially the criminal foreigner, even if indicating understanding of the criminal and his/her 
circumstances  
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In both cases of designer malware (C13 and C14), “The Police Porn Virus” and “Cryptolocker”, 
the virus created an elaborate deception that implied the payment of a ransom in order to 
recover the computer, be it from what was a supposed “police seize” of the data or the 
encryption. Both were regarded as complex schemes, quite sophisticated in terms of both 
their design and deployment. The Police Porn Virus is presented as a “good product” (NPEX2, 
C13xviii ) for reasons such as “the deceit was well thought through in the sense that the 
infection stemmed from web-pages where pornographic content was displayed” (NPEX2, 
C13xix ) and “they [the criminal organisation] had a good virus because it wasn’t detected by 
any anti-virus” (NPEX2, C13xx). The technical infrastructure behind the virus deployment and 
management was also quite sophisticated as it is considered “bullet-proof hosting” (NPEX2, 
C13), meaning that: 
it is super safe for them, because at this moment he/she says: OK. Well, he erases 
everything or remotely I connect to my server and erase everything and you open 
another one in other place, thus they are very safe services for criminals. (NPEX2, C13xxi) 
 According to NPEX2, the money-laundering procedure used in this kind of malware scheme 
was also extremely intricate as in some cases it implied payments by the victim using Bitcoin as 
well as Ukash and Paysafecrd codes that later required another money/code laundering 
process (NPEX2, C13 and C14). These skilled “career criminals” were able to design a tangled 
web of technical and legal deception that allowed them to function in a multinational 
environment and position themselves ahead of law enforcement agencies, legislators and 
computer experts. 
 
A deep sense of respect and admiration for career criminals was evident in many of the 
interviews, with the offenders’ creativity and skills often being praised expressly or implicitly: 
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I have a good product; I want to reach as many people as possible across the world. 
Then, what can I do? What is something everyone visits, well child pornography web-
pages, sorry pornography, not child pornography just pornography. Then, if I distribute 
this good product in pornography web-pages that a German, a Chinese, a Spaniard a 
Briton; whoever can visit, well what I have to do is give a credible message to that 
people. (NPEX2, C13xxii, emphasis added) 
The term “Good product” is used three times in the interview when describing the “Police Porn 
Virus”. The use of such a term, for a designed virus, indicates an understanding of crime and 
“infection” from a capitalistic point of view. In the “market of crime”, the “Police Porn Virus” 
was deemed an admirable player. This idea underlines the notion – already mentioned – of 
entrepreneurship.  Exquisite craftsmanship can also be found in the design of cyberfrauds:   
It is the mother of all frauds, sincerely (murmuring: A most big son of a bitch). I have 
really have grown fond of him, because it has been so brutal and so perfected, 
everything so studied; I have never seen such a perfect thing, fraudster more deserving 
of admiration than this man, for me this is the investigation of my life. (NPEX1, C11xxiii, 
emphasis added) 
In the above case, the words highlighted demonstrate respect. Even if NPEX1, despised what 
had been done morally (by referring to fraudsters as lacking of any scruple), he had to admire 
the complexity of what had been created, which is in fact a multi-layered fraudulent umbrella 
corporation.  
 
Another manifestation of this idea of professionalization and entrepreneurship was that in 
many cases offenders did not act as “sole practitioners” but involved their families in their 
trade. No account was given as to how these “partnerships” were created or originated, or 
whether the investigated offender was the founder of the criminal enterprise or simply a mere 
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follower of a tradition. It is very important, in this study, to analyse or to address how an 
offender’s morality can be “contagious” or how it can be shared amongst a number of related 
individuals. The idea of kinship seemed to be fundamental in the construction of 
cybercriminals by law enforcement agents: 
In this case it was a family relationship, a clan, it was a family relationship because every 
time there is a criminal organized structure what we have detected is that there is a 
strong relationship or a close and strong trusting, generally it is generated in families. 
(NPEX1, C10 also mentioned in C11xxiv) 
 It was a Russian family clan, based here, it was the father, the son, the father’s 
girlfriend’s son and the girlfriends of both sons, I mean, totally a closed family clan, they 
had this way of living and this business model. (NPEX2, C13 also mentioned in C14xxv) 
It is important to highlight how two of the interviewees used the word “clan” to define the 
cyber-offenders family relationship. Even though the interviews took place in Spanish, this 
word has the same meaning both in English and Spanish. It could be inferred that interviewees 
wanted to emphasizes the exclusive, close-knit and outlandish relationship between members. 
Perhaps because social bonds forged and glued through crime could be understood as more 
solid, a collective experience in the family consciousness stemming from structural and social 
disadvantageous situations. NPEX1 used “gypsy clans”20 to illustrate the kind of criminal 
relationships forged between families. 
 
NPX2 pointed out that these “clans” forge alliances and collaborate with other clans. This was 
seen in one of the designer malware cases (“Cyptolocker”, C14) where the indicated clan 
collaborated with another Russian family in order to launder proceeds of crime “evidently 
20
 In Spain, some gypsy clans are specialised in drug trafficking. 
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because of the language and the much easier communication” (NPEX2, C14xxvi). Once again a 
market reference was made, this time in the interviewee’s reference to the offenders’ 
“business model” (see also Europol, 2015).  
 
5.1.2. Fraudsters without remorse 
 
The elaboration of the fraudster’ personality seemed to have more specific traits than the 
regular “professional criminal”. Fraudsters are, according to the academic literature, deemed 
to have a very specific set of personality traits that emphasise an over-acquisitive personality 
(Herrero Herro, 2007; Gavin, 2014). This is an assessment that is shared by NPEX1, who 
provided a very thorough description of two cyber-fraud cases (C10 and C11). These cases are 
of essential for this study given that they were new forms of fraud that deviate from 
traditional “phishing” (C3 is a phishing case, for example) or “Nigerian scam” schema. C10 
refers to an online gambling fraud, which involved a bogus betting webpage, whereas C11 was 
an extremely complex fraud case with on-line and off-line elements that involved the creation 
of a fake network of police magazines in order to obtain money from fraudulent advertising. 
 
When referring to the three brothers that set the fraudulent gambling webpage, NPEX1 
claimed that: 
The profile of the fraudster is a remorseless person, a disproportionate motivation for 
economic gain. They are usually very intelligent and smart people and very creative. 
(NPEX1, C10xxvii, emphasis added) 
Then, when talking about the perpetrator of C11: 
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Well, the profile of a total fraudster, with a disproportionate motivation for economic 
gain, fraud as a way of living, the acting in connivance with people from their circle of 
trust, family members or close friends…A very controlling person, very smart and 
intelligent, because in order to do this and to have control over the smallest detail of 
anything you have to be a very intelligent person. (NPEX1, C11xxviii, emphasis added) 
NPEX1 also expressed (as indicated in previous paragraphs) that the aforementioned fraudster 
was deserving of respect as well as “a most big son of a bitch”. According to NPEX1, the 
economic motivation is disproportionate, unlike other criminals that might be motivated by 
economic gain, and it seems to be linked to the absence of remorse that could indicate a very 
specific moral make-up in relation to cyberfraudsters - close to a psychopathic personality. 
Also, both descriptions (C10, C11) are almost identical within NPEX1’s discourse. NPEX1 might  
not be elaborating from a personal or professional point of view, but reciting a criminological 
“mantra” learnt from his studies and police education. The use of the word “connivance” (in 
Spanish “connivencia”) is legal jargon and could be an indicative of the reciting of learnt crime 
concepts.   
 
Herrero Herrero (2007) describes the psychosocial profile of white-collar criminals as 
materialist, selfish and narcissistic, pragmatic, smart, socially adaptable, elusive to moral 
feelings and cynical (p. 769). Garrido, Stangeland, Redondo, and Beristain (2013) summarise 
different approaches to White-Collar Crime and explain the triangle of fraud; involving the 
existence of opportunity, necessity and rationalisation, and they also draw attention to current 
research that indicates that fraudsters are narcissistic individuals with low self-control. The 
idea of neutralisation techniques becomes extremely relevant when explaining fraud 
psychology (Garrido, Stangeland, Redondo, & Beristain, 2013, pp- 789-794, citing Cressey & 
Coleman (2001); Bromberg, 1965; Hogan & Hogan, 2001; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). 
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 Gavin (2014) analyses the psychology of White-Collar Crime highlighting the various 
characteristics of fraudster that have emerged in the literature: 
- Clever and confident 
- Ego-challenge 
- The attraction of power, wealth and the desire to possess 
- Might rank highly in psychopathy scales, as well as in dimensions such us charisma, 
communication skills and creativity 
- Narcissism and the impossibility to empathise with others 
- Employment or rationalisations (neutralisation techniques) 
 
All of the above are consistent with NPEX1’s discourse on the profile of the fraudster, yet this 
sheds no light on the persona of the cyberfraudster, as an autonomous and specific type of 
offender. However, Gavin (2014) explains that in e-mail frauds; “There is little social 
interaction and hence few social cues are given to the offender. It is this that leads to a 
reduction in the influence of norms and constraints” (p.212). Once again, the idea of the 
criminogenic architecture of the Internet is taken into account when considering its interaction 
with the individual.  
 
Professional thieves - including fraudsters or confidence men - were studied by Sutherland 
(1937), leading to the foundations of the differential association theory. What Sutherland 
(1937) argued, after analysing the biographical account of a professional thief, is that “the 
profession of theft … is organized around the effort to secure money with relative safety” (p. 
217). Some of the characteristics of cybercriminals mentioned by interviewees (in the case 
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studies) are linked to Sutherland’s (1937) exposition of the characteristics of professional 
thieves: 
- Technical skill  
- Belonging to an exclusive group  
- Immunity from punishment (including monopoly and being used as agents of the 
state)  
- A body of knowledge transmitted by mentoring 
In terms of the above list of characteristics, “belonging to an exclusive group” and “technical 
skill” have both featured in the case studies - not only in relation to fraudsters but also 
hackers.  “Immunity from punishment” also featured in the case studies in the sense that the 
virus designers collaborated with law enforcement agents by confessing and helping law 
enforcement agents investigate other criminals (C13, C14). By contrast, “a body of knowledge 
transmitted by mentoring” were not expressly mentioned in the interviews.   
 
Studies by KPMG (2011) indicate that corporate fraudsters are motivated by greed (“the desire 
for financial gain”), work pressures (like having to achieved a certain set of targets) and the 
exploitation of weak internal controls (pp.9-11; see also KPMG, 2007 for previous results). The 
findings of KPMG’s (2011) work  seem to be consistent with PSEX’s views on company fraud 
with his stating that “disloyal competence” and “disclosure” tend to be the most common 
frauds taking place in the private sector, because of an economic drive or motivated by 
curiosity (PSEX, C7 and C9). Essentially, these offences are committed by disgruntled 
employees exploiting weak controls or because of the lack of computer security awareness by 
executives and employees (PSEX, C7 and C9). In these cases (C7, C9), PSEX highlighted 
opportunistic and economic elements but did not make any remarks on psychological factors, 
such as empathy.  
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 5.1.3. Hacker morality 
 
When talking about C1, GCEX elaborated on the idea of hacker morality by offering an 
exculpatory discourse in terms of morality: 
The hacker is not a bad person, let this be clear what the concept of a hacker is, not a 
criminal, I mean not all hackers are criminals. I mean, they are people longing for 
knowledge that want to know things and are very committed to the matter of 
information security and they like discovering different flaws. (GCEX, C1xxix, emphasis 
added) 
There is no evidence that can support whether this is solely GCEX’s perception of hacker 
morality or is a more wide-spread conception, even assumed by all of the law enforcement 
agents in Spain.   
 
In this case, GCEX seemed to be talking about ethical hackers, those devoted professionally 
and ideologically to discovering security flaws and loopholes in order to share them with “the 
interested party or the Security Corps” (GCEX, C1). The offender’s behavior, according to this 
construction, could be likened to the work of someone employed as a security consultant, for 
example. These people - ethical hackers – are seen, at least by GCEX, as extremely skilled and 
longing for an esoteric knowledge that might require the breach of a thin moral or legal line in 
order to be acquired. GCEX finished the discourse on hacker morality by adding “the concept 
of a hacker is not always a bad person, OK?” (GCEX, C1xxx, emphasis added). 
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GCEX seemed to contemplate the idea that there might be two types of hacker: those 
mentioned in the account above - helping others by using their “mystical” knowledge; and 
some breed of evil hacker - working for a malignant purpose. In GCEX’s account of C1, the 
portrayal of the hacker did not  seem to be very positive one, as the narration described a 
chain of hackers (not a network or an organized crime, more similar to outsourcers) who 
created, sold and modified software in order to create a “Botnet”. The Botnet was described as 
an interlinked set of slave computers managed through a console with criminal purposes (for 
example, Denial of Service Attacks). This network is comprised of thousands of computers that 
are infected with “zombie malware” in order to control them, unbeknown to the owner or 
user.  
 
That Botnet is considered a product that is part of the “market” and that the “end is always 
economic” (GCEX, C1 also referred in C3xxxi). Therefore, some hackers might consider putting 
their intellectual skills and drive for the obtaining of an economic gain by illicit means. It seems 
that hacker morality moves in shades of grey following GCEX’s accounts.  
 
The idea of identity construction amongst hackers has been studied by Sherry Turkle (2005) 
and Orly Turgeman-Goldschmidt (2011). Turgeman-Goldschmidt (2011) refers to “good” (pp. 
38-40) and “bad” (pp. 40-43) hackers, and the transition period from bad hacker to pro-social 
individual (pp. 43-4). On the other hand, Turkle (2005) talks about the hacker culture that 
“supports them as holders of an esoteric knowledge and defenders of the purity of 
computation” (p. 191). She then elaborates by indicating that it is “a culture of mastery and 
individualism that values complexity and risk in relationships with things, and seeks simplicity 
and safety in relationships with people” (p. 205). 
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 The moral duality of the hacking culture is exemplified by the qualities and motivations of 
“good hackers” and “bad hackers”: 
Good hackers do not feel the desire to engage in computer break-in because they are 
usually engaged in other activities that yield the same results, recognition, and esteem 
for their abilities. (Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2011, p.39) 
This is in contrast to bad hackers who “described themselves as having a wild and gifted 
persona” (2011, p. 40). However, “bad hackers” do not accept the deviant label (p. 41) and 
sometimes criticise the link established between hacking and cybercrime (Turkle, 2005, p. 
214). Also, “bad hackers” do not usually have problems when combining  their deviant identity 
into a non-deviant identity as these offenders y regard their activities as “pranks” or “mischief” 
(Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2011, p. 44) and the label of computer criminals is “branded by the 
law” (p. 44). In conclusion, “they have no moral problem with hacking itself or with their status 
as ex-hackers” (p. 44). 
 
Nowadays, hacker (“good”) culture is gaining mainstream recognition through regular  
“hakathon” festivals - nothing more than programmed reunions and events, with food, drink 
and the promise of excitement, fun and networking (and registrations that cost exorbitant 
prices). The Droidcon 2014 Hackathon for example, was advertised as follows:  
This hack will attract some of the most talented coders and creative experts – like you! 
And you’ll have the chance to work together and create something amazing. So come 
along to watch, learn and get stuck right into some hardcore hacking! (Skills Matter, 
2014) 
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Going back to the interviews, NPEX2 also talked about hackers, as mentioned before (designer 
malware in C13 and C14), yet the economic gain seemed to be the only motivation in these 
scenarios. There is, however, a hacker account that calls for a more complex moral standpoint. 
Those are C15 and C16. Especially complex in terms of hacker morality is C15: the Spanish cell 
of world-wide movement “Anonymous”. 
 
5.1.4. Child sex offenders and “internet monsters” 
 
Many of the cases that were dealt with by interviewees related to child sex abuse or child 
pornography use on the internet. C2 involved a network of prostitution organised by 
“consenting” minors using social networks and enables offending to be explored from both the 
victim’s point of view and the sex offender’s point of view. C4 and C18 enabled an examination 
of the “Nannysex” case from two different sources (PSEX and NPEX3). It should be noted that 
the “Nannysex” case has become part of Spanish crime culture and it shocked the general 
population as it involved the abuse of babies and on online commercial basis by a Spanish 
paedophile ring. “Nannysex” was the online moniker of the head of this ring. C19 was a similar 
case that involved small children in a deep web based exchange community and C20 was a 
child sexual grooming case. The internet, according to NPEX3, has fostered the possibilities of 
creating links between paedophiles: 
On the Internet what is, and well it is very consolidated, the creation of a paedophile 
community. A paedophile community that protects them, supports them, makes them 
see that what they are doing is not bad. (NPEX3, C18xxxii) 
NPEX3’s insights on these cases was extremely relevant given that he worked as the leader of 
the Child Protection Unit at the Spanish National Police and had amassed an immense body of 
knowledge in the investigation of these crimes, as well as leading the aforementioned 
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investigations. It is unclear as to what was PSEX’s involvement in the investigation of C4 as a 
former police officer and his/her accounts might stem from personal experience, general 
knowledge or indirect second-hand testimony. It is worth mentioning that when talking about 
different neutralisations used by pedophiles, NPEX3 indicated that he “was completely 
convinced they believed what they say”. This affirmation is relevant in terms of the depth and 
realism of NPEX3’s discourse, as some other interviewees, like NPEX1 and GCEX, were more 
critical towards the neutralisation used by criminals, in some cases labelling them as spurious 
or farcical.   
 
PSEX and NPEX3 were asked about the reasons for the commission of crimes and the 
rationalisations behind the actions of people abusing children, recording abuse or sharing the 
aforementioned abuse on the internet. One of the most relevant and detailed explanations 
was given by NPEX3, when explaining the existence of a “community” that served to justify 
paedophile behavior on the internet. The community offers the following justifications: 
That is just another sexual act, that the sexuality of children has to be taught by an 
adult, and well that the love in between children and adults is possible, all that things, 
that sexuality is born since we are babies and well that is not a major issue to perform 
sexual acts with children. (NPEX3, C18xxxiii, emphasis added) 
Such faceless, internet communities were said to work as a support group, providing almost 
some sort of psycho-social manifesto in relation to the abuse of children. In addition, GCEX 
indicated that some of the child abusers investigated “tried to justify themselves like if the act 
they are performing is something normal and is something natural” (GCEX, C2xxxiv). 
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NPEX3 elaborated on other justifications used by “Nannysex’s” child sex abuser co-offenders 
by explaining that one of the offenders said “I am playing” (NPEX3, C18
xxxvi), yet NPEX3 added that the 
narrative was very common in many of the sex offenders he investigated.
xxxv) when shown by the 
judge videos of him penetrating a child anally.  Also, it was reported that many child groomers 
and child sex offender blame the victim. Nannysex indicated, for example that “they blame it 
all on me, but they let the child go naked at home” (NPEX3, C18
 
 
The use of the concept cognitive distortions (or cognitions) can be misleading, given the 
breadth of the construct. Guglielmo (2015) critiques the concept, arguing that it comprises 
plenty of sub-categories and has become extremely open-ended. Maruna and Mann (2006) 
seem to have similar concern. After conducting meta-analysis, Guglielmo (2015) tries to 
integrate the majority of current definitions of cognitive distortions into a single working 
instrument: 
Cognition x is distorted if and only if 1) it possesses at least one type of problematic 
property, which must be identified, and which is associated with clinically relevant 
distress, 2) it possesses a specifiable operational status, and 3) it demonstrates a domain 
relevant scope. (p. 74) 
Hence, the idea of “clinically relevant distress” indicates that the term belongs in the realms of 
psychology or even criminal psychology, yet it is not an inherently criminological term, 
therefore difficult to apply to the SAT-RI. Maruna and Mann (2006) examined the literature to 
ascertain whether cognitive distortions preceded and facilitated offending, or occurred as an 
ex-post mechanism. They criticised the ideas of Sykes and Matza (used in this research 
adjacent to Wikström’s Situational Action Theory (2006; 2010, Wikström and Treiber, 2007; 
Wikström and Treiber, 2009) “that excuses precede and lead to offending (as opposed to just 
following it)” (p. 160). This has proven to be problematic as, according to the Maruna and 
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Mann (2006) there is not enough empirical evidence on the matter and they add that: 
“moreover, the cognitive distortion label is used to group together far different phenomena 
such as attitudes, cognitive products and post hoc excuses” (p. 161). Even so, this thesis 
explores the idea that there exist certain narratives inherent in cybercriminals that shield 
against perceptions of moral reproach. Many of these neutralisations can stem in some cases 
by certain social imperatives like acquisitiveness. 
 
It may be that the concepts of cognitive distortion and neutralisation techniques are dissimilar, 
and in terms of the present study and the development of the theoretical model, they should 
be treated as different concepts yet offering the same result (the excusing from crime and the 
morally protective discourse facilitating engagement). This theoretical assumption can be 
somehow considered a weakness of this thesis, but originates from what has been mentioned 
before, the absence of agreement in the literature on matters relating to cognitive distortions 
(and neutralisations up to a point). Also, the present work does not aim to be a comprehensive 
study on criminal psychology (or the psychology of sex offending) but the development of a 
general cybercrime theory. 
 
Boer, Merdian, Wilson, Thakker, and Curtis (2014) tried to shed light on the cognitive 
distortions used by child pornography offenders and contact sex offenders, through their use 
and revision of tools designed to measure different components of cognitive distortions 
(cognitions) for child sex offenders. The meta-components, and individual items of which they 
were composed, which they identified, included the following: “sexual objectification of 
children” (children as consensual partners, denial of harm, sex as an expression of love and 
free will) (p. 985); “justification” (blame attribution) (p. 985); “children as sexual agents” 
(children as sexually active) (p. 985); “denial of sex offender status” (ability to minimize the 
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harm or denial of control over the  situation) (p. 985); “emphasis on cognitive element” (some 
understanding of the negativity of one’s action) (p.985); “power and entitlement” (pp. 985-
986);  and the so-called “component 7” (based solely on the item “My daughter [son] or other 
young child know that I will still love her [him] even if she [he] refuses to be sexual with me” 
(p. 986). Boer et al. (2014) indicated that child pornography offenders might use specific 
cognitions and the development of a specific scale might be needed in order to measure the 
specific use of cognitive distortions by these offenders (p. 988). Burn and Brown (2006) 
reviewed different theories of child sexual abuse and stated that “these implicit theories are 
identified as similar to scientific theories in that they are used by individuals to explain, 
predict, and interpret interpersonal situations” (p. 228). The authors advocate for the 
relevance of these cognitions during the whole of the offending process not as a mere ex-post 
mechanism (p. 228). Cognitions, therefore, are relevant before, during and after the offence.   
 
NPEX3’s explanation of the overall schema of cognitions, reflects what has been researched 
and discussed in the academic literature.  The idea of children being attributed sexual capacity 
and agency, by offenders, is mentioned several times by NPEX3, even the idea of them being 
blamed by the offender. NPEX also reports offender’s normalising or minimising the impact of 
their actions “sexuality has to be taught by an adult”, “it’s another sexual option” or it’s “no 
major issue”. Offenders sometimes constructed their behavior in romantic terms: “love can 
exist between an adult and a child”. NPEX3’s discourse seemed to offer a professional account  
of child sex abuse that is consistent with literature on that matter, moreover, at some points a 
certain patchwork of professional experience and academic literature might emerge in relation 
to NPEX3’s views. In addition, NPEX3 - like NPEX2, and in some instances NPEX1 - based his 
explanations of cases on investigative evidence (such as pictures, which he shared with the 
present researcher). 
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 According to NPEX3, the existence of the internet has fostered the creation and sustenance of 
these cognitions underlying child sexual offending. He stated that in his extensive professional 
experience, child sex offenders were prone to asking for treatment or even committing suicide 
when apprehended before the internet became widespread. In contrast, with the arrival of the 
internet, child sexual abuse (in terms of the sharing of pornography) has increased 
dramatically and the sense of identity within this community has become bolstered.be. NPEX3 
also warned that “organised crime has entered into the production of child pornography, 
which is very grave” (NPEX3, C18xxxvii). This is also in accordance with PSEX’s accounts of how 
the internet has facilitated access to children by people with that “appetite”, a mere “click” 
away, as “you don’t have to go looking for them there on the street” (PSEX, C4xxxviii).   
 
Boer et al. (2014) differentiated between child pornography offenders, contact sex offenders 
or multiple offenders in relation to child sexual abuse.  It must be taken into account that in 
C18 and C19, extensively explained by NPEX3 the offenders were involved in the creation, 
consumption, trading and producing of child pornography. As mentioned before NPEX3, 
explained the “Nannysex” (C19 and in lesser detail C4) case as a paedophile ring involving 
other sex abusers that also performed penetrative sex on children.  In the “Nannysex” case, a 
new narrative emerged relating to this child sex offender’s morality and his being labelled “a 
monster”, not by society, or even the interviewee, but by other child sex offenders. Following 
NPEX3, other offenders investigated or imprisoned told the police how much they despised 
what “Nannysex” had done. “Nannysex” was presented as an extreme character, with a liking 
for sexually penetrating babies, and recording it for his pleasure and then trading these 
images. During the interview, NPEX3 performed a cache search in a browser and found the 
following message, written by someone called Nannysex: 
218 
 
Why do you want to see naked children? I do not understand …. is it to avoid the cold 
turkey of seeing them in action? Why watch pictures from 30 years ago? If you could be 
watching current pictures, you who are addicted to children, or what, do you believe 
that because they are lighter those pictures are not illegal? Well, yes they are. Maybe 
not as much, but they still are. Well, go fuck yourselves hard! (NPEX3, C18xxxix, message 
found in online cache) 
Given the extreme nature of this case, the following conversation took place during the semi-
structured interview: 
Jorge:  Normally for them, is it the same to abuse such a very small child? Or are there 
like differences or castes or strata between people that abuse smaller children, pre-
adolescents, babies? Or is it seen the same way? 
NPEX3: No, no, them in the paedophile world, when we had the first notice of 
‘Nannysex’ he was considered [by other child sex offenders] a monster. (NPEX3, C18) 
The above exchange seemed to point towards the existence of a moral scale between child sex 
abusers, depending on the age of the children they abused. Whilst paedophiles are 
constructed and fabricated as monsters by the general public, “Nannysex” was deemed to be 
way too extreme by other paedophiles, as he abused babies. NPEX3 implied that “The 
Chameleon”, the cybergroomer from C20, was also a “monster” (he referred to him as “big 
time tosser”), explaining that the state of his victims after the continuous and escalating abuse 
they experienced was “heart-wrenching”. 
 
This is very relevant information for the present study as it relates to the practice of moral 
qualities being ascribed by criminals to other criminals, law enforcement agents to criminals, 
and individual criminals to themselves. In fact, the very essence of neutralisation techniques -
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discussed earlier during the exposition of the literature review to this study - is that criminals 
envy and participate from common bourgeoisie morality, hence the necessity of justifying 
what they have done according to those standards. This allows criminals to rate themselves as 
less morally noxious than others, or to rate other criminals as more perverse or depraved.  
 
One of the issues raised by this account is whether NPEX3 views were purely professional or 
whether he was also transmitting his own personal feelings towards the offender. Even more 
so, was he expressing not his own feelings but acting as a vehicle for the repulse of the whole 
of Spanish society. As indicated above, the “Nannysex” case was etched into Spanish cultural 
consciousness, as one of the most striking and abhorrent child sexual abuse cases ever. 
 
5.2. Offender Neutralisations 
 
As indicated during this work, neutralisation techniques are a fundamental part of the SAT-RI. 
All of the interviewees talked about the use of these scripts, even without being asked about 
them. Six neutralisation techniques were identified by the researcher (some of them differing 
from the list of the eight chosen for the online survey). There were a number of reasons for 
these differences.  First, the techniques used in the online survey were identified by the 
present researcher, based on his review of the literature, and before the design of the survey 
was finalized.  The researcher, in drawing up this list, aimed to make it as comprehensive as 
possible, giving participants as much choice as possible.  By contrast, during the interviews 
stage, the scripts emerged “ex post” and usually in an impromptu manner as interviewees 
were asked broadly about what offenders told them and how they justified their actions. 
Interviewees tended to highlight justifications that were somewhat different to those 
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identified – through the literature - for the online survey. (The term “neutralisation 
techniques” was not used, by the researcher, during these interviews.)  It became evident, 
moreover, in the course of the interviews that offenders developed “ad hoc” justifications 
tailored  to the particular case in which they had been involved (for example the on-line 
prostitution case, C2: robust heterosexual identity) that were not considered within  
criminological literature.  That said, a notion similar to the concept of non-neutralisation - 
what was coded as “it’s not justified” in the online survey - did emerge in the course of the 
interviews, and which has been referred “indifferent attitude”.  
 
Once again, the idea of police culture (as explained below) has to be borne in mind, given that 
these are indirect accounts by law enforcement agents. Some of the interviewees (in some 
cases NPEX1 or GCEX) believed that offenders were simply lying when affirming statements 
such as “I haven’t done anything wrong”. It was not possible to determine the truth behind 
these statements made by offenders; in other words, it is complex unravelling whether: 
offenders were lying; offenders believed what they did was not wrong; or law enforcement 
agents believed offenders to be lying. In order to accommodate all accounts made by the 
interviewees, the code “indifferent attitude” was created to contain the narratives of 
offenders who seemed simply not to care about either their actions or being apprehended.  
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5.2.1. Denial of injury 
 
In this type of case, offenders tried to minimise the effects that their offending had upon 
others or upon society. It can be argued that the differences between “denial of crime” and 
“denial of injury” are blurry. The idea of denial of crime seems to be oriented towards the 
script of “I haven’t done anything bad at all” or “what I did it’s not really a crime”, whereas in 
“denial of injury” accounts, a certain level of acceptance (of wrong-doing) seems to be at work, 
albeit with the consequences of the crime being “dulcified”. 
 
One of the clearest examples of “denial of injury” was provided by NPEX2, when talking about 
the response from the “Police Porn Virus” creator (C13), when he was apprehended and 
questioned by the police: 
He knows it’s not right, but well he sees it as if, what he said was: I haven’t killed 
anyone, I’m not a killer, I’m not a drug dealer. What I mean, he didn’t see it as a crime, 
or under his conscience as a serious crime. That is what he said; I’m not a drug dealer, 
ok? I’ll pay for what I have done but, fuck! I don’t understand why this is so serious or 
this penalty so much, because I am not…. I haven’t killed anyone; I’m not a drug 
dealer…. He didn’t have the perception that it was a violent crime. (NPEX2, C13xl, 
emphasis added) 
In this case, the offender accepted the blame - “I’ll pay for what I have done”, “He knows it’s 
not right” - but he needed to protect his non-criminal identity by resorting to comparisons in 
scales of wrongfulness and harm. He had created a ransomware scam to earn some money, 
but he did not commit was he understood to be a serious crime (homicide and drug 
trafficking). In this way offenders are able to integrate their acts into the values of common 
middle-class morality, by accepting these moral scales. The problem in this account is the 
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reliability of what has been said as a “testimonial”, where NPEX2 acted as “proxy”. There are, 
though, two elements of this report that led the researcher to believe that what he said was 
correct. First, NPEX2 repeated the same idea in various paragraphs (part of it can be seen on 
the excerpt of the interview reproduced above). Secondly, NPEX2 explained that he had 
participated in the direct examination of the offender and forged a long-lasting “working” 
relationship with him – both of which should have meant that he had a good insight into the 
offender’s motivation. A similar narrative was encountered in the “Nannysex” case (C18) with 
references to the “monster” code, and “different” child sex offenders rating themselves (and 
others) along different points of the morality scale. 
 
In other cases, the same narrative is found where, in a manner of sorts, the offender assumes 
the commission of a crime but, at the very same time, tries to trivialise it. In case C16 (“Latin 
Hackteam”) the offenders dedicated their time to “defacing” certain webpages and then 
sharing their deeds on-line in a hacking community. NPEX2 reported that the offenders, when 
apprehended, claimed “but we never did any harm” (NPEX2, C16
xliii
xli). According to NPEX2, this 
group of hackers recognized their hacking activities (the manipulating of webpages and 
images) but argued that “[I] could have accessed more data, but I don’t go any further” 
(NPEX2, C16xlii). Apparently, they had the skills to wreak online havoc by stealing information, 
but they decided simply to “deface” different webpages and brag in a private online 
community about their actions. This seems to be congruent with the ideas presented earlier 
about hacker morality, and hackers’ curious and playful attitude, as if they were hobgoblins of 
the internet with their trivial shenanigans. In C17, a minor, living in a remote Spanish village, 
ransomed a big corporation after stealing information from them. NPEX2 revealed that the 
minor was questioned by him and “he knew he was doing something illegal, but he saw it as If 
saying, I didn’t have the idea of doing any more harm, I wanted my money” (NPEX2, C17 ). 
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One of the key elements in this conversation was the reference to “any more harm” - the 
minor was perfectly conscious of the consequences of stealing information from a big 
company (according to NPEX2, he has performed the same scheme before and successfully so), 
but the economic drive simply overdrove his moral compass (his need for money justified any 
collateral damage). When questioned about the reasons for ransoming the precise figure of 
2,500 € he answered simply: “I wanted to buy a bicycle” (NPEX2, C17xliv). In his previous 
cybercrime, the minor obtained a state of the art smart phone from another company he 
ransomed. A narrative in terms of minors and consumerism emerges if C2 is also considered 
(children selling sex in exchange of small amounts of money or commodities).  
The ones between 12, 10; between 10 and 13, those were not aware of what they were 
doing, simply well… They are going to get 50 €, a Playstation and that is all, it is of no 
consequence. (GCEX, C2xlv) 
Money and goods, therefore became an easy way to justify the harm that can result from 
crime, whether for the individual offender’s own well-being or for society. 
 
By contrast, PSEX criticised the “culture of free”, explaining how individuals were not aware of 
the industry behind, for example, copyright and cultural creation. He argued, through his 
discourse, that individuals find it much easier to download movies or books (for free) than 
going to the cinema, because it is extremely expensive and “we are in a [financial] crisis” (PSEX, 
no casexlvi). It was difficult to ascertain whether PSEX was applying this justification to himself, 
onto others or being extremely critical about the damage caused to the entertainment 
industry by piracy. All in all, any of the aforementioned approaches are consistent with the 
literature and data collected on internet illegal downloads.  This calls for a deeper examination 
in terms of a critical analysis, which will be carried out in the final chapter, when considering 
the online survey and interview data as a whole. 
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 5.2.2. Denial of crime 
 
This technique is extensively developed in NPEX1’s account of cyber-fraudsters (C10 and C11), 
in many cases can complement “denial of injury”. As indicated above, NPEX1 described the 
fraudster identity as being devious and lacking in empathy. The techniques presented in this 
epigraph support this view. In relation to C10 (online gambling scheme), NPEX1 said the 
following of the offenders: 
Well, when you detain them all, they do not know what you are talking about, they do 
not know what you are investigating, evidently they haven’t done anything, they only 
have a legal business that went wrong and they show no remorse, and they do not even 
recognize the harm they have done. (NPEX1, C10xlvii, emphasis added) 
This “I haven’t done anything” narrative seemed to appear in all of the other interviews (GCEX, 
PSEX, NPEX2, and NPEX3) at some point. However, it was more related with what has been 
called “Indifferent Attitude”, which relates to an obtrusive, detached, cold and farcical attitude 
towards police work, embedded in the idea of “criminal career” and part of the “game” (the 
eternal criminal/police struggle). In order for this narrative to work as a proper neutralisation 
technique, it needed to be believed to some extent by the offender, as it worked as a moral 
shield. In these cases, one could argue that this is just usual criminal behavior, that is a tactic in 
a legal sense; preparation for any future legal action against the offender (no admission of 
facts). Even so, it is important to consider that offenders might not have been entirely sure or 
aware of the consequences of their acts, and even though there is a present mantra that 
needed to be recited in front of police officers, it can become fixated in their minds.  
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Evidently, he said that this was not a crime, that it was a legal business, that he was a 
company man that employed too many people, that he did a great social job because 
thanks to him there were too many people working. (NPEX1, C11xlviii, emphasis added) 
The paragraph above refers to the creation of the attitude of the fraudster depicted in C11; the 
creator of an extremely intricate schema that involved on-line police magazines and 
advertising. The set-up involved companies within companies and an interlinked structure that 
supposed a real challenge for police officers to investigate. When the fraudster was 
apprehended (and it should be noted, once again, that NPEX1 praised his intelligence and 
skills) he stated that all his activities were parts of a legal business. He added that his business 
helped many people in dire economic situations. When questioned about whether or not the 
employees in the pseudo-criminal companies knew what they were doing was illegal NPEX1 
indicated that “they knew somehow” (NPEX1, C11xlix) but they kept on working there. 
 
The following is a statement in NPEX1’s interview, after being questioned about the nature of 
the statements printed above: 
Jorge: But as a lie for an audience or for himself? 
NPEX1: No. A lie for an audience, what happens is that the moment this is illegal and 
criminal everything falls apart, I mean he would be recognizing the existence of a crime. 
(C11l) 
Lying is compulsory for the majority of cybercriminals (following NPEX1); otherwise it would 
indicate the admission of a crime and have legal repercussions. This becomes a matter of 
strategy in order to prepare the possible trial. 
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In addition, PSEX pointed out the following when he spoke about people stealing Wi-Fi signal: 
People do it, but well, really, the commission of said crime is there. Nowadays there is 
nothing stipulated but we would be stealing or hacking the cost of the Wi-Fi, that 
amounts for a monthly 30/40 € let’s say, that type of crime, well people say: Noooooo 
this is nothing and I do it and sometimes because of the simple fact that I am good at 
hacking the neighbour’s Wi-Fi. (PSEX, no caseli, emphasis added) 
This is very similar to what was elaborated before on illegal downloading, and can easily be 
related to the general sense of normlessness that populates the internet. Individuals might 
believe that stealing Wi-Fi is not a crime, especially because of how easy it has become for the 
general public; they can do it even by downloading mobile applications (according to PSEX). 
 
On the other hand, from a critical standpoint there might be a subtextual power abuse, the 
police acting as agents of control, understanding criminals oversimplistically as scheming liars. 
Law enforcement agents like NPEX1 and GCEX affirm that offenders know what they do is not 
right, yet they lie about it.  It would seem that law enforcement agents are taking from 
offenders the capacity of taking the blame, of desistance or repentance; therefore 
constructing a viler and deterministic view of a criminal career.  At the same time, law 
enforcement agents spoke from their professional experience; one in which they understood 
the whole system of constitutional rights assisting detainees and indicted individuals. 
 
 
 
 
227 
 
5.2.3. Appeal to higher loyalties 
 
This neutralisation technique refers to the justification of a criminal act by resorting a greater 
authority, or even the greater good. Offenders might indicate that they did what they had to 
do in order to save their country or that they were just doing justice. This technique is featured 
in C15 (Anonymous Spain) and serves to explain the reasons why many individuals might have 
joined the hacktivist crusade. Anonymous has published an online manifesto, in which it clearly 
states its cosmovision (world-view). People joining this “movement” presumably adhere to the 
core principles of this manifesto. According to the manifesto, the philosophy of Anonymous 
revolves around the following ideas: unrestrained access to information; rule of the people 
(self-governance); importance of personal privacy; the use of privacy and secrecy by 
institutions according to the rule of the people; and citizen responsibility in maintaining a 
transparent society. They then add their manta:  “We are Anonymous. We are Legion. We do 
not Forget. We do not Forgive. Expect Us” (NPEX2, C15). They also assert that “Anonymous 
exist only as an idea”. One could argue that what Anonymous seek is social justice by 
disseminating a fairer idea of democracy and, in order to achieve it, they have resorted to 
using hacking.  
 
 In C15, Anonymous Spain was investigated by the police because it: published confidential 
information on  police staff; disseminated personal information on a local politician who it 
believed was corrupt; and defaced institutional webpages – including a political party’s 
webpages, by painting fangs on politicians’ pictures. When asked why Anonymous did this, 
NPEX2 replied: 
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Firstly, I believe, that one, it is because of a motivation, because of an ideology. The first 
of them is because he/she believes that he/she can change, that hacktivist discourse of 
“Anonymous” that we can change the world, down with the corrupt, freedom when 
sharing information, I mean that hacktivist discourse from Anonymous. You are totally 
integrated, and you say, I want to collaborate with the cause; we are many the ones 
who want to change the world, and whatnot. (NPEX2, C15lii, emphasis added) 
The above explanation is concordant with the Anonymous manifesto and it could be seen to 
demonstrate a belief in a higher order: a freer and more democratic world, worth fighting for; 
a world worth committing crimes for. However, and according to NPEX2, the motives behind 
all the people who were investigated were not as sublime as has been suggested above. Some 
of the authors involved, according to NPEX2, only wanted to take revenge on a politician they 
held a grudge against.  
 
One could argue that NPEX2 was being frivolous and debasing a movement that has inspired 
many people to fight for constitutional rights; that he was acting as an agent of the “status 
quo”. However, another perspective could be that NPEX2 - and bearing in mind he had a 
computing  engineering background – was better able to understand the movement, and his 
essential criticism is that individuals where using the movement as an excuse for committing 
crimes. 
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5.2.4. Fun/just a game 
 
It seemed that for some of the people who featured in these cases, the commission of a crime 
was just a game or was perpetrated for fun or thrills. Continuing with the Anonymous case 
(C15), NPEX2 explained that he believed that younger offenders joined the movement in the 
search for fun and for the purposes of socializing. The Anonymous platform allowed them to 
chat or even organize offline meetings all over Spain. It should be remembered that these 
assessments – of the motivations of Anonymous members – were based largely on NPEX2’s 
beliefs and personal opinions, as was clear in his regular use of terms such as “I think” or “I 
imagine”. 
 
Also, according to NPEX3, “Nannysex’s” co-offenders referred to the idea of game on several 
occasions. The one referred to as “D’Arcy” liked to spank children (exploiting his role as a 
school teacher), whereas the one named “Etex” used his situation, as a doctor, to involve his 
victims in sexual games. Similarly, the one known as “Todd” said “I am playing” (NPEX3, C18) 
when confronted with a video of himself penetrating a child. 
 
This neutralisation technique is very complex to analyse and comment upon. On the one hand, 
the idea of adolescents joining the Anonymous crusade for the purposes of “passing the time” 
seems a plausible idea and could help understand better the hacktivist movement. On the 
other hand, the “just playing” technique when applied to child sex offenders collides with the 
concept of cognitive distortions (cognitions). 
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Another case with a reference to the “game” neutralisation was found (albeit in a more 
implicit way) in C2, which involved minors selling sexual services via social networks, and which 
was discussed by GCEX. GCEX explained his assessment by pointing out that younger children 
(10-12) did not really understood that what they were was  “sexual”, but were preoccupied 
with thoughts of the “easy money” and the commodities (like video-games) that they gained 
from their role in this offending. According to GCEX, the way these children construed their 
involvement was as if it was a game, where they could win desirable rewards. Maturity could, 
then, played a fundamental role in the design of particular neutralisation techniques. As GCEX 
made clear, children were not old enough to understand the “value of sex”. 
 
5.2.5. Denial of victim 
 
In using this neutralization technique, offenders focused blame on the victims, believing that 
whatever happened was partially or entirely due to their behavior. Offenders also - through 
their use of this technique - minimised the impact of their behavior upon victims by perceiving 
their crimes as victimless. 
 
When talking about sex offenders’ cognitive distortions, the idea of blame and children agency 
has been already mentioned. NPEX3 indicated that “Nannysex” argued that it was the parents 
who “let the child go naked at home” (NPEX3, C18 but also referring to C19 and C20). This 
becomes also very relevant when describing C20, a child sexual grooming case. In this case, 
“The Chameleon” (he used quite a large number of online identities) pretended to be a girl in 
some cases, in order to gain the trust of other girls and subject them to a spiral of sexual abuse 
and extortion. He convinced them to send him pictures of their breasts. Once he had the 
pictures and had gained control over their e-mail system, computers or webcams, he 
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threatened the girls with deleting their Hotmail accounts, distributing their pictures or deleting 
their friends list. Girls were to send a specific quota of pictures, with the explicitness of these 
images having to increase over time.   According to NPEX3, this narrative was fairly common 
among online child sex offenders: “No, no, it’s them [the girls] the ones provoking” (NPEX3, 
C20liii). It is worth pointing out that NPEX3 considered child sexual groomers also sex abusers, 
because of the subjugation and control over the victim.  
Jorge: So groomers have even said that it was the lads or lassies’ fault 
NPEX3: Yes, yes. Many times. (NPEX3, C20liv) 
In the description of the aforementioned C13, NPEX2 believed that one of the reasons behind 
the malware designer’s use of neutralisation techniques is the he did not “see the victim” 
(NPEX2, C13lv), he did not have any awareness of doing something wrong and that, in a way, 
seem to coalesce with the denial of injury narrative already mentioned. NPEX1, also indicated 
implied in relation to C10 (fraudulent gambling scheme) that offenders were extremely 
abusive towards their victims, what also seems to connect with the interviewee’s discourse of 
the absence of empathy and remorse from fraudsters.  
 
5.2.6. Robust heterosexual identity 
 
This neutralisation technique, utilized in C2, was according to GCEX, an “ad hoc” script.  GCEX 
explained that male children were selling themselves sexually to men, via social networks, in 
order to obtain money or goods. However, the children in question took an active role in 
limiting the extent of the sexual relationship. They did not want to be sexually penetrated or to 
have any other sexual act performed on them. By doing so, these children (according to GCEX) 
were able to justify that they were, in essence, heterosexual males. 
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Jorge: And why do you think the older ones did demand being the ones penetrating, yet 
not being penetrated? I mean, why this contradiction? 
GCEX: Because as these aggressions have a homosexual nature, the concept the minor 
has in mind is, I’m not homosexual. The moment when I am not penetrated or I don’t 
perform anything, I mean, I do this for money, he is aware of penetrating an adult man, 
ok? But his way of thinking is saying… I am not homosexual, you know? (GCEX, C2 lvi) 
GCEX believed that the above minors involved did not ascribe any value or importance to the 
sexual relationships in which they were engaged. For them, they were means to an end; the 
acquisition of money and desirable goods. In order to realise these goals, the minors sold sex 
to male adults. These homosexual practices seemed to endanger their masculinities and 
heterosexual identities so they created the “robust heterosexual identity” justification. This 
justification is relevant in social and cultural terms, as it seemed to imply a commodification of 
sexuality by young people and a capitalistic rationale. In this chapter, the idea of crime and 
deviance, as means for the acquisition of money, has been prominent. Money was the 
ultimate social goal; therefore morality, identity and sexuality, had to bend and be re-imagined 
in line with capitalism. Also, what becomes really important is the public reinforcement of 
their masculine identity and the necessity to justify homosexual sex in the light of a “greater 
good” (money). This justification is also relevant from a gender perspective, given that the idea 
of justifying homosexuality would imply that homosexuality itself is contemplated as deviant 
by the children involved.  
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5.2.7. Indifferent attitude 
 
The last neutralisation technique that will be dealt with in this chapter is what has been coded 
as “indifferent attitude”. This is not a proper neutralisation technique, but rather marked the 
lack of such a technique. This technique is the equivalent of the “non-neutralisation” (this is 
not justifiable used in the online survey) and emerged during the interviews. Many of the 
interviewees referred to the indifferent attitudes of offenders, describing them as “non-
cooperative” or “lying”, or stating that they had an accepting attitude towards being 
apprehended by law enforcement.  
 
In many situations, this was a mere legal manoeuvre, with the offender attempting to protect 
himself from legal proceedings. In other instances, offenders “did nothing”, opting instead to 
remain silent or otherwise not collaborating with law enforcement. This seems to relate, in a 
way, to the later cultural construction of law enforcement work as a game of chess, a 
tournament of the minds, between criminals and law enforcement agents. Again, it must be 
remembered that these findings draw upon the perceptions of law enforcement agents – 
perceptions that might be influenced by cultural biases of these agents. Interviewees do not 
narrate (or are unaware of) the existence of the term and concept of neutralisation techniques 
in offenders.  
Jorge: And The Chameleon, did you learn of his justifications, why he did it, why not? Did 
he say something in that regard? Maybe in between lines? 
NPEX3: No, his motivations, really…They don’t explicit them, except they feel guilty, they 
don’t, in the first place he doesn’t feel guilty. (NPEX3, C20lvii) 
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NPEX3 described a case (C19) which involved a child sex offender producing child pornography 
and sharing it on the internet, via the deep web. The offender indicated that that “It wasn’t 
him. He hasn’t done anything. But we found all the material in his house, even the dildos he 
made a six year old girl use” (NPEX3, C19lviii ). This is also concurrent with the “I am playing” 
line, used by “Todd” (one of “Nannysex’s” co-offenders, C18) during a court hearing. At first 
sight these narratives might be understood as a “Denial of Crime” neutralisation, but from the 
context of the interview, NPEX3 wanted to signify that these individuals were non-cooperative. 
NPEX3 emphasised an external manifestation (of offender’ behavior) as opposed to any 
intersubjective assessment (of their motivation). In these situations, law enforcement agents 
could not glean how offenders felt inside or whether they really believed what they had said. 
Continuing with this theme, NPEX3 added that Nannysex’s co-offenders started blaming one 
another and that one of them “completely shuts himself down” (NPEX3, own translationlix). 
Moreover, “Nannysex” himself “doesn’t recognize it is a crime, yet he doesn’t justify either” 
(NPEX3, C18lx), therefore “Nannysex’s” attitude is understood as somehow ambivalent in 
regards to the investigation of the case named after him. NPEX3 went on to say that he had to 
empathize with “Nannysex” in order to trying to understand the motivations behind his acts 
because he also “shut himself down”. “Nannysex” did not want to collaborate with law 
enforcement agents and the investigation was put and risk. 
 
NPEX1 believed that all cyberfraudsters were openly lying when negating the facts. However, 
he felt that such lies were not a mechanism for the self-protection of an offender’s moral 
compass but rather “a lie for an audience” (C11, see the “denial of crime” section). The C11, 
the designer of the online scheme “didn’t show resistance, neither collaboration” (NPEX1, 
C11lxi) when confronted with proceeds of his crimes by the investigators. This points, again, 
towards offenders lying when negating facts and being non-cooperative.  
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 GCEX expressed something similar to what NPEX1 and NPEX3 described about offenders 
demonstrating an “indifferent attitude”, using the cybercriminals’ point of view: 
 OK, I know what I have done. If they have come so far is because they need to have 
more than enough evidence to get them here, but now it is the Guardia Civil the one 
who has to find all evidences to proof what I have committed. (C1lxii) 
GCEX continued explaining offender’s indifference: “they won’t tell you the origin of the 
economic benefits they had, they won’t reveal who their clients are, they won’t reveal their 
providers” (C1 lxiii). Indicating how professionalized cybercriminals have become and how they 
seem to be encouraged by what NPEX2 called a “perception of security” (C14lxiv).  
 
5.1.  (Cyber)Police Culture 
 
Zizek talks about ideology following a Marxist assumption: 
 The very concept of ideology implies a kind of basic, constitutive naiveté: the 
misrecognition of its own presuppositions, of its own effective conditions, a distance, a 
divergence between so-called social reality and our distorted representation, our false 
consciousness of it. (Zizek, 2008, p. 24) 
This classic concept of ideology, according to Zizek (2008), works as a filter, a lens through 
which we experience society leading to a “misrecognition of the social reality which is part of 
this reality itself” (p. 25), a social fantasy were individuals find themselves immersed in 
unknowingly.  Zizek subsequently expands on the concept of law and authority based on 
“external” obedience for the sake of abiding by authority as an external entity that is in itself 
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and by itself (not because what is to be done, or how the law is understood as good or 
necessary, but because it is authoritative and therefore good or necessary). Ideology and 
obedience can be seen as a pivotal point in understanding how police officers work under the 
rule of law. Section 5.1 of the Security Corps Act, which regulates the functioning of the 
Security Corps in Spain (including National Police and Guardia Civil), states:  
Abiding by the legal order, specially: 
a) Exercise its function with absolute respect for the Constitution and the rest of 
the legal order (1986) 
The law becomes the superior structures that ideologically and normatively rules police actions 
and, therefore, directs and articulates their discourse.   
 
Following the ideological approach, Reiner (2010) contends, when talking about police culture, 
that “police forces in modern liberal democracies do face similar basic pressures that shape a 
distinctive and characteristic culture” (p.116).  Reiner believes there are seven key elements 
that recur in police culture. These elements shape the beliefs and narratives of police officers, 
creating a sort of common moral ground for the majority of them. These elements are: 
1. Mission-action-cynicism-pessimism 
2. Suspicion 
3. Isolation/Solidarity 
4. Conservatism 
5. Machismo 
6. Racial Prejudice 
7. Pragmatism 
(Reiner, 2010, pp. 118-132; also Rowe, 2008, p. 102 citing Reiner, 2000) 
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From a critical point of view, it is important to understand how these values may have shaped 
police accounts of cybercriminals in Spain; first, because there might be differences in  how 
“cyberpolice” construct criminal identities (or how highly specialized police units do), and 
secondly because no studies on police culture (of any sorts) have been carried out in Spain. 
This insight is essential in trying to understand how individuals “ascribed” to law enforcement 
morality, review and rate their own morality and the morality of others.  
 
5.1.1. Mission- action-cynicism-pessimism 
 
Reiner (2010) talk about this sense of mission and how police work is “victim-centered” 
(p.119). At the National Police Academy in Ávila (four of the interviewees were trained at said 
facilities) the words engraved at the very entrance of this facility are shown in Figure 22. 
Figure 20. Spanish National Police Academy entrance  
 
Figure 21. Another detail of Spanish National Police Academy entrance 
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“Lex, Vis, Iustitia, Pacis Cause” (Figure 20) means “Law, Strength, Justice at the Service of 
Peace” whereas the wall engraving can be translated as “At this place blazes the light that is to 
be the policing style of tomorrow. Service. Dignity. Commitment. Loyalty” (Figure 21). The 
sense of mission and destiny seems to be present at a very early stage of the law enforcement 
career.   
 
Following this discourse, offenders may be viewed as oppressors, and in some of the 
interviews, law enforcement agents refer to cybercriminals as “a most big son of a bitch lxv” 
(NPEX1, C11) or “un cabrón con pintas” (slang Spanish that could be understood as a “big time 
tosser”, NPEX3, C20). In relation to this sense of mission, police officers harden themselves by 
resorting to pessimistic and cynical attitudes. Insults (grandísimo hijo de puta, cabrón con 
pintas) are also used in their superlative form (grandísimo=big time) and even though it is very 
difficult to find an exact translation into English of “cabrón”, the word transmits the idea of a 
bad or ruthless person. One could argue that, by using insults, police officers position 
themselves in moral superiority (‘they are bad, we are good, we fight evil’) exerting a position 
of power as means of agents of social control - labelling undesirable deviant agents. On the 
other hand, the use of swear words is very common in Spain, even in formal contexts, and in 
some cases could ironically mean affection or familiarity, but usually they are a means of 
expressing masculinity. This could be something to say your male friends after meeting them 
randomly on the street. NPEX3 also resorted to insults, even if following a neutral and 
detached discourse throughout his accounts, whereas NPEX1 used a more ironical, brisk and 
conversational discourse.  It is also possible that NPEX1 is not acting entirely cynical and bye 
his tone, almost inaudible when insulting, it was supposed to be a “wink” to the researcher in 
order to create a connection. 
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The need for action does not seem to apply to “cybercops” as their job is desk-based, with 
their acting as investigators and knowledge-brokers. However, their particulars views do not 
seem to be tainted by cynicism or pessimism, but are informed by a sense of understanding, a 
“social and criminal awareness”. NPEX1 indicates that you “always put yourself in other 
people’s place” (C10)lxvi” in order to investigate criminal offences. Moreover, many of the 
accounts have demonstrated a high degree of empathy and understanding in terms of cyber-
criminals. NPEX2 indicated how “they became friends” with one of the designer malware 
creators. NPEX1 felt “admiration” towards cyberfraudsters and GCEX understood how 
cybercrime can be a career option for some disadvantaged yet intelligent youngsters “Well, 
logically you are going to do it” (GCEX, C3). Also, PSEX reflected on the idea of computer 
illiteracy and societal change, meaning that some people are not even aware of their 
commission of a crime on the internet because of the absence of a “computer safety culture”. 
He also added a very critical approach to the fast changes that the family institution is facing 
because of the use of digital technologies, for example, the parent-children divide and the 
liquid nature of romantic relationships.  It could be argued that PSEX’s narrative moved 
between a cynical,-pessimistic approach and a critically realist approach. 
 
5.1.2. Suspicion 
 
This element refers to the ever-present sensation of constant suspicion that permeates police 
work and also to their penchant for offender stereotyping (Reiner, 2010). Interestingly enough, 
the interviewees were keen on breaking the stereotypes of some offenders, especially in terms 
of hacking and child sex abusers. GCEX commented in C1 that hackers “are not evil” or “do not 
fit the shy guy stereotype”. At the very same time, the interviewee GCEX tried to demystify the 
obscure figure of the child offender in contrast with popular depictions. On the other hand 
NPEX3 described only child abuse and grooming offences with professional detachment 
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(although in C20; a child grooming case, he/she indicated how taken aback he/she was by the 
emotional state of victim’s or how the offender was a “big time tosser”). In addition, NPEX3 
and GCEX offered very interesting insight on paedophile psychology. According to NPEX3, 
Nannysex (C18, also mentioned by PSEX as C4) was a “monster” amongst the child abuser 
“community” because of his abuse of babies and other extremely young children. Interestingly 
enough this “monster” label is not applied by the interviewees, but is accounted by them as 
applied by society or other sex offenders.  
 
5.1.3. Isolation/solidarity 
 
In respect of this element, police work is presented as a “Them vs Us” (Reiner, 2010, pp. 122-
16) - a sort of ever-present battle between a cohesive group (police force) against external 
indomitable forces.  Said antagonists can be divided as follows (with only those appearing 
directly or indirectly in interviewee accounts are listed, with: “challengers”, “disarmers”, “do-
gooders” and “politicians” being omitted): 
- “Good-class villains” - Worthwhile of pursuit and rewarding to chase and investigate 
by police officers. This becomes very patent in the narratives of NPEX1 who 
demonstrates a professional admiration for the fraudster under investigation. Other 
interviewees ascribe high levels of intelligence and skills to the cyber-criminals they 
pursue (GCEX, NPEX2). 
 
- “Police Property” - This refers to the idea of police being left in charge of solving a 
particular problem or dealing with a social group. These groups are usually social 
“pariahs” and the police are left to “control and segregate” (Reiner, 2010, p. 123) 
them. This is relevant given that the general public is not really aware of the majority 
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of cybercrimes being developed and committed (PSEX account is centered on that 
idea).  
 
- “Rubbish” - are people who are deemed as messy or unworthy when making calls to 
the police (2010, p. 124), they waste police time with trivialities that do not belong to 
the path of higher destiny that police officers walk. The only oblique mention during 
the interviews was made by NPEX2 when explaining C13 (Police Porn Virus) indicating 
that: 
We can tell anecdotes of people calling, for example on the phone, and they 
told us that… Fuck, I’d pay the fine without any problem. Well, well, yes, but I 
think it is not a crime to watch pornography. (NPEX2, C13lxvii, emphasis added) 
And other people calling the police and indicating that: 
No, no I haven’t watched child pornography at any moment, I have watched 
this and whatnot from that webpage but it was adult pornography and all, I 
don’t know why this about child pornography appears, but if the least I have to 
do is paying 100 €, I pay 100 €. (NPEX2, C13lxviii, emphasis added) 
 
However, these comments do not seem to imply criticisms of victims for “bothering” 
the police with their petty concerns or for becoming easy prey. The researcher 
understood them as a humorous relief, with NPEX2 trying to explain how cleverly 
designed the virus was, infecting users from porn websites. Also, the tone and the use 
of the word “anecdote” tried to convey a sense of “vaudeville” when depicting 
internet users explaining to unknown police officers their pornography watching 
habits.  This seems to add more to the empathic texture of NPEX2’s account. It could 
be argued that NPEX2 was one of the officers that demonstrated the least judgmental 
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attitude and the least incisive tone, maybe because the crimes he discussed were more 
technical in nature and were less toxic in terms of the consequences in terms of 
victimization.  
 
5.1.4. Conservatism 
 
This element of police culture refers to the idea of police officers being conservative politically 
and morally (Reiner, 2010, pp. 126-128). It is an element of paramount importance in 
understanding police views on offenders’ morality. In this study, the idea of morality and 
perceptions of morality takes center stage; therefore the issue of police painting their accounts 
with their political, religious or moral cosmovision or world-view has to be addressed 
thoroughly and critically.  
 
Once the interviews were studied, in terms of wording, we can find small hints of the existence 
of such conservatism. However, it does not seem to be part of the integral architecture of the 
discourse but more a superficial coating. This moral conservatism manifested itself in a 
threefold manner during the interviews: by describing offenders as “evil”, by describing 
offenders as “not so evil”, and by describing current moral state of affairs as dire (“dark 
times”): 
- Evil - This idea seem to be present, but not in a biblical antagonistic manner. As has 
been indicated above, NPEX1 refers to one fraudster as a “son of a bitch”.  NPEX1 also 
indicates that fraudsters are “remorseless” and overwhelmingly profit-driven, whereas 
NPEX3 calls a cybergroomer a “big time tosser”. The idea of the “monster” is 
constructed by NPEX3 when indicating that one child sex abuser was a “monster” in 
the eyes of other sex abusers and how dealing with victims of cyber-grooming was 
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heart-wrenching. It is extremely important to mention that when NPEX3 refers to “the 
monster” he is (in theory) conveying the views of the child sex abuser community (or 
maybe society in general). It could be indicated that NPEX3’s account is detached and 
professional and NPEX1 is more emotionally charged with more references to 
cybercriminals being remorseless and evil. 
 
- Not so evil - Hackers and malware designers are presented by GCEX and NPEX2 as not 
evil “per se”. They are seen as people with a lust for knowledge and challenge. Also, 
the idea of individuals who were driven to crime because of structural causes (such as 
poverty) seems to be present in both discourses. One could argue that this view is 
conservative and condescending in its simplicity: Russians are poor and they decide to 
commit crimes against Spaniards. NPEX2 indicates that he befriended some of the 
cybercriminals and he resorted to a more humorous or ironical approach during 
interviews with them. GCEX seemed to be more conservative when trying to describe 
the social class of one of the cyber-offenders in C2: 
the parents came from medium-low social stratum. Well, we are not going to 
say they were… I mean, they lived in a humble house and in a humble 
neighbourhood, but it wasn’t a slum, they weren’t … OK… They were, I mean 
from medium-low stratum, but not low at all. (GCEX, C2 lxix) 
GCEX tries very hard to justify the social class of one minor that prostituted himself by 
using social networks, but this description seems to be awkward and uncomfortable 
for the interviewee as if talking about social class was in bad taste. He does not seem 
to be very sure as to how to convey the idea of lower social class. This can be also 
understood as an exertion of power from the Guardia Civil interviewee, as he 
understood the world from a middle class morality and understood of crime as being 
linked to lower classes and strata - something more or less admitted, yet not to be 
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publically spoken about.  The idea of social class seems, from the point of view of this 
account, to be something alien and pertaining to arcane police knowledge.  
 
NPEX2 also talked about Anonymous in C15 and their defacements of political parties 
web-pages. Interestingly enough, the interviewee’s description of the attacks and the 
“Anonymous” hacktivist initiative is detached and professional; no pejorative language 
is used when talking about them. NPEX2 is critical of offenders, when indicating that 
the core reason for their joining Anonymous could be ideological, but he identifies 
other drivers, such as revenge or “having fun” especially for youngsters who, he thinks, 
might view their activities as some sort of social pastime. Also, NPEX2 invites reflection 
when talking about Anonymous attacks one major newspaper published a new entitled 
“DDoS attack: Crime or protest?” (Maeztu, 2011). This article advocated that citizens 
fight for their rights by using cybercrime techniques and criticized the criminalization 
of such behaviour. Later on, as indicated by NPEX2, the major newspaper in question 
suffered a cyberattack and published the following headline “Far-Rightist arrested 
because of attacks on various digitals media” (Público, 2013) and hacktivism was 
presented in a less favorable manner.  
 
- Dark Times:  Many interviewees argued, or at least suggested, that the internet was 
posing a major social challenge, as it is changing many behavioural or relational 
paradigms.  
 
Following that discourse on current morality, PSEX was extremely critical of current 
society and its relationship with the internet.  His discourse elaborated ideas about 
how smart phones fostered infidelity or at least normalised extra-marital flirting. He 
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also discussed how the legal apparatus seemed to crush the powerless and benefit the 
powerful. This idea was linked to how companies are extremely harsh on ordinary 
workers (in terms of, for example, compliance, company rules and sanctions.) and too 
lenient on executives “many hindrances, to the people at the bottom many key-locks 
are put” (PSEX, no case lxx). Metaphorically and by resorting to hyperbaton, PSEX tried 
to emphasise what might be understood as an unfair power shift.  
 
PSEX also criticised the idea of individuals not paying for goods and services related to 
the entertainment industry: 
 It’s not the same but well, the culture of free and of what I have obtained and 
it hasn’t cost me anything, and well, we are in a crisis … he/she doesn’t have 
any knowledge of the whole industry behind copyright, of creator rights. (SPEX, 
no case lxxi, emphasis added) 
References were also made to the absence of computer and security knowledge. 
According to PSEX, there was a generational divide that impeded parents from 
understanding what their children were doing on the internet. At the same time, 
according to this interviewee, the very same children did not understand the entirety 
of the dangers that loomed on the internet. 
 
Another interesting reflection on capitalistic values and moral crisis was made by GCEX 
when talking about C2, and why children sold sexual services on the internet. 
According to this account, children trivialised sexuality and commodified it. They did 
not understand the inter-personal and emotional charge of sexual exchanges, and 
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used sex to obtain trivial goods, such as “A Playstation 3, a state of the art mobile 
phone that is worth 200 €, 300 €, 400 €” (GCEX, C2lxxii). 
 
All in all, it is difficult to separate out the elements that relate to police cultural conservatism 
from those relating to personal moral values. Although, the majority of participants were 
extremely critical of society in terms of “moral drift”, they did not seem to apply this 
conceptualisation to cybercriminals but to internet users in general. Following this line of 
thought, it could be argued that the internet is a reflection of the offline society -what 
Baudrillard (1988) called a “simulacrum”, a copy without the original, which becomes another 
entity in itself. The internet could be understood as the perfect example of a simulacrum 
drawing from tangible reality and then creating its own structures. As such, it replicates its 
moral compass, accentuating some elements by its very peculiar architecture. What happens 
in society is to happen on the internet, yet in different ways. What can be safely indicated is 
that all interviewees were critical of different aspects of society and crime. 
 
5.1.5. Machismo 
 
No implicit accounts of machismo were dealt with during the interviews. PSEX critiques on 
technology changing the concept of family and relationship were presented from a masculinity 
of femininity perspective. Also, many of the male interviewees talked about homosexual 
practices without ascribing any negative aspects to them. GCEX elaborated how male child 
prostitutes justified their sexual identities by resorting to non-passive sexual practices.  
 
247 
 
Also, only one of the interviewees was female, yet no gender discourse seemed to permeate 
her account. On the other hand, it could be argued that, in some ways, she acted and 
presented herself as “tough girl” (not expressly). However it is not possible to discern if she 
ascribed to constructed male gender male models, or views on female police officers as there 
is no data about it in Spain. 
 
5.1.6. Racial prejudice 
 
In relation to racial prejudice, no specific account has been made explicitly. NPEX1 mentioned 
that the family structure of fraud business was similar to “gypsy clans”, in a factual way. As 
indicated beforehand, many of the cybercriminals were based in other countries and had 
managed to form multi-national networks.  Comments on people committing crimes because 
of their country of origin’s structural situation (for example, Russia) might be understood as 
prejudiced by some, yet the interviewees seemed to be talking about them in a purely 
explicative manner without ascribing negative connotations.  
 
GCEX indicated, when talking about C1, that hackers were stereotyped as shy and reclusive 
people but he added that while this description could apply to Anglo-Aaxon countries it was 
different in Spain: “we have better weather, we have the sun and we have other 
circumstances that help us socialize with people” (GCEX, C1 lxxiii). This comment does not seem 
to add anything to the discourse and could be understood as clichéd and irrelevant, maybe 
even chauvinistic, however, there is not enough data to support that GCEX is prejudiced 
towards other countries.  
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In addition, NPEX2 talked about forging “friendships” (better understood as “strategic 
alliances”) with Russian cybercriminals.  Also, C16 and C17 were explained as cybercrimes 
perpetrated by South American individuals. C16 was organised  by a group called “Latin 
hackteam” and C17 by a Bolivian minor living in a remote village in Asturias (Spain).  When 
referring to the investigation of the hacking offence (information ransom) committed by this 
minor (C17) NPEX2 stated that: 
It was a message written in South American words, even the e-mail account was a 
domain from @bolivia.com, and because of the accent, the attack was perpetrated by a 
South American. (NPEX2, C17lxxiv, emphasis added) 
It is unclear as to what was meant by “South American accent” in a written e-mail, but 
following NPEX2’s explanation, it seems to refer to the linguistic differences between South 
American Spanish and Castilian Spanish. Both versions of the language are clearly 
distinguishable in both written and spoken format, as wording and phrasing differ. Although it 
is quite generic and vague to refer to “South American words”, as it does not reflect the rich 
particulars of many of the variations of the Spanish language, it does not seem to be overly 
charged with racial prejudice. It could be argued that it is quite a generic affirmation, colloquial 
and somehow lacking in cultural awareness. 
 
5.1.7. Pragmatism 
 
According to Reiner (2010) police constables had a “very pragmatic, concrete, down-to-earth, 
anti-theoretical perspective” (p. 131). Contrarily, the sample of interviewees demonstrated 
themselves to be highly motivated individuals interested in understanding crime from a less 
pragmatic point of view. Their long experience in the field and their current jobs (the three 
National Police experts were in charge of different units: Open Networks, Logic Attacks, and 
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Child Exploitation and Protection). NPEX1 claimed that it is important to think as the criminal 
would do in order to investigate cybercrime, and also advocated for the use of intelligence 
techniques in investigating and explaining cybercrime. NPEX3 made affirmations about online 
child sex offender’s identities and the process of grooming, and NPEX2 was very skilled in the 
technical side of computing.  These three interviewees worked with Europol, and were also 
involved in disseminating knowledge amongst colleagues and law enforcement agencies. 
These three interviewees had their case presentations pre-prepared, having used them 
previously for educational and training purposes. As indicated above, NPEX1 used extremely 
elaborate graphs, inspired by intelligence analysis, to guarantee a clearer investigation.  
 
GCEX and PSEX also had very extensive experience in terms of investigation and policing more 
generally. Both of interviewees were extremely cautious when asked about child sex abusers, 
explaining that this subject raised complex psychological issues, about which they were not 
very knowledgeable. However, this should not lead them to labelled as extremely pragmatic 
individuals but maybe cautious or humble. 
 
5.1.8. Concluding remarks on (cyber) police culture 
 
Talking about police culture in Spain is a complicated task. The police tend to be opaque in 
terms of their relations with academics and in respect of public accountability. However, a 
common understanding of Spanish police culture seems to exist between social researchers, 
even though it has not been studied. 
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Police officers are currently moving towards a more “public-friendly” image, by means of, in 
particular, social networks. (Guardia Civil and Spanish National Police both have official Twitter 
and YouTube accounts. The Spanish police has an official Facebook account and an Instagram 
account. Different local police services also have Twitter accounts). The National Spanish Police 
official Twitter account - @policia - has gained media and social praise and recognition 
because of its down to earth, humorous and, in some cases bizarre, approach to policing and 
crime prevention by using jokes, memes and slang. Guardia Civil has also followed that trend 
quite successfully. Plenty of police officers are also using personal accounts to tweet about 
their daily jobs (some of them have reached internet celebrity status). 
 
Thus, considering Reiner’s (2010) construction of policing (drawn from Anglo-American 
policing but utilised in this thesis), it can be argued that the sample interviewed in the present 
study do not abide by the previously discussed maxims. Many of the agents interviewed 
demonstrated some of the seven elements at some point during their accounts of their work in 
cyberpolicing, but these elements were not the dominant mould or script of their discourse, 
but rather seemed to indicate fragments of the interpersonal axiology of the experts. 
 
Having analysed all of these elements, it could be maintained that “cybercops”, at least 
Spanish “cybercops”, do not seem to ascribe to a  specific  cultural pattern. According to what 
Reiner (2010) calls “variations in cop culture” (pp. 132-135) - where he summarises different 
police approaches found in academic literature, as well as his own nomenclature - it could be 
contended that Spanish “cybercops” could be close to being labelled as “the professional 
policeman”, who are ambitious and career-conscious, with a balanced view on all the aspects 
of crime fighting (Reiner, 2010, p. 133; citing Reiner, 1978, chapter 12). 
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 A  new type  of police culture might be emerging in Spain, one where senior police officers 
have a stronger social sensibility (than their peers) stemming from a life-long learning process, 
which involves training in disciplines, such as law, criminology, computing and psychology. 
These “new” police officers are also concerned about the causes of crime, the sharing and 
updating of investigative knowledge, and the use of intelligence and multi-disciplinary 
approaches. However, it is difficult to indicate whether this culture applies solely to police 
officers who investigate cybercrime or the newest generations of high ranking officers that 
perform a “desk job” rather than a “street job”. It is, therefore, not possible to conclude 
whether the interviewees have provided biased information, and whether this is due to the 
existence of cultural paradigms and axiological programming or because of their own personal 
life narrative. There are many elements that support the idea that the five interviewees have 
tried to offer the most trustworthy account of their cases, trying not to contaminate these 
with their subjective world, but have tried instead to talk from a professional and emotionally 
detached standpoint.  In many instances, such is the nature of qualitative research; their 
personalities emerged in the discourse. NPEX1 showed a passion for policing, as well as a fast-
paced, “down to earth” way of expressing it. NPEX2 was more ironical and even humorous at 
certain points, NPEX3 tried to be as detached as possible, PSEX was very critical of societal 
values and GCEX used a professional yet “everymanish” and critical approach.  
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Chapter 6: Integrated Discussion and Validation of SAT-RI Model 
 
 
The online survey and the interview data were analysed and discussed in the two previous 
chapters. This next chapter is dedicated to integrating the above quantitative and qualitative 
and quantitative strands; this being the crux of the present researcher’s mixed methods 
approach. As it was indicated in the epistemology section (in the Methodology chapter), the 
epistemological approach was to be essentially interpretivistic, given that the research relates 
to the fields of perceptions (for example, the morality of others and perceptions of criminal 
identity).  
 
The survey and interview methods complement each other and were chosen in order to 
establish and explore the theoretical design, as has been discussed. The mixed methods used 
in the study are not only a mere sum of opposing approaches (quantitative and qualitative). 
Rather, the different methods were used to help answer distinct but interlinked research 
questions. The online survey was intended to enable the present researcher to identify the 
role of self-control, morality and neutralisation in cybercrime causation.   
 
The interviews were designed to further understand the use of neutralisations by cybercrime 
offenders, as well as to inform several social and cultural issues that transcend the theory (yet 
permeate it). The use of these interviews adds layers of depth to the formulation of the SAT-RI, 
as cybercrime involves a number of psychosocial issues that cannot be addressed only from a 
statistical or quantitative perspective. These social and psychological issues offer a discourse 
on society that will be analysed in this chapter: a discourse on hypermodernity and liquid 
modernity, on societal changes and new cultural paradigms. Finally, an adjusted theoretical 
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model is presented and defined in this chapter, along with its constituent elements. The 
adjusted theoretical model represents the essence of this thesis, which aimed to developing 
SAT for the explanation of cybercrime. 
 
Issues of gender, identity, sexuality and pornography are discussed in this chapter as they 
proved to be recurrent themes during the data analysis and academic literature. Revisiting the 
cyborg discourse presented in the literature review chapter is also necessary. The idea of 
mankind influencing the machine and the machine influencing mankind, and both influencing 
and being influenced by society, nurturing an evolutionist circle, is paramount to 
understanding why cybercrime has become the widespread phenomenon it is now. The 
rapport forged with the machine (essentially the internet) is also absolutely necessary in order 
to understand the perceptions from the online survey and the construction of cybercrime and 
cybercriminals by law enforcement agents who were interviewed.   
 
6.1. Reformulation of SAT-RI Model 
6.1.1. Answering research questions 
 
After the online survey and the law enforcement agents’ interviews analysis, the SAT-RI model 
had to be re-structured, into a sequential model, instead of a simultaneous model (one where 
the variables converged at the same time). The research questions have been answered in the 
following manner: 
RQ1. What is the role of self-control in cybercrime causation? 
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The influence of different levels of self-control on the commission of cybercrime was found to 
be very important in the present study. Self-control has been measured using a 24 item scale 
comprising six sub-scale variables (impulsivity, simple tasks, risk-seeking, egotism, physical 
activities and temper), which represented the elements of self-control following Gottfredson 
and Hirschi (1990). According to Gottfredson and Hirschi, individuals with low self-control are 
more prone to the commission of crime as they do not have the capacity to postpone 
immediate satisfaction. This is due to the fact than individuals with low self-control tend  (as 
theorised by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, pp. 89-91) to be individuals oriented to the short-
term without a liking for carrying out complex tasks, very keen on taking unnecessary risks and 
on physical tasks rather than mental ones. Also these individuals are self-cantered and 
impulsive, and lack the ability to manage conflict. The 24 items also were computed into a new 
scale variable called “self-control”, produced by aggregating all the answers from the scale. 
This was done as recommended by Grasmick et al. (1993), who understood self-control as a 
“coalescent” and unidimensional trait. Also, a dichotomous variable was computed in order to 
divide respondents into membership of two different groups: those with high and those with 
low levels of self-control.  
 
Statistically, self-control was compared, using T-Tests, ANOVAs and chi-squared tests, to the 
other variables that formed the SAT-RI (engagement, morality and neutralisation). The self-
control variables (the interval variable and the dichotomous high and low variable) were 
statistically relevant in terms of perceptions of morality and engagement in cybercrime 
activities. In other words, those with higher levels of self-control were (usually) less prone to 
the commission of cybercrimes and understood cybercrimes as more morally wrong. This 
association was broken in respect of some vignettes, which acted as “outliers” (essentially 
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sexting, Wi-Fi Stealing and Illegal Downloading that are subject to a special discussion in this 
chapter). 
 
Comparison between self-control and neutralisation techniques produced different results. 
ANOVAs demonstrated that people with higher self-control were more likely to choose the 
“this is not justifiable” technique. (This answer was introduced into the survey questionnaire 
as a “non-neutralisation technique”.) However, self-control was not associated with any  other 
neutralisation technique. 
 
RQ2. What is the role of personal propensity (morality and engagement) in cybercrime 
causation? 
SAT-RI theory is an updating of Wikström’s SAT theory for the Internet environment. The core 
of Wikström’s theory can be found in the “formula: propensity x exposure” to criminogenic 
setting equals crime causation. Propensity and exposure are based on moral norms: the moral 
norms of the individual and the moral norms inherent to the environment, including its 
deterrent capabilities. Perceptions of morality were introduced into the questionnaire 
following research by Schoepfer and Piquero (2006) modelled as different vignettes for 
participants to rate. Another variable - “engagement” - was created and introduced into the 
survey to assess the likelihood a participants would participate in the acts depicted in the 
scenarios. The reason for using two different variables to measure the same concept 
(propensity) was related to the projective nature of the questionnaire, given that opposing 
sets of questions tried to avoid “social desirability bias”. Results showed very good correlations 
between pairs of scenarios - respondents who understood one scenario as morally wrong were 
less likely to be involved in it. Also, a trend emerged whereby participants tended to rate the 
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majority of scenarios as morally reproachable and their engagement in them as very unlikely. 
They formed what was called the “morality precipice” due to the steep shape of the 
distributions (modes were usually either 0 or 10, the two extremes of the Likert scale).  
 
However, this symmetry was broken from time to time, when respondents were faced with 
“outlier vignettes” (Illegal Downloading, Sexting and Wi-Fi Stealing). One of these vignettes 
was Sexting, that was rated as “morally lukewarm”) but would not engage in them. At the very 
same time, statistically significant results were obtained when comparing the morality and 
engagement variables with the neutralisation techniques.  
 
In relation to the interview data, several types of moral structures emerged:  professional 
cyberoffenders who understood their trade as sustenance and online child sex offenders.  The 
latter processed their cyberoffending activities through cognitive distortions. In addition, a 
distinction between different professionals emerged: cyberfraudsters and hackers. 
Cyberfraudsters were professionals who had a disproportionate liking for economic gain. 
Hackers, on the other hand, had a more liquid morality, shifting between constructions of 
good and evil. 
 
RQ3. What is the role of neutralisation techniques in cybercrime causation? 
Analysis of the survey data showed that the function of neutralisation techniques was to shield 
the offender against moral repulse and facilitate the hypothetical commission of cybercriminal 
acts. The survey offered eight neutralisation choices. These choices stemmed from classical 
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neutralisation theory (Sykes & Matza, 1957) and current studies on cybercrime and 
neutralisation (Moore, 2011). 
 
Denial of crime (“I haven’t done anything wrong”), denial of victim (“It’s the victim’s fault”) and 
denial of responsibility (“It’s not my fault” and “I didn’t have any other choice”) seemed to be 
very effective and widely picked by participants.   
 
It was also evident from the interviews that neutralisation techniques played a role in 
cybercrime causation. For example, some child sex offenders joined an online community, of 
likeminded individuals, in which they were offered solace and justification for their behaviour . 
Simultaneously, several cognitive distortions seemed to be at work, like understanding child 
sexual agency and blaming infants for sexual approaches. Law enforcement agents indicated 
that other criminals used other neutralisation techniques, such as, “I haven’t done anything 
wrong” and “this is not a crime”. One of the core issues that stemmed from the interviews is 
whether, or not, offenders lie, tell the truth or are perceived as lying or telling the truth by 
police officers.   Police officers were cautious as to why cybercriminals might have used a 
neutralisation technique, but they were able to identify and describe the techniques 
accurately.  
 
RQ4. What is the relationship between morality, self-control and neutralisation techniques in 
cybercrime causation? 
It has been demonstrated above that propensity (morality and engagement) and 
neutralisations do not occur simultaneously, mediated by self-control.  It is worth re-stating 
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that the initial theoretical model considered this relationship (neutralisation techniques and 
propensity) to be of co-causality.  For example, an individual with high cybercrime propensity 
and a sufficient catalogue of neutralisation techniques starts to use the internet. He is likely to 
commit a cybercrime if his self-control is low at that moment. Neutralisation, propensity, 
engagement and self-control were theorized by the researcher to converge at a very precise 
moment in relation to the internet and work together as coadjutants thereby causing 
cybercrime.  This can be seen in Figure 6, in the literature review chapter, as the “propensity x 
exposure x neutralisation formula”. 
 
 
RQ5. What are the general population’s views and attitudes towards cybercrime? 
 
The majority of respondents taking part in the online survey did not show propensity towards 
the commission of cybercrimes. In fact, there was a general feeling of moral reproachability 
towards those crimes that involved violence, psychological abuse and abuse of trust (for 
example, Cyberbullying and Cyberfraud). Crimes with a sexual content, such as Revenge Porn 
and Cyberstalking, were found to be especially repulsive. On the other hand, Sexting was not 
understood as wrong by the generality, maybe because it involved what was, for participants 
who lived in Spain - who comprised the large bulk of the sample - non-illegal practices (where 
this involved sending pictures). Also, one might argue that as some aspects of sexuality are 
sensitive social issues, the “social desirability bias” and the “correspondence bias” may have 
directed the respondents towards what was deemed to be acceptable or right by them or the 
researcher.  
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By contrast, Illegal Downloading and Wi-Fi Stealing (even though they are illegal in Spanish 
legislation) were not varnished with negative connotations. This might be due to the wide 
spread use of neutralisation techniques, but also because of a change in social paradigms 
precipitated by digital technologies. The notions of downloading music and films from the 
internet and the “necessity” to connect to the internet at any cost, as If it were a human right, 
seemed, among the survey sample, to be part of current generational trends. Several studies 
on neutralisation techniques and the music industry were discussed in the literature review 
(Higgins et al, 2011; Hinduja, 2007; Ingram & Hinduja, 2008; Moore, 2011; Moore & McMullan, 
2009). 
 
Police officers constructed the cybercriminal in various ways. For them, some of these 
offenders are vicious fraudsters looking for economic gain at any cost and who are borderline 
psychopathic in their profiles. Others are child sexual abusers (some of whom assault very 
young children) who have a convulsed psychological makeup and who even regarded as 
“monsters” by other child abusers. A third group of cybercriminals is constructed as more 
amicable, intelligent ‘riffraff’ without a choice; hackers with a hunger for knowledge; virus 
creators who want only to earn money the easy way; or even cyberactivists motivated by 
personal grudges. To this third group, police officers demonstrated an empathic proximity (yet 
somewhat paternalistic). The other groups are described in a more vitriolic manner or simply 
with professional detachment.   
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RQ6. How do law enforcement agents investigate and tackle the issue of cybercrime and 
cybercriminals? 
The Spanish law enforcement agents demonstrated a very high degree of specialisation in their 
work and knowledge, with considerable knowledge of psychology, criminology and law. They 
do not seem to adhere to British police culture as described by Reiner (2010). This might be 
due to their: generally ascribing to different moral values than their British counterparts; being  
members of specific  Spanish police corps (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía, Guardia Civil and the 
private sector), which may have had their own  “sub-cultures”; or being higher ranking officers 
who had acquired specialised knowledge and street experience (which distanced them from 
lower ranking agents). Spanish “cybercops” and “cybercop culture” call for more research and 
investigation on their understanding of policing and crime. It was difficult to separate what 
constituted a personal account, a professional account, what was an institutional directive and 
what was informed by academic literature. During and after the analysis and discussion of the 
interview data, enough caution was exerted in order to being able to differentiate between 
these perspectives, thanks to the discourse analysis. There was evidence to indicate that 
officers were, in essence, able to provide professional accounts. Yet, there is a reasonable 
possibility that the accounts were to some extent a bricolage of personal opinion, professional 
experience, institutional mandate and academic training. 
 
In terms of investigation and tackling cybercrime, law enforcement agents demonstrated good 
technical knowledge, social skills, and the ability to navigate the internet and social networks 
with ease. They were also very creative and extremely determined.  However, and as indicated 
before, a cultural study on Spanish police would be extremely valuable.  
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6.1.2. The SAT-RI “circuit of cybercrime” based upon the online survey  
 
The relationship between the SAT-RI variables has proven to be more complex and layered.  
Figure 22 presents a re-formulation of the SAT-RI triangle, now understood as a sequence that 
will be named metaphorically: “The circuit of cybercrime”. 
 
Figure 22. The SAT-RI circuit of cybercrime based upon online survey data 
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Once the data from the online survey was analysed, the following conclusions were drawn. 
Self-control modulates cyber-crime propensity, as generally those with high self-control do not 
engage in cybercriminal acts and rate them as morally wrong (with some exceptions, such as 
Wi-Fi Stealing, Illegal Downloading or Sexting). In other words, self-control tends to affect 
graver cybercrimes.  
 
Self-control also affects the pick the unjustified neutralisation techniques. Yet self-control did 
not seem to impact upon the use of other neutralisation techniques. Higher (and especially 
high) self-control is, therefore, an indication of lesser tendencies towards cybercrime in 
general; as individuals with high self-control tend not to show crime propensity or the 
necessity to justify their anti-normative behaviour.    
 
According to Figure 22, the first step towards the commission to cybercrime would be the lack 
of enough self-control, leading to higher cybercrime propensity and less capacity to opt out in 
terms of neutralisations. 
 
The second key variable to consider is non-neutralisations (the “Unjustifiable” answers). It was 
necessary (after analysis of the results stemming from the statistical analysis of the survey 
data) to create two divisions in the reformulated SAT-RI mode: the “Unjustifiable” 
neutralisations (lack of neutralisations) and all the other ones that would include the use of 
any neutralisation technique. The resulting opposing concepts are “non-neutralisations” 
(unjustifiable) and neutralisations . As indicated above, non-neutralisations are indeed affected 
by self-control. Also, non-neutralisations affect propensity, given that individuals who tend to 
see cybercrimes as unjustifiable have demonstrated lesser cybercrime propensity (in terms of 
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higher morality means and lesser engagement means). These findings create the image of a 
closed circuit of sorts, as self-control affects propensity and non-neutralisation, and non-
neutralisation affects propensity. The circuit imagery captures the profound redesign of 
numerous psycho-social paradigms produced by the embedment of technology into the fabric 
of human existence.  
 
According to Figure 22, the second step in the commission of cybercrime is the lack of non-
neutralisations, which can affect cybercrime propensity. These two mentioned steps are 
closely-linked and feed into each other. 
 
Finally, the last key variable to consider is neutralisation. These neutralisation techniques 
when used effectively (and this solely depends on the type of cybercrime to which they are 
applied), have the capacity to enhance cybercrime propensity by dulcifying the perceptions of 
morality and by boosting the engagement means. Individuals who apply an efficient 
neutralisation technique to a cybercrime would regard it as less morally despicable and would 
feel more disposed to commit such a crime. 
 
According to Figure 22, the third key step towards the commission of cybercrime is presenting 
an adequate neutralisation technique in order to boost cybercrime propensity. As shown in the 
findings from the online survey, some techniques might be effective for a specific type of 
cybercrime, but not any or not all are effective for any or all cybercrimes.  
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The new formulation of the SAT- RI as a “cybercrime circuit”, working sequentially instead of 
absolutely simultaneously (as initially proposed) demonstrates implications in terms of 
cybercrime prevention. Prevention programmes should be designed in order to act over 
different stages and layers of the “circuitry”, depending whether either the flux of 
neutralisation or the flux of propensity are to be managed.  
 
6.1.3. The SAT-RI “circuit of cybercrime” after mixed methods 
integration 
 
The circuit depicted in Figure 23 follows on from the integration of the online survey and the 
law enforcement agents’ interview data. The interview data adds more depth to the different 
stages of the circuitryby adding the elements of “cognitive distortions” and “structural/cultural 
narratives” that are part of what will be referred to as “Cyborg Neutralisation Items (CNIs)”. 
These cyborg items are collective neutralisation techniques stemming from the re-
arrangement of social structures brought about by digital technologies. Structural and cultural 
narratives relate to the idea of the “culture of free”, “culture of security”, “capitalistic drive” 
(the so-called “capitalistic critique”) and even notions of gender (for example, the 
neutralisation technique mentioned in the interview data as “robust heterosexual identity”). 
“Cognitive distortions” refer to the ones used by online child sex abusers (“the paedophile 
community”), but they could be applied to other behaviours occurring on the internet.   
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Figure 23. The complete SAT-RI circuit of cybercrime 
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6.2. The Cyborg Construct in the Reformulated Theoretical Model 
 
6.2.1. Cyborg theory redux 
 
It is necessary to revisit the idea of the cyborg that was presented in the literature review 
chapter. The crucial elaboration of the concept stems from Haraway’s seminal work and her 
conception of such an entity as a postmodern, feminist milestone; and cultural, 
anthropological and political metaphor. The author indicates that “A cyborg is a cybernetic 
organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of 
fiction” (Haraway, 1991, p. 149). She further contends that it is “a creature in a post-gender 
world” (1991, p. 150) and she then refers to the three “crucial breakdowns” that have enabled 
the birth of the construct: The breach of “boundary between human and animal” (1991, p. 
152), the distinction “between animal-human (organism) and machine” (1991, p. 152) and the 
imprecision of the “boundary between physical and non-physical” (1991, p. 152). In relation to 
the referred blurring between human and machine she argues that: 
Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference 
between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, 
and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines. Our 
machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert. Technological 
determination is only one ideological space opened up by the reconceptions of machine 
and organism as coded texts through which we engage in the play of writing and reading 
the world. (Haraway, 1991, p. 152) 
Haraways’s work has generated considerable academic attention. This might be due to its 
obscure, and somewhat allegorical and figurative nature, and its capacity to lyrically discuss 
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the role of women in the “dictatorship” of masculinity, science and technology, or politics and 
the postmodern blur of dichotomies. Wilson (2009) indicates that the cyborg is “a material-
semiotic entity”, a “figuration” and a “narrative device” (pp. 501-502). In addition, Kuni (2007) 
discusses several cyberfeminist approaches to art and language, and the idea of cyborg 
writing, based on the conception of language as a virus. All these ideas seem to demonstrate 
that the cyborg construct serves as a metaphor embedded in the sympathetic relationships 
that many human constructions forge between each other, but also with technology and 
biology.  
 
As to the key ideas permeating the cyborg concept, we must understand that essential 
consequences of the connections between humans and tools reviewed by academic literature. 
The cyborg results in: “augmentation”, (Wells, 2014, p. 11; citing also Clynes & Kline, 1960), 
and “embodiment” and “hermeneutical” (Vicini & Brazal, 2015, p. 151). Augmentation refers 
possibilities brought by the cyborg, not only in enhancing bodily functions, but also in changing 
and jumpstarting social and cultural processes (Wells, 2014, p. 11); embodiment to the tool 
becoming part of the users physique and/or identity; and hermeneutical to the idea of the tool 
becoming an extension of the self (Vicini & Brazal, 2015, p. 151). 
 
Vicini and Brazal (2015) provide another perspective on the cyborg, constructing it in 
theological terms, comparing it with the “(Cyber-) Body of Christ”. By following the ideas of 
embodiment, sacramentality, difference and solidarity, they offer a Christian and ethical 
reading of the term “cyborg” (pp. 161-164). These authors also touch upon the concepts of 
posthumanism and transhumanism. Transhumanism refers to the idea that “technology needs 
to be used to transform the human body and human nature” (p. 155), whereas posthumanism 
represents the idea of moving forward (socially and individually) into the next step of evolution 
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by using technical ability and human will (p. 155). These two concepts are connected, with 
transhumanism being the “midwife” and delivering posthuman civilisation. Hayles (2010) 
explains that “just as the posthuman need not be antihuman, so it also need not be 
apocalyptic” (p. 22). She believes that posthumanism will come to mark the end of current 
conceptions of humanity, which are based upon inequality and the privileges of a powerful 
over-class. Technology is thus understood as empowering and liberating for humanity, yet not 
unburdened of certain perils as this present thesis aims to demonstrate. Wells (2014) contends 
that “the cyborg concept simply (perhaps ironically) describes us as we already are, as we have 
been for some time, and as we are likely to continue” (p.10). Humanity has forged deep 
relationships with machines through history, some of them with drastic and positive 
evolutionary consequences, in cultural, biological, psychological, sexual and social dimensions. 
All in all, the internet has had a more profound impact, and upon many different aspects of 
human existence, that any other artifact or tool ever developed.  However, the idea of 
elevation and transcendence seems to be emphasized in the cyborg theory, but the 
human/machine interface could also generate deviant and non-normative behaviours. Connor, 
Coombes, and Morgan (2015), for example, relate Haraway’s metaphorical cyborg concept 
with anorexia sites. They refer to how anorexic girls’ posts on pro-anorexia issues (in terms of 
content and structure) mirrored their bodily states and how their body metaphorically 
expressed itself through the blogs, for instance, by “feasting on information” (p. 239), 
“starving” (p. 239) or a necessity for “connectivity” (p. 240) .The girls’ relationship with their 
blogs was a relationship that implied, essentially, embodiment but also hermeneutics (as 
anorexia is related to bodily perceptions). These girls gave tips on how to be “properly” 
anorexic, they even offered nutritional advice and they supported each other in their 
“community”.  
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Going back to the technological and social discourse, Katz and Aakhus (2002) have developed 
the term Apparatgeist “the spirit of the machine that influences both the designs of the 
technology as well as the initial and subsequent significance accorded them by users, non-
users and anti-users” (p. 305). Lever-Mazzuto (2012) summarises the theory, explaining that it 
“examines one’s relationship with his or her technology, as well as the relationship that the 
two have with society” (p. 83) and that “the essence of Apparatgeist Theory: norms for 
technology use are socially constructed” (p. 83). The thesis proposed by Katz and Aakhus is not 
dissimilar to the cyborg construct; however it is more focused on the social role and social 
consequences of mobile phones use. They refer to the idea of “perpetual contact” (Katz & 
Aakhus, 2002). This is extremely relevant as it refers to the impact of mobile phones and other 
digital technology in social decision-making, as well as the way this technology has penetrated 
the sphere of the intimate. More importantly, it refers to how the use and design of digital 
technologies follow normalised patterns all around the globe. According to the authors, 
technologies affect the entire world in a similar fashion.  They also highlight the anxiety that 
the absence of contact produces in a networked world. In relation to this last point, Castells 
(2010) explains the characteristics of the networked society (pp .70-76). Some of the features 
of this society are the “pervasiveness of effects of new technologies” (p.70) - meaning that 
technology shapes all the facets of our existence - “the networking logic” and “flexibility” (pp. 
70-71). The system is organic and must grow, connect, adapt and change; creating higher 
structures or changing them. The idea of “convergence” (p.71) becomes extremely relevant, 
here, whereby different technologies or systems tend to integrate with one another. Castells 
reflects upon the idea of convergence by stating “the information technology paradigm does 
not evolve towards its closure as a system, but towards its openness as a multi-edged 
network” (pp. 75-76). He then moves onto the discourse concerning technological change by 
adding that technology is a force “under the current technological paradigm that penetrates 
the core of life and mind” (p. 76). Humans have become intertwined with technologies in 
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irredeemable ways, either under the cyborg fusion, which Haraway explains metaphorically, 
creating new entities that do not (and should not) abide by antiquated rules of science, biology 
and technology; or according to the Apparatgeist, where the rules of the machines define 
society and society defines the rule of the machines, or as an organic ever-growing system 
envisaged by Castells: a system that is shaped by the nature of networking machines. That 
system is always changing, evolving and in perpetual necessity of connectivity and integration.   
 
All of the abovementioned contentions are extremely relevant in light of the findings of the 
study at hand. The survey and the interview data have brought to the forefront important 
societal issues that need to be addressed - issues that relate to the shifts in social paradigms 
brought about by the internet and the becoming cyborg. The reason for dealing with these 
matters, once again, in this penultimate chapter is to produce a revised SAT-RI model that 
includes new elements that emerged during the analysis of data. The essence of the literature 
review, in Chapter 2, was to present and assemble SAT-RI, to put together the general 
theoretical drawbacks in the elaboration of cybercrime, to give examples of cybercrime and to 
address the sociological issues relating to the permeating of new technologies into social and 
personal lives. This permeation was quite conspicuous in both the online survey (for example, 
the acceptability of stealing W-Fi signal and the illegal downloading of movies) and the law 
enforcement agents interviews interview data (for example, the creation of an online 
paedophile community and the sense of security that criminals have on the internet). This 
chapter, which tries to bring together and intertwine both sets of findings, is the forum in 
which the cyborg discourse will be deepened. The present researcher has also decided that the 
ideas relating to the cyborg construct should be included in the reformulation of the model 
(“the circuit of cybercrime”), as they were not present in the original model and they can help 
explain the etiology of cybercrimes. The discourse of how structural forces (market forces and 
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gender constructions serve as good examples) guide, model  or affect the rapport with the 
with the internet (and vice-versa) has become integrated in the theoretical model as the 
findings indicated that they played a role in the commission of cybercriminal acts.  
 
6.2.2. Cyborg neutralisation items  
 
Different narratives seemed to emerge following analysis of the interview data. None of these 
narratives had a clear adscription to the theoretical structure of neutralisation techniques or 
cognitive distortions. These narratives referred to the broader socio-cultural Spanish structure, 
rather than a personal introspection on the part of offenders. Dissimilar as these narratives  
might appear to be, they do have a profound connection to neutralistation techniques, as both 
stem from patterns of normalised morality and bourgeoisie morality (the social), and they 
serve to personally justify the crime or cyber-crime (the anti-social). The essence of traditional 
neutralisation technique theory is that the delinquent still “clings” to dominant supra-personal 
moral normativity: “he would appear to recognize the moral validity of the dominant 
normative system in many instances (Sykes & Matza 1957, p. 665)” and needs to justify his/her 
acts by resorting to that system.  
 
In the case of the proposed “Cyborg Neutralisation Items (CNIs)” a different process occurs 
(yet one not entirely disconnected from the traditional neutralisation process). Stemming from 
the different accounts contained within the interviews (and it must be noted that all of them 
reflect upon Spanish society), several new codes emerged, “ex post” and unrelated to all the 
neutralisation techniques discussed in earlier chapters. What was common to all of these 
accounts was that they represented a social critique, explicit or implicit, which reflected how 
272 
 
these police officers understood several social issues. At the same time, those Cyborg 
Neutralisation Items (CNIs) can be implicitly found in the online survey data. These CNIs have 
been theorised by the researcher after the data analysis and their definitions are offered in 
this chapter.   
 
It is important to note that these CNIs are theorised when juxtaposing the abovementioned 
accounts to current sociological or anthropological literature and that they suffer from the 
general limitations of the interview data. These CNIs are born from accounts narrated by police 
officers, and are therefore inherently subjective and possibly influenced by all the facets of 
police culture (Reiner, 2010). At the same time, it must be recognised  that one of the major 
conclusions from the analysis of police culture – based upon  the sample of Spanish cyber-
police - was that cyberpolice officers seemed to be depart from the seven key elements of 
Reiner´s police culture (2010, p. 117). 
 
Cyborg Neutralisation Items (CNIs) are defined as: 
Explicit or implicit socio-cultural compulsions and/or narratives that originate in the 
intersections between the internet user, the internet in itself (or any aspect of information and 
communications technologies) and structural constructs (like extreme capitalism or gender 
semiotics), and serve to drive the user to the commission of cybercrimes and enable collective 
or personal justification of these crimes. 
 
The CNIs that will be discussed here are “a capitalistic critique/drive” implicitly stated in many 
of the accounts and “the culture of free” and “the culture of security”. 
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 6.2.2.1. A capitalistic critique/drive 
 
This item is presented as a critique and it also works as a neutralisator by supposing a social 
drive that directs the actions of many individuals involved in cybercrime: an external force 
driving the commission of cyber-crime like a cultural tropism. This CNI also relates to other 
notions obliquely related to extreme capitalistic societies, such as narcissism and the 
commodification of sexuality.  
 
Briggs (2013), talks about the blinding and binding powers of extreme capitalism in his studies 
of British holidaymakers in Spain, engaging in conducts of excess, consumption, risk and 
deviancy: 
They [the sample] are as much a by-product of an ideological social conditioning of 
being over a period of time as they are drawn into excessive consumption, deviance and 
risk taking by the powerful corporations, commercial entrepreneurs and tourist 
companies/organisations. (p. 45) 
He also suggests, in relation to this group of  holidaymakers, that “a kind of emic and reflexive 
evaluation of the self takes place as they become unhinged from everyday home life” (p. 46). 
The aforementioned reflections refer to British holidaymakers in Spain, and to their 
constructions and de-constructions of the self, based on their creation of the ideal “extreme” 
holiday as programmed by capitalistic “software”. From this, Briggs develops the idea of 
“unfreedom” (Briggs, 2013a, 2013b). In relation to the present study, one could ask whether 
the above holidaymakers - reshaping their identities and actions according to extreme 
capitalism – represent society more generally: the cyborg constructs travelling throughout and 
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by the internet in a perpetual anthropological holiday. What if the psychic rapport with the 
machine - which leads to cybercrime- is woven by threads of extreme capitalism? 
 
In a similar fashion, Lipovetsky (2005) develops the idea of hypermodernity, a time of 
hyperbolic excesses following postmodernity.  In this hypermodern epoch “hypercapitalism is 
accompanied by its double: a detached hyperindividualism” (p. 33). This pathological necessity 
to anchor the present against the anxieties of the blurring future creates a “civilization of 
ephemerality” (p. 39). In such a civilization, consumption, media and fashion take center-stage: 
The world of consumption and mass-communication appears like a waking dream, a 
world of seduction and ceaseless movement, whose model is none other than the 
system of fashion. (p. 36) 
At the same time, “in the functional universe of technology, dysfunctional behaviour is on the 
increase” (p. 33). Lipovetsky’s themes are very relevant to the present work. This is because 
these themes enable a critical connection to be made between consumerism and technology, 
relating to many of the emergent narratives found in the law enforcement agents’ interview 
data, and the narratives underpinning some of the quantitative findings. Parallel ideas are 
found in the discourse by Bauman (2000) on “liquid modernity”, where he addresses the 
concept of individualism and its profound links to consumerism (and vice-versa). Bauman 
(2000) discards the idea of “needs”, and focuses on the creation and production of “desire” 
(pp. 74-75). Thus, “consumers guided by desire must be `produced´, ever anew, and at high 
cost” (p. 75).  
 
The abovementioned ideas of desire, excess, extreme capitalism, engineered necessity and 
hyper-consumption seem to be found in the accounts coded as “a capitalistic drive”. A very 
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good example of this is found in C17: “Why are you asking for only 2,500 €? It’s because I 
wanted to buy a bicycle” (NPEX2, C17lxxv). 
 
In C17, a 16 year old minor when trying to extract a ransom from a powerful company and 
asked for exactyly 2,500 €. NPEX2 explained that this boy confessed that he had done this 
before albiet in exchange for a smart-phone. (The offender lived in deprived northern Spanish 
village.) Other relevant accounts in terms of a capitalistic critique are those found in GCEX and 
NPEX3’s depiction of cases C2, C18 and C19. 
 
GCEX explained how, in C2, The Guardia Civil investigated a group of minors who were offering 
sexual services, via a social network. The children involved ranged in age from 10 to 15 years. 
The minors sexually penetrated male adults and allowed male adults to touch them or perform 
fellatio on them in exchange for small amounts of money and “desirable” goods, such as 
mobile phones and game consoles. These minors were recruited into these freelance activities 
by other minors, already involved in these practices, who had been boasting about their new 
possessions.  GCEX’s involvement in C2 led him to reflect on the importance of sexuality for 
young children: “the value of maintaining a sexual relationship… I mean, a boy it’s not very 
clear on how much it is worth or the cost of it” (GCEX, C2lxxvi). At the very same time, those 
children were able to maintain their hegemonic heterosexual identity and status by resorting 
to the “robust heterosexual identity” neutralisation. Hyperconsumption, therefore, is able to 
“corrupt innocence” leading children into sexual activity with male adults and even truncate 
their own heterosexuality. Mercer (2012) reflects upon straight performers in gay pornography 
and the idea of “straight men for consumption as homoerotic objects” (p. 540). It must be 
noted that he is talking about consenting adults in pornographic films fulfilling contractual 
obligations, as opposed to children offering themselves sexually for adults in contravention of 
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legal norms. What is interesting about Mercer’s discourse, though, is that sexuality and/or 
sexual orientation can become products for massive consumption, via the internet, even if 
endangering heterosexual normativity. He talks about “alibis” (Mercer, 2012, p. 540), which 
are cultural or artistic neutralisation techniques that serve to justify heterosexual identity. 
Theese alibis are “the financial alibi” (p. 541), “the amoral alibi” (p. 542) and “the exploratory 
alibi” (p. 544).  
 
In contrast, NPEX1 discussed how cyberfraudsters are criminals with a “disproportionate 
motivation for economic gain” (NPEX1, C10 and C11lxxvii) when presenting a profile of the 
cyberfraudster. The wording of the  explanations in his discourse on cyberfraudsters is almost 
identical (ánimo desmedido de lucro and ánimo de lucro desmedido; only changing the position 
of the adjective disproportionate) in these two cases as NPEX1 had interiorised that idea as a 
police mantra; one that might have stemmed from the criminological literature or from police 
his police education. It should be noted that these profiles of cyberfraudsters were drafted by 
NPEX1 (as he was the first law enforcement agent to be in contact with the offenders when 
they came to be investigated) and not by the researcher. NPEX 1 stated, in respect of C11, that 
“If I want to earn money and have no scruple lxxviii
lxxix
” you can resort to fraud. In NPEX1’s interview 
the word “dinero” (money) was mentioned 66 times and in NPEX2’s interview 28 times (both 
Police officers focused on several manners matters relating to online fraud, hacking and 
computer virus design).  PSEX also talked about money when explaining C7, a case of industrial 
espionage that took  place in the private sector; where employees disclosed information to 
other companies in exchange for money “everything is for sale, nowadays absolutely 
everything is for sale” (PSEX, C7 ). 
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In a word cloud (Figure 27) generated through NVivo 10, depicting the 20 most frequent words 
in all of the interviews, “dinero” (money was cited most often, even more than internet or 
“ordenadores” (computers)). “Empresa” and “empresas” (company and companies) were also 
referred to quite frequently. “Pago” (payment) appears amongst the 20 most repeated words 
as well. References to capitalistic structures are, therefore, recurrent in the interviews.  
 
Figure 24. Interview word cloud 
 
 
NPEX3 made the following criminological reflection upon the idea of women involved in online 
paedophile rings and the production of child pornography as a business: 
Yes, yes, there are more and more women in relation to this and the majority of women 
we had at the beginning was evidently that were into these matters of child 
pornography within the sphere of prostitution, I mean, as another way of earning 
money. But now, we are also seeing that, effectively, there is a group of people that are 
women and are paedophiles and that are pederasts. (NPEX3, C18lxxx) 
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And, 
There is plenty of child pornography production that only looks for economic gain, when 
we talk about organized crime, the recruiting of children, the creation of webs, the 
money laundering proceeding from the sales of child pornography … there are merely 
economic interests because it generates plenty of benefit. (NPEX3, C18lxxxi) 
 
NPEX3 assumed the existence of two types of individual involved in online child pornography:  
those who subject to powerful cognitive distortions, who are driven by paedophile interests; 
and those who comprise persons involved in organised crime, the production of child 
pornography or women involved in prostitution, who are motivated by an economic 
considerations. NPEX3 envisions some of these networks as businesses, satisfying the demands 
of a globalized networked world. Thus, according to NPEX3, crime can easily follow the diktats 
of market forces and extreme capitalism. From a feminist perspective, Harrison warns that 
“some feminist and profeminist writers have consequently argued that it is spurious to 
distinguish between adult and child pornography” (2006, p. 370). Online pornography will be 
discussed in more detail in below, and feminist perspectives will again be utilised.  It is 
important to note here, though, that child pornography and pornography can be understood 
as forms of social gendered violence against women and children, reproductive of structural 
inequalities (Harrison, 2006; Tsatsou, 2012, p. 520). Thus, women committing child sexual 
offences and producing child pornography (for economic purposes) represents a very complex 
issue, a possible feminist contradiction. That said, the proportion of child sex offenders who 
are female small: “Offenders were all white, and 18 of the 19 offenders were male. The one 
female was offending in conjunction with a male offender” (CEOP, 2013b, p. 20). Gannon and 
Alleyne (2013) produced a meta-analysis of cognitive distortions in female sexual abusers and 
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commented on the small body of literature available and judged this to be a major limitation 
of their review (p. 76). 
 
In relation to the online survey data, this item - economic drive as a CNI- does not seem to be 
clearly or implicitly identified. As mentioned previously, the majority of the sample was clearly 
repulsed by cybercriminal acts. The only cybercrimes that were commonly seen as acceptable 
were Wi-Fi Stealing and Illegal Downloading. Sexting was more complex in terms of 
acceptance. The reason behind the blatant acceptance of cybercriminal and illegal activities 
may be that they are embedded in social practices that are not considered cybercriminal (the 
downloading of movies, for example). In addition, the neutralisation techniques favoured in 
these vignettes (and which demonstrated high statistical significance in terms of shielding 
against cyber-criminal propensity) are: “I haven’t done anything wrong” (denial of crime), “It’s 
my right” (entitlement) and “I didn’t have any other choice”. The reason why participants 
concluded that they had no  choice but to steal Wi-Fi, might lie in social expectations or 
pressures that have elevated access to the internet from being a privilege to the status of a 
right and necessity, in Western societies. The culture of hyperconsumption could be behind 
the creation of such a necessity; a “desire” as Bauman has argued (2000, p.73-75). This desire 
might also explain why individuals are so keen on downloading movies illegally from the 
internet: “desire becomes its own purpose, and the sole uncontested and unquestionable 
purpose” (Bauman, 2000, p.73). Following this reasoning, it is not a crime to acquire, by any 
means, what we are “programmed” to long for: entertainment, culture, movies and music - 
like intellectual fast-food delivered by cable connections.  There is not enough data to support 
such an interpretation of the survey data and ideally there would have been a follow-up phase 
to the present research in which qualitative data was obtained from participants on their 
motivations.  However, the literature discussed in this discussion chapter invites the 
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researcher to consider the incidence of capitalistic structures in the neutralisation of Illegal 
Downloading and Wi-Fi Stealing.   
 
In order to close this section, a definition of this CNI is offered: 
An explicit or implicit socio-cultural compulsion for acquisitiveness (derived from capitalistic 
constructions) that guides the behaviour of many internet users towards the commission of 
cybercrime. 
 
6.2.2.2. The culture of free 
 
The culture of free also stems from the overwhelming market forces applied to the cyborg 
nexus (the individual in contact with the internet and society) and is profoundly connected to 
the “capitalistic drive”. Once again, Lipovetsky’s (2005) discourse is relevant in that he invites 
the reader to “witness the mania for consumption” (p. 32). In relation to this “mania for 
consumption”, PSEX offers a diatribe on current social issues, such as the illegal downloading 
books and movies. PSEX’s diatribe also refers to other unrelated topics, including infidelity, via 
WhatsApp, and the generational digital divide. The main question to be asked is whether PSEX 
is speaking from his experience as a former police officer, and now a private security 
consultant, or simply as an everyman. Another methodological issue in PSEX’s discourse is that 
it is not entirely open to triangulation with the survey data, as no other law enforcement 
agents commented on these particular matters. In spite of these methodological 
shortcomings, PSEX’s narrative is very relevant. This particular discussion named “PSEX’s 
diatribe” was generated after at the end of the interview, given that some cases were ruled 
out as cybercrimes (C5, C6) and other cases were explained briefly.  
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Jorge: And the topic, for example, of illegal downloading be it movies, [TV] series, music?  
Do you think people are aware that in that case it could be indeed criminal; do you think 
people think whether, in some cases, it is moral or immoral? What is your opinion in 
that regard? 
PSEX: My opinion is that people, If they can get something for free. Why are they going 
to pay for that? (PSEX, no case lxxxii) 
It must be noted that PSEX is not implying entitlement (entitlement would indicate that they 
shouldn’t pay, as they have a right to it). What cannot really be understood from the narrative 
is whether he is being ironical, cynical or speaking in a “matter of fact” dialogue. 
PSEX continues his diatribe: 
Let’s say, for example, if I go to the cinema and have to spend 8 € for going to the 
cinema, If I go and give a simple click, also I am at home, I prepare my pop-corn, my 
Coke and it’s for free… It’s not the same, but well, the culture of free, and of what I have 
obtained that hasn’t cost me anything, and well, we are in a [financial] crisis. The crisis 
deepens and people do not spend that much in… (Emphasis added, no caselxxxiii) 
He finishes by talking about illegal movie and book downloading, adding “[the offender] 
doesn’t have any knowledge of the whole industry behind copyright, of creator rights” (PSEX, 
no caselxxxiv). His perception is that these practices are not entirely innocuous or innocent, as 
they may entail damage to the entertainment industry. 
 
The illegal downloading case, in the survey data, engagement -whether respondents would 
engage in Illegal Downloading - (M=7.71; Mode=10, SD=3.03), whilst perceptions of morality -
how morally wrong respondents perceive Illegal Downloading- (M=3.40; Mode=0; SD=2.76). 
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For the Wi-Fi stealing case, engagement (M=7; Mode=10; SD=3.31) and perceptions of 
morality (M=4.32; Mode=5; SD=3.02). Looking at the modes, it can be seen how the majority 
of people would have engaged in Illegal Downloading and Wi-Fi Stealing readily. Also, the 
majority of respondents rated Illegal Downloading as absolutely moral, and Wi-Fi Stealing as 
morally correct. Even though the results are similar and coherent (Wi-Fi Stealing and Illegal 
Downloading), Wi-Fi stealing is, for the sample, less immoral than illegal downloading. The idea 
of a culture of free could explain these results, especially if considered with the neutralisation 
techniques (“everyone else is doing it” or “it’s my right to do so”, for example). Having decided 
to use an interpretivistic epistemology - based on the idea of a blurring of the frontiers 
between quantitative and qualitative methodologies (in this mixed methods study) - it is 
necessary to evaluate this perception.  One of the first issues that should be borne in making 
this evaluation, is that a large proportion of the sample was comprised of “captive audiences” 
from criminology and law courses. In terms of socio-demographics, an even larger proportion 
of the sample was made up of university students, lawyers, lecturers and law enforcers. Given 
these characteristics, the sample should have had a more detailed knowledge of the law (than 
the general population) that should have led them to understand Wi-Fi Stealing and Illegal 
Downloading as anti-normative (they are against criminal law, in fact). On the other hand, one 
could have expected that a sample with said demographic characteristics might have rated any 
type of anti-normative action as wrong, especially a sample with such high levels of self-
control. These were not, however, the findings in the online survey. Only 17.3 % of the survey 
sample found Illegal Downloading vignette as unjustified - very close to the 18.2 % that found 
the Wi-Fi Stealing case as unjustified.   
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It is worth repeating, here, what PSEX said in his interview, in relation to Wi-Fi Stealing: 
People do it, but well, really, the commission of said crime is there. Nowadays there is 
nothing stipulated but we would be stealing or hacking the cost of the Wi-Fi, that 
amounts for a monthly 30/40 € let’s say, that type of crime, well people say: noooooo 
this is nothing and I do it and sometimes because of the simple fact that I am good at 
hacking the neighbour’s Wi-Fi. (PSEX, no caselxxxv) 
PSEX emphasised how easy Wi-Fi stealing is, pointing out that there are even mobile 
applications for facilitating such offences. According to PSEX this behavior has, in a manner of 
speaking, been socially naturalised . PSEX explained that legislation, in Spain, is to be changed 
to create a specific offence of Wi-Fi stealing. Up until now, this behavior had to be prosecuted 
either as a civil wrong or in criminal law by using an analogous approach to “electricity fraud”.  
 
It is important to understand where this sense of normlessness stems from. Having analysed 
the idea of the culture of free, and the survey and interview data, only two options remain: 
that the general public is not really aware that they are committing crimes or legal wrongs (for 
example, administrative or civil wrongs) or that they are aware but it is so intrinsically 
neutralised by social habit that it has become conventional and non-deviant.  It is essential to 
define by the resaercher what is understood as the culture of free and how it works as a CNI: 
An explicit or implicit socio-cultural understanding that technological goods and services 
(software or hardware, including products related to the entertainment and culture industry) 
are free of charge because of their availability. It also implies that the access and usage of the 
internet and its fruits are rights or necessities in themselves that should be at anyone’s 
disposal.   
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6.2.2.3. The culture of security 
 
The culture of security refers to two opposing aspects of computer security obtained from the 
law enforcement agents’ interviews. The first aspect is the absence of a culture of security, 
which leads to something of a generational divide between younger and older internet users, 
or the sense of false confidence that some criminals display because of their technical 
expertise. Both of these states are related to the structure of the internet and the mutating 
nature of hypermodern (Lipovestky, 2005) and liquid societies (Bauman, 2000), where 
technological advances happen at an extremely fast pace and are doomed to short-term 
obsolescence. Bauman (2000) describes this situation with elegance and eloquence when he 
states that “the insubstantial, instantaneous time of the software world is also an 
inconsequential time” (p. 118). It is, then, on the internet where changes become much more 
frequent, difficult to be framed or measured by the devoted user or the mere onlooker. Due to 
these changes it is very difficult to keep up with computer security. 
 
NPEX1 explained that C12 involved a group of young men posting videos of illegal sport cars 
races on the internet and the subsequent investigation of an illegal race ring in Spain. Even 
though this case was deemed as “not entirely a valid cybercrime”, because of NPEX1’s focus on 
the investigation of driving offences, there was an element in the case that fell under the 
umbrella of the cybercrime definition: the posting of content about illegal acts on YouTube. 
NPEX1 [Asking Jorge]: Why did he upload the videos, why do you think he uploaded 
the videos? 
Jorge: I have plenty of ideas, but If I tell you… 
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NPEX1: Is that I haven’t really stopped to think. I say, that guy is dumb. The guy is a 
brat, daddy’s boy boasting his feats without thinking in the consequences of his acts, 
much less thinking that if he’s not caught at that moment doing the races, through the 
internet even less. Then, he doesn’t think by a moment that it could be a crime, nor 
that he is risking anybody’s life, nothing. Who does that? A person that is arrogant, 
boasting about what he has on YouTube channels, uses them for boasting about the 
money, the cars, all he has, and the people surrounding him, because  they were 
nothing more than poor 18 year-old brats with two brain cells.(NPEX1, C12lxxxvi) 
 
The general idea permeating NPEX1’s acid explanation of the case is that the capricious 
youngsters behind the races were not aware of the dangers it represented to them or others. 
They were also not aware of the dangers of being involved in risky criminal activities and also 
making it public. Ironically, that publicity, after an exhaustive analysis of all the videos, led 
NPEX1’s team to apprehend all of the offenders. For NPEX1, making the videos available on 
YouTube was an act of narcissism, but also of recklessness. He used the terms “brat”, 
“arrogant”, “boast”, “daddy’s boy”21 and “dumb”, and who possessed “two brain cells”, in 
what seems an act of transforming the protagonist into a pariah by means of irony.  NPEX1’s 
street-wise and anti-formal discourse contains  a certain black humor (“dumb”, “two brain 
cells”, “daddy’s boy”) that might be mistaken for disdain in certain cases, for example, when 
explaining how utterly reckless the actions of the offenders were and how they were very 
unintelligent, bragging individuals . This anti-formality can also be found in NPEX1’s swapping 
the roles of interviewer/interviewee and asking questions to the researcher that serve as a 
rhetorical invitation.  It cannot be really proven that the protagonists of the case did not really 
know the consequences of their behaviour or were acting out of hyper-narcissistic 
21
 In fact, the expressions are very similar in English and Spanish as niño de papa, means exactly daddy’s 
boy 
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compulsions, yet a certain level of such motivation can be inferred from the act of publicising 
criminal deeds. Narcissism plays a fundamental role in Lipovetsky’s (2005) hypermodernity. 
Some studies also point to the trait playing an important role in our relationship with the 
internet, especially when taking into account that plenty of social networks are devoted to the 
sharing of pictures, videos or statuses of oneself. Fox and Rooney (2015) investigated the 
relationship between the The Dark Triad and trait self-objectification as predictors of men 
uploading pictures on social networking sites. The Dark Triad refers to the following traits: 
Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy (Fox & Rooney, 2015). The following results 
were emerged from Fox and Rooney’s study: men that tend to self-objectify and narcissistic 
men spent more time on social networks, and more narcissistic and psychopathic individuals 
upload more selfies. However, narcissistic and highly self-objectified men devoted more time 
to the editing of uploaded pictures. These results might seem obvious, but offer a very 
interesting insight into the psychology behind social networks (especially those more oriented 
to photographic images, like Facebook and Instagram). Kasper, Short, and Milam (2014) 
discovered that “two of the three measures … indicated that individuals who endorsed higher 
levels of narcissism also endorsed a greater frequency of internet pornography use” (p. 485). 
 
After the interview with NPEX1’s, relating to the C12 case, the present researcher conducted 
searches on the main offender, on YouTube and Google, using the nickname provided by 
NPEX1. Several videos were found: in one of them he appeared with several sports cars and in 
another he was being interviewed for a national TV exposé documentary22.  
 
22
 The google searches imply he had reached an embryonic level of Internet celebrity, with some of his 
videos spoofed and news on him, plenty of news; message boards discussions, a twitter account that 
could be a fake. Even though said information is public and accessible, the primary source was 
confidential and for ethical reasons it won’t be compiled in this work.  
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NPEX3, when talking about C20 (The Chameleon grooming case), provided a victim’ 
perspective, explaining how adolescent girls were led into believing that they were talking to 
another girl and then how -andafter an exchange of erotic pictures - they were trapped in a 
web of extortion in which increasingly sexually explicit pictures were demanded from them. 
According to NPEX3, minor girls were easily manipulated  by the groomer into believing that he 
would send their pictures to others or deactivate their social network’s friend’s list or webmail 
accounts. The process of grooming them was as follows: 
It’s the way of stinging the minors through social networks, they sting them, but then he 
takes them  to other places, I mean he takes them so they facilitate images and videos, 
be it through Skype or through applications that enable for fast communication. (NPEX3, 
C20lxxxvii) 
Although victims were terrified and felt morally degraded by what they had to do, and the 
intensity and duration of their experience. (NPEX3 revealed that he had investigated some 
grooming cases where the victim had committed suicide.) The prospect of losing internet 
access or friend’s lists was, according to NPEX3, more frightening for the victims than having to 
provide pictures or the thought that these would be distributed, and was sufficient to ensure 
that they abided by the groomer’s wishes.  In this case, the lack of a culture of security helps to 
explain how they came to be groomed. This comprised: the use of certain sites and 
applications by minors (like Skype and social networks); the misinterpretation of the sexual 
nature of the acts they were obliged to perform and the possible empty threats of deletion of 
passwords or friend’s lists; and essentially their inability to detect dishonesty from their online 
acquaintances. As discussed above, the pressures of hypermodernity and capitalism, and the 
lack of proper emotional understanding of sex, enabled children, in some cases, to commodify 
their own sexuality.    
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In PSEX’s “diatribe”, there were several references to a general sense of socio-technological 
normlessness, with his arguing that “they [minors] are not really aware of that what they are 
doing is really a crime” (PSEX, no caselxxxviii). He said this in relation to minors who published 
threats or slander on platforms such as social networks and messaging mobile applications. He 
believed that the problem lay with education: 
The thing with education is that there is a great divide, it’s called the digital divide, in 
which you can’t instill something into minors without having instilled it previously in 
elders. (PSEX, no caselxxxix) 
Adults are not really aware, according to PSEX, of the dangers that the internet and 
technological devices pose for children in this epoch of ephemerality and immediacy. As an 
admonishment and maybe in an extremely dramatic tone he used the following allegory: 
A father buys a Blackberry for an 11 year-old boy, without knowing that in his hands he 
has a weapon that can commit, well, the suicide of a girl that is being subject to abuse . 
(PSEX, no casexc) 
The continuous change of pace and scenario that occurs on the internet is, following what 
emerged from C20, C12 and PSEX’s diatribe, exemplified by social networks. Social networking 
platforms thrive in the vertiginous pace of internet development and change. Some networks 
are more generalist, whilst others are highly specialized, in terms of demographics for 
example. This may enlarge the digital divide that exists between generations, marked by 
different use patterns or intensities.  
 
Data provided by Duggan, Ellison, Lampe, Lenhart, and Madden (2015), based on American 
internet users, revealed that most (87%) Facebook users in 2014 were aged 18-29 years. It is 
also the most popular site by far, with 71% of American adults using Facebook in 2014. This is 
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interesting, as although young adults are the predominant Facebook group, it is also widely 
used by older adults, so there is not an unfathomable divide. Similarly, only 37% of Twitter 
users are 18-29 years, so the digital divide with older adults is even less stark regarding this 
social platform. In relation to Instagram, differences are more visible: 53% of 18-29 year olds 
use Instagram as opposed to only 25% of 30-49 year olds and 11% of 50-68 years. According to 
Lipsman (2014), Snapchat is the social network that is showing the highest degree of 
penetration amongst 18-24 years old mobile users. The network is penetrating the market like 
no other, “trailing only Facebook and Instagram” (Lipsman, 2014). In relation to this, 
Snapchat.com shares the following information under its advertising tag “Snapchat is the best 
way to reach 13 to 34 year-olds” (Snapchat, 2015). The following demographic information is 
displayed on the site: 37% of users are 18 to 24 year-olds, 26 % are 13-17 and 23% are 25-34. 
Snapchat23 is a good example of a young social networking site, oriented to a much younger 
generation than Instagram, Facebook or Twitter, and one which  exemplifies the “here and 
now” orientation of liquid and hypermodern society. Educators, parents and children have 
different necessities and skills, and their level of internet knowledge might  vary. However, 
data analysed in this present thesis seem to point towards the absence of a widespread culture 
of security. 
 
In contrast, the culture of security cyborg neutralisation item can be understood from a 
different perspective: a false sense of security among offenders, who believed that they would 
not be apprehended because of their wit and skills. As NPEX2 explained, some offenders, such 
as the ones involved in C14 (the “Cryptolocker” case) have “a feeling that they won’t be 
caught” (NPEX2, C14xci), explaining that they were aware of what they were doing, but relied 
23
 The essence of Snapchat is sharing pictures, video and text that self-destructs in seconds after having 
been read.  According to Snapchat’s Terms of Use “Although these Terms form a proper legal contract—
and inevitably read like a proper legal contract—the bulk of them are simply designed to ensure our 
users have fun (…)Just use common sense: Keep sending awesome Snaps to your friends, and please 
don’t send Snaps that they don’t want to receive. (Snapchat.com, 2015) 
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on that sense of protection facilitated in many cases by the architecture of the Internet 
(anonymity is a clear example of this). NPEX3 went on to say that offenders were aware of 
what they were doing, but relied on the sense of protection facilitated in many cases by the 
architecture of the internet (anonymity is a clear example of this). NPEX3 touched upon these 
themes when explaining the “paedophile communityxcii”, and how it served to justify and 
protect offenders psychologically by disseminating several cognitive distortions. NPEX3 was 
sure that without the internet this “shadow community” would not have been created and 
then reinforced. This is important, as the existence of the community influences the cognitive 
schema of child sex abusers. 
 
It is difficult to elaborate, from the survey data, on these ideas of a sense of security or the lack 
of a culture of security. Inferentially, the Sexting vignette might be suitable for a possible 
explanation. Although morality perception means were “lukewarm” (people rated it as 
acceptable or reproachable or neutral), engagement perceptions were very low. It may be that 
the sample (N=709), because of its particular demographic qualities and high levels of self-
control, were less likely to engage in risky activities. In terms of age, this was a young adult 
sample with high levels of dispersion (M=28.36, Mode=23, SD= 10.02) and it comprised mostly 
university students and professionals. It may be that such a sample was well aware of the 
possible risks in sharing erotic pictures of themselves, but at the same time their answers may 
be based on what is socially expected from them (social desirability bias).  The questionnaire 
vignettes are projective; therefore, they do not represent unquestionable evidence as to 
whether or not the participants engaged in the activities they were rating.  
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Finally, after the discussion on the existence (or lack thereof) of a culture of security and a 
false sense of security, the cyborg neutralisation item that has been named “the culture of 
security” is theorised by the present researcher as:  
An explicit or implicit lack of knowledge of socio-cultural norms (including legal norms) 
regulating the use internet (and/or any information and communication technology device) 
that can facilitate the commission of cybercrime. Also, in opposition, a perceived sense of 
security on the internet that can facilitate the commission of cybercrime and/or reassure the 
offender after the commission of cybercrime.  
 
6.3. Cybercrime and Gender 
 
The Sexting vignette sparked considerable debate in this thesis  because of its particularities. 
The scenario in the questionnaire depicted the following situation: 
 Gena is a 16 year old young girl that thanks to a social network has befriended a 31 year old 
man called Bad_Wolf and started a relationship of sexual undertones. One day Bad_Wolf asks 
Gena to send some naked pictures of her, she agrees and does it. 
 
Respondents were asked, in the survey, to place themselves in Gena’s position, rate the case 
morally, indicate whether or not they would engage such behavior and how would they justify 
their behaviour. It is important to repeat that they were asked about Gena and her sending 
naked pictures, not about Bad_Wolf’s relationship with a minor girl. They were asked to rate a 
character who is female, a minor and is engaging in active sexual activities, acting overtly 
about her sexuality. According to the text, Gena was not coerced into sending the naked 
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pictures; she did it of her own volition. This was the only case that did not constitute any illegal 
wrong (criminal or otherwise) in Spanish legislation.  
 
The Sexting vignette has a sequel or even a parallel in the Revenge Porn vignette, drafted in a 
different way: 
 Peter and Susan were going out. Susan used to send suggestive pictures of herself via e-mail 
accompanied by saucy messages. One day Peter discovers Susan is having an affair and he 
decides to take revenge on her by sending her pictures and messages to his friends via social 
networks and e-mail, as well as posting them on the internet. 
 
In this case, participants were asked to rate Peter, who had disseminated naked pictures of his 
girlfriend on the internet out of scorn. Peter actions were rated as very morally reproachable 
(M=9.20) and engagement was very low (M= 0.46). In fact, this morality mean was the highest 
of any vignette. Yet it was Susan who sent Peter the erotic pictures, as Gena had done. It is 
possible that the Revenge Porn vignette acted to warn participants of the risks involved in 
sending sexually explicit pictures to someone, as it preceded the Sexting vignette. This 
knowledge may have affected their engagement responses in the sexting case?  
 
When comparing the engagement and morality means by using T-Tests and gender as the 
grouping variable, all the mean differences were statistically significant, following the patterns 
that emerged during the analysis of the survey data (males showed higher engagement and 
females higher moral reproach in all vignettes). The exception was found in the sexting 
morality question (see Figure 13), where the difference between morality means were not 
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statistically significant in relation to gender, and are very similar between male and female 
respondents. Both males and females were morally neutral about female minor sending naked 
pictures of herself to an adult. It may be that they approached the cases from a perspective of 
absolute sexual freedom, a feminist liberation perspective or maybe even from a perspective 
of masculine hegemony (Juschka, 2009). 
 
The present work has identified several issues that call for a discussion of gender. These issues 
comprise sexuality on the internet, sexting and pornography. This discussion has arisen not 
only from the Sexting vignette, the Revenge Porn vignette and the Cyberstalking vignette, but 
from  the recurring references to pornography throughout the interviews .   
 
 
6.3.1. Sexuality and pornography on the internet 
 
The idea of the cyborg is fundamental to this present thesis, as is the idea of Apparatgeist. In 
terms of sexuality, these notions become of the uttermost relevance. Haraway’s discourse is 
essentially a feminist one (her seminal book cited in this research is called Simians, Cyborg and 
Women: The Reinvention of Nature) and has spawned a recognized trend of cyberfeminisms. 
She argues that: 
The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-
oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness 
through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity. (Haraway, 
1991, p. 150) 
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The cyborg, according to Haraway, transcends the idea of gender. At the core of the concept 
lies the idea of escaping what is human and what is technological in our nature, and becoming 
something more that is both and neither. Boler (2007) indicated how authors have recognized 
in the qualities of cyberspace “the potential for challenging notions of fixed and static 
identities, for fluidity of identity though gender play and an escape from binaries” (p. 149; see 
also Jewkes & Sharp, 2003, for a discourse on internet identity). 
 
Online pornography represents in a way, sex with, and through, the cyborg construction. 
Cronin and Davenport (2001) analyse pornography from the theoretical standpoint of a social 
shaping of technologies - an approach not dissimilar to Katz and Aakhus’ Apparatgeist (2002), 
which examines how social norms shape the use of technology and vice-versa. In Cronin and 
Davenport’s discourse, pornography production and consumption are defined by the demands 
of electronic commerce and technology. “The world of cyber pornography is a compelling, 
impulse-driven market with, by some counts, more than 30 million unique visits being 
recorded daily” (Cronin & Davenport, 2001, p.43). They offer, perhaps, a much positive 
account of what they seem to understand as a budding business with, multiple personal and 
social advantages. For Cronin and Davenport, consumers can benefit from interactivity, 
comfort, control and relative anonymity, where the internet becomes a “sanitized” (p.43) 
environment far from disease and shame, a cyborg haven were bodily constraints hold no 
significance whatsoever. The cyborg metaphor can be taken to the extreme, with Cronin and 
Davenport referring to the use of wearables and immersive hardware that grant a quasi-real 
sexual experience with a real-life partner or a performer. However, cybersex (or cyborg sex) is 
not entirely safe from “disease”. C13 (The Police Porn Virus) is important here; with the 
perverse allegory regarding sexual infection found in NPEX2’s discourse. NPEX2 described how, 
in C13, a computer virus was inserted  into pornographic content, such that user’s computer 
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became infected when they  accessed that content: “What is something everyone visits, well, 
child pornography web-pages; sorry pornography, not child pornography just pornography” 
(NPEX2, C13xciii).  As discussed in the law enforcement agents’ interview findings, NPEX2 
praised the quality of the virus design, and its capacity to spread by using instruments of 
globalisation and social engineering. Helmreich (2000), coming from a cultural anthropological 
perspective, studied the biological rhetoric of computer virus infection, their figurative 
penetration and invasion of the “body”, and the health discourse attached to their prevention 
and treatment. Once the user enters the internet “it holds the threat of plunging the user into 
a disorderly and dangerous universe of encounters with strangers that are almost sexual in 
their character” (p. 477-478). This relates well to NPEX2’s account of the efficiency of the 
dissemination of the Police Porn Virus; a point reiterated by Helmreich: “the biological 
metaphor is often extended beyond comparisons with the infection of an individual, placing 
viruses within the larger context of an evolving population” (p. 475). 
 
Returning to Cronin and Davenport’s positive analysis of online pornography, these authors  
also discuss the role of women in pornography, either as consumers or performers (2001, pp. 
44-45). They indicate that the pornography business pays attention to the habits of women 
consuming porn, as well as the welfare of (female) performers. But they also address the 
existence of an ideological divide and debate in terms of pornography and feminism (2001, 
pp.44-45). This debate is important in this research when account is taken of the 
cybervictimisation of women and children. On the one hand, Tsatsou (2012) describes the two 
sides of the feminist discourse on cybersex “a women’s victimization perspective” or “a 
women’s liberation perspective” (p. 520). The victimisation perspective has been discussed in 
the present work already, with reference to grooming, harassment and child sexual abuse. 
Contributing to this discourse, Harrison (2006) contends that there was no difference between 
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pornography and child pornography, as they represent the same inequalities and 
overwhelming masculine hegemonies. She adds that the architecture of the internet, and the 
absence of limits on the content and depiction of violence or degrading behaviour “have 
contributed to an escalation in offending” (p. 371), and a “desensitizing” (p. 371) effect on 
young consumers of pornography and violence. Fisher and Barak (2001) warn about the use of 
“pornography” as an umbrella term when referring to concepts such as erotica, or even violent 
pornography. If these “categories” of pornography were adequately labelled they could offer 
relevant information on the effects of the consumption of pornography (p. 315). Most 
importantly, according to Fisher and Barak (2001), experience of internet sexuality will shape 
and affect the future sexual responses of individual to sexual stimuli. Internet pornography is 
then, according to Fisher and Barak having a psychological impact on the individual, yet at the 
very same time it affecting social structures or is affected by them.   
 
Another debate on pornographic content and child pornography was raised by Reeves (2013), 
when analyzing “Second Life ageplay” (acting out as children in Second Life, for various 
purposes). Sexual ageplay is defined by Reeves (2013) as: 
Not simply an image of virtual child sexual abuse (a sophisticated drawing of abuse), but 
it is the act of simulated virtual child sexual abuse: sexual ageplayers manipulate their 
avatars to interact and engage in sexual acts within the online world (p. 238) 
It must be borne in mind that these child avatars are operated by consenting adults, during a 
fantasy in an online world. A market has arisen, though, for the trading of these images. 
Reeves (2013) considered different propositions relative to the link between sexual ageplay 
and child sex abuse - the creation of a paedohpile community and the reinforcement of 
inappropriate feelings towards children. Reeves concludes that there is not enough evidence 
to support these concerns   and recommends “in the interim, to prohibit sexual ageplay in the 
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registration, license and bail conditions for known sex offenders, and for those subject to sex 
offender orders” (p. 245). 
 
From a masculinity point of view, Garlick (2010) provides a discourse on male hegemony and 
online pornography: 
Of central importance is the illusion of technological control that the Internet offers over 
sexual experience via the enframing of nature—a calling to order in the name of 
securing hegemonic masculinity. The ability to access pornographic images of every 
variety on one’s computer screen in an instant seems to fulfill the desire to reveal 
sexuality in the form of a standing reserve that makes bodies and acts available to 
reinforce the existing gender order. (p. 610) 
This hegemony is not only domination over women and the perpetuation of gender 
inequalities. It goes far beyond this, as it refers to control over nature, by the capacity of 
“enframing nature” - capturing it, cataloguing it, disembodying the sexual act and the 
performers, and classifying it by thematic tags on the internet, and making them available or 
searchable. Bodies are thus “merely resources, calculated and catalogued in advance, the life 
sucked out of them, circulating as empty forms within a largely commodified digital economy” 
(Garlick, 2010, p. 612). Sex, individuals and nature are demoted to fungible goods to be 
exchanged and accessed following the diktak of capitalism.  
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6.3.2. Sexting, gender and cybervictimisation 
 
A gendered approach is necessary in trying to understand how cybercrime affects children, 
females and males differently, and essentially why some of the practices were perceived 
differently or similarly by male and female respondents. The Sexting vignette became one of 
the cruces of the survey findings. 
 
Sexting is, from a cultural standpoint, a consequence of a media-dominated society. Curnutt 
(2012) describes the relationship between sexting, Twitter and the celebrity culture: 
If the libidinal economy supporting the mainstream media’s eroticization of teenage 
sexuality is in some way the byproduct of the mechanisms that regulate the media 
industry’s depictions of sexuality (e.g., rating systems and ordinances prohibiting 
underage nudity), then the enjoyment found in these depictions corresponds with the 
manner in which they implicitly transgress, without explicitly violating, the law. (p.363) 
 
Therefore, sexting becomes a borderline legal/illegal practice that cannot really be considered 
deviant in its generality. At the same time, boundaries between an intimate practice and a 
public practice (like the emergence of the selfie culture, for example) become blurry: 
 
However, sexting does not necessarily have to be classified as an exclusively private or 
public activity. Instead, it can be thought of as a sometimes-private/sometimes-public 
practice that relies on a level of reflexivity for its participants to remediate themselves in 
accordance with the institutional discourses and conventions that govern the media 
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industry’s production of sexual imagery for a heterosexual male audience. (Curnutt, 
2012, pp. 360- 361) 
 
According to studies carried out in the UK, “Indecent images of children (IIOC) continued to 
proliferate across the internet with no single means of storage or distribution achieving overall 
dominance in 2012” (CEOP, 2013b, p.8) and “120 of the victims depicted were female and 26 
male” (CEOP, 2013b, p. 9) meaning “An overall increase in the number of female children in 
images. A 70% increase in female victims aged under ten and a 25% increase in female victims 
aged over ten” (CEOP, 2013b, p. 9). In regards  to self-generated indecent imaginary (SGII), it 
has been found that “the majority of this imagery as having been freely produced by young 
adolescents in the course of developmentally appropriate behaviour not involving coercive or 
exploitative conduct by an adult” (CEOP, 2013b, p. 12) - as depicted in the Sexting vignette 
from the online questionnaire. In terms of the gender, the research indicates that for all forms 
of SGII (still and moving) 18% of individuals featuring in these images are male and 82% female 
these cases, data indicates the following percentages divided in still and moving SGII: males 
18%, whereas females 82 %. In respect of moving SGII 55% of featured individuals are male 
and and 37% female. Females, therefore, are much more prone to share still pictures, whereas 
men are more keen on moving imagery (videos)(CEOP, 2013b, p. 12). CEOP warns that “In 
stark contrast, moving images also showed a greater tendency towards more sexualised 
content than still imagery, with 10% depicting penetrative sexual activity” (CEOP, 2013b, p.12). 
 
In Spain, the case is different. Instituto Nacional de Telecomuncaciones (National 
Telecommunication Institute, INTECO24) and the mobile company, Orange,  found, in relation 
to sexting that, “in Spain, 4% of minors in between 10 and 16 years old admits to have taken 
24
 Now called Instituto Nacional de Ciberseguridad (National Cybersecurity Institute, INCIBE) 
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pictures of themselves or videos in a sexy pose (not necessarily naked or erotic) using a mobile 
phone” (INTECO & Orange, 2010, p.87xciv). In contrast, 8.1% admitted receiving sexually 
provocative pictures from others (INTECO & Orange, 2010, p. 87). There is no data on gender 
relative to these practices. Strassberg, McKinnon, Sustaíta, and Rullo (2013) undertook an 
exploratory study of sexting by high schools students and after a gender comparison they 
discovered that more male students than females reported having received a sext, yet “the 
groups did not differ in the percentage of students reporting having sent a sext of themselves” 
(p.18). There is very limited data on sexting in Spain (which is surprising as it does seem to be a 
quite common practice among minors) including the gender of those involved in it. However, it 
does appear a practice that involves both sexes. Rollins (2015), studied the outcomes of 
several sexting legal cases in the USA and found profound differences in terms of gender in the 
rulings. In his study, three rulings are compared:: one case involved teenage girls keeping 
pictures of themselves scantily clad (but no naked or  pornographic content). Another case 
involved a male high school student that tricked other male students into sending naked 
pictures to him. (He facilitated this ruse by pretending to be a flirtatious girl on the internet. He 
ended up manipulating the other male students into having sex with him and taking 
photographs of the acts.)  The final case discussed by Rollins (2015) concerned a hockey coach 
who started a relationship with a 16 year old girl and took pictures of both of them having sex, 
and then sent these pictures to the girl. After a discussion on gender, sexuality and childhood, 
Rollins (2015) reached the following conclusions: 
Child sexual abuse is perceived as more damaging to boys because it threatens to 
undermine their gender training as sexual agents. Girls, meanwhile, are expected to 
assume their properly gendered role as sexual objects; sexual abuse of girls is part of the 
norm. (p. 66) 
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And, 
Sexual agency and object status remain gendered but the underlying power dynamic is 
no longer so closely aligned with sexual orientation; the primary axis of tension is now 
becoming age. (p. 67) 
Each of the reflections above may help explain why the sexting case contained within the  
online questionnaire, in the present thesis, obtained such morally discrepant results, featuring 
as it did  a 16 year-old girl exerting sexual agency. For some people, she might be acting 
“saucy” and would have to face the consequences of her actions; whilst for some others she 
was just doing what any youngster would do, regardless of gender. For some other people, the 
“moral key” might lie in the fact that she is 16 (not that she is a girl) and she is sharing pictures 
with an older male (Bad_Wolf), therefore shifting the tension from gender to age. On the 
other hand, this tension between gender and age could explain why vignettes, such as those 
involving Revenge Porn and Cyberstalking, obtained such high moral reprobation. In both of 
them, it could be assumed that the characters are of the same age, involved in, initially, 
socially licit dynamics. In the Revenge Porn vignette, the characters were going out together, 
whereas in the Cyberstalking case they were workmates. In both cases, the male protagonists 
were acting predatorily against women (even though in the Revenge Porn vignette, the female 
protagonist also exerted sexual agency by sending erotic pictures to her boyfriend). 
 
It should be noted that there were some leading words in the instruments that might need to 
be modified and/or corrected for further research. First, the idea of using the nickname 
Bad_Wolf in the sexting case was supposed to be ironical, yet it could have tampered with the 
respondent’s perception of the situation. In addition, the gender of the individual sending the 
picture was said to be female. This may have had an impact on the way in which participants 
responded to this vignette. After much thought from part of the researcher, as it could 
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generate a gender bias. It may, in fact, have been better if all the vignettes had been gender-
neutral in order to avoid such problems or at least more varied in terms of gender. Similarly, 
the present researcher now feels that it was not necessary to add a coda to the cyberstalking 
scenario – “Deborah feels very uncomfortable and scared about this”, and again this may have 
had the effect of leading participants to give particular answers. 
 
6.4. Brief Summary of Current Cybercrime Prevention and 
Cybercrime Policy 
 
The present thesis is not primarily concerned with crime prevention. However, it is felt to 
appropriate briefly examine current instruments for the prevention of cybercrime both in 
Spain and the UK, given that implications regarding this have emerged from the present 
research.   Welsh and Farrington (2012) have described the different paradigms in crime 
prevention, albeit from a US perspective. Developmental crime prevention is “informed 
generally by motivational or human development and life-course theories on human 
behaviour” (Welsh & Farrington, 2012, p. 8). This approach draws upon empirical studies in 
order to design prevention programmes, focusing essentially on youngsters. “Community 
crime prevention” (pp. 9-11) is centred on how the social climate can affect communities and 
their stakeholders, and how manipulating those conditions can help prevent crime. Situational 
crime prevention differs from the other paradigms because of its “special focus on the setting 
or place in which criminal acts take place” (p. 11). In the case of situational crime prevention, 
the emphasis is placed not on the person or the social structure, but on opportunities for 
committing crimes and the physical deterrence of crime (for example, building fences and 
installing CCTV). 
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 In relation to cybercrime prevention, Wall (2007) talks about preventing crime by using 
technology (pp. 187-192). He summarises the technological approaches as “designing crime 
out of systems or designing crime control into them” (p. 187). These are, essentially, 
situational crime prevention techniques. Wall also refers to “digital realism” when explaining 
cybercrime control by using the law: 
law does have the capacity to shape not only the environment that influences the 
formation of the code which forms the architecture of cyberspace, but also the social 
norms which internet users take with them online and the incentives and disincentives 
created by the market which shape the behaviour within (p. 192) 
Therefore, the prevention of cybercrime can be understood from two distinct approaches: the 
opportunity one and the legal-behavioural one.  
 
In respect of preventing cybercrime, Buono (2014) suggests using strategic intelligence analysis 
to gain “a clearer picture of the gangs involved in cybercrime modi operandi and 
cybercriminals’ motivations” (p. 3), international cooperation, and awareness raising and the 
education of users. An example of education of users will be represented by law 
enforcement’s use of social media in Spain.  An example of international cooperation in Spain 
is represented by the integration of Spanish Policing in the European Cybercrime Centre (CNP, 
2013a, 2013b). The use of intelligence analysis was alluded to by NPEX1, when he pointed out 
that he belonged to an intelligence gathering unit (named “open sources”). He also described 
the use of intelligence gathering techniques and software for the investigation of C10 and C11: 
“then you go and input the data, complaint by complaint, and it makes these schemes, and it 
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gives you the relationships” (NPEX1, C11xcv). He revealed that these tools were a great aid in 
his investigation and in the presentation of findings to judges.   
 
In relation to the legal-behavioural approach mentioned by Wall (2007), several changes in the 
current criminal code have been introduced to counteract certain cybercrimes (see Chapter 2: 
Literature Review). In this way the Spanish Criminal Code acknowledges the ubiquity of 
cybercrime and seems to recognise the existence of new criminal activities arising from the 
development of new technologies or simply the adaptation of older crimes into cyborg 
constructs. The definition and tackling of cybercrime has occurred gradually in Spain, yet the 
instruments used are still too embryonic to test their efficiency in preventing cybercrime.  
 
In the UK (see also Chapter 2: Literature Review), for example, the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 includes the concepts of “pseudo-photograph”, incorporates electronic data in the 
formats of “indecent photograph” and makes reference to “imaginary children”. In addition, 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003 criminalises child grooming, and the recent Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015 prohibits the disclosing of private sexual images or film with the intention of 
causing distress and the possession of pornographic images or rape or assault. The UK has, 
therefore, elevated Revenge Porn to crime status.  
 
In terms of policing, Wall (2007) talks about different stakeholders policing the internet, 
including internet users , moderators of online communities , ISP’s , corporate security , non-
governmental bodies, non-police organizations, governmental non-police organizations  and 
public police groups  . In Spain, as has already been pointed out in this thesis, the Guardia Civil 
and the Policía Nacional have different cybercrime units (UIT for Policía Nacional and GDT for 
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Guardia Civil). There also exists the INCIBE (formerly INTECO) is the Spanish National Institute 
for Cybersecurity, governed by the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism. These are 
examples of public police groups and governmental non-police organizations in Spain. 
 
The police and the Guardia Civil are both trying to encourage community-based policing by 
using social networks). One of the most visible manifestations of the online community is the 
creation of the @policia Twitter account (already mentioned in the LEA interview findings).  
(@guardiacivil is following their steps closely, and Instagram and YouTube accounts, and 
Facebook pages have been created lately by these law enforcement bodies). In trying to reach 
the general public, they have amassed a huge following and almost achieved a cult internet 
status.  The prevention emphasis is placed on the eventual victim and on situational crime 
prevention (Clarke, 1999; Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 1987; Miró Llinares, 2011; Newman & 
Clarke, 2003; Yar, 2005). The National Spanish Police also organize courses with schools and 
parents in order to teach students and families about problems arising from internet misuse, 
and they also seek to minimise the already mentioned “generational digital divide”.  
  
The National Cyber Crime Unit (under the National Crime Agency) in the UK “leads the UK’s 
response to cyber crime, supports partners with specialist capabilities and coordinates the 
national response to the most serious of cyber crime threats” (NCA, 2015). The National 
Cybercrime Unit works as a multi-partner agency that carries out intelligence gathering and 
advisory duties, and pursues cybercrime at a national and international level.  The 
Metropolitan Police Cyber Crime Unit works in partnership with the National Cyber Crime Unit 
and is charged with investigating several types of cybercrime. Finally, CEOP is also part of the 
National Crime Agency, and investigates the abuse and exploitation of children online. At the 
306 
 
same it tries to educate and raise awareness among children, parents and educators with 
several sites and social networks accounts25. CEOP, in its 2013-2014 Centre Plan and 2012-
2013 Annual Review identified fours strategic themes:  setting priorities and coordinating the 
delivery of a response; supporting operational delivery and the development of new 
capabilities; building and maintaining specialist and mutually beneficial relationships; and 
providing and supporting an expert workforce (CEOP, 2013a). Education and awareness rising 
in children is one of its fundamental priorities (CEOP, 2013a). 
 
The new adjusted model, with its circuit of cybercrime, could work as a tool for cybercrime 
prevention. Programmes could focus on any of the steps of the circuit, maybe on all of them. 
Instead of working with a victim-based criminology, it may be time to focus on the different 
stages that lead cybercriminals to the commission of crimes. This may be especially relevant in 
light of the fact that cybercriminals are not ontologically criminal, written and programmed 
from crime, but are individuals with a level of self-control and propensity that, at a given time, 
enter into contact with the internet. At the same time, emphasis should also be put on the 
macro-structures that transmit frustrating messages (like the capitalistic drive, for example) 
and there should be a rethinking of the ways in which individuals interact with the internet.  
 
6.5. Limitations 
 
The first essential limitation found in relation to the online survey concerns the sample, as it is 
comprised mostly of university students. This demographic overrepresentation might have 
25
 For example, the twitter account @ThinkuknowUK 
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resulted in certain perceptions of morality or self-control measures. That overrepresentation 
might have occurred because of the absence of a randomization procedure. The characteristics 
of the sample could be seen as an inherent limitation of the study, as an educational and/class 
bias could be present because many of the respondents are educated and affluent attending a 
private university.  In addition to this, there are no minors in the sample and no self-reported 
criminals either.  
 
Having access to individuals who had committed cybercrimes should have provided more 
reliable data on the use of neutralisations and crime propensity. One could argue that some of 
the survey respondents might have committed some of the behaviours depicted in the 
vignettes. More specifically, those rated as morally acceptable and/or those they as acceptable 
to engage in, according to Wikström et al. (2013) that tends to be the case.  The online survey 
sample, also, tended to overrepresent law enforcement agents, lawyers and university 
students. Another limitation is related to the instrument, especially the presentation of the 
vignettes, as some of them might be gendered-biased (the Sexting vignette and the 
Cyberstalking vignette, for example).  
 
The questionnaire survey sample was not entirely representative of the general population of 
internet users. In regards to the “captive” audience (those surveyed in the classroom), the 
demographic leant towards affluent young students studying at a private institution in Spain. 
There also existed a slight imbalance within the sample, in terms of gender (60% female, and 
40% male). When the questionnaire was disseminated on the internet, it drew its respondents 
primarily from the researcher’s contacts, creating an educated sample, comprised mostly of 
university students, lecturers, lawyers and police officers. Minors (people aged less than 18 
years) were not represented (as far as author knew). The less than 18 year old age group 
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would have been very interesting in terms of cybercrime, attitudes and neutralisation, as it 
would have included the so-called “digital natives” or “millennials”, whose contact with 
technology and exposure to the internet is more extensive than any other group. Also, high-
levels of self-control might be expected from a sample that is, theoretically, generally 
comprised of “non-criminal” individuals and collectives with strict views on morality (for 
example, police officers). 
 
In relation to the law enforcement agents’ interviews - even though the number of 
interviewees might be considered small - the catalogue of cases is varied and all of the 
interviewees have considerable experience in the investigation of cybercrimes. One of the 
major issues that has been discussed thorough this work is the possible existence of an 
ideology and a police discourse.  
 
One major limitation of this study is that it did not explore the subjective reality of 
cybercriminals. As indicated in previous paragraphs, and from a qualitative point of view, it 
drew conclusions from “proxies” (law enforcement agents) and their construction of criminal 
identity. This construction, as rigorous as it may have been, may also have been contaminated 
by cultural perceptions (there are no studies of police culture in Spain). First-hand narratives of 
cybercriminal identities could have explained the reasons why neutralisation techniques were 
used, or why and how this propensity towards cybercrime was forged. Moreover, interviews 
with cybercriminals themselves would have helped understand the psycho-social rapports 
established with the computer world and how these affect the development of criminal/non-
criminal narratives. Having said this, several practical and ethical issues would likely have 
emerged from trying to use such a sample, including gaining access to a very elusive sample 
and the practice of online ethnography (Hooley et al., 2012). All of these issues had to be  
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taken into account by the researcher when he designed the methodology, faced as he was 
with time, budget  and access constraints.  
 
Finally, in relation to the adjustment of the theoretical framework as the “circuit of 
cybercrime” the following issues arose: the first issue (generated by the mixed methods design 
of the study) is that “Cyborg Neutralisation Items” (CNIs), have not yet been tested after their 
emergence.  The second limitation is found in the discussion of whether some of the data that 
emerged after the case study are either neutralisation techniques or cognitive distortions 
(essentially in all the cases that related to online child sex abuse). This is the reason why, in the 
final adjustment of the “circuit of cybercrime”, cognitive distortions (cognitions) have been 
added to the model as they would fulfill the same role neutralisation techniques do in the 
theory.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
7.1. Summary of Findings 
 
The present thesis explored whether the SAT model required adaption in order to explain 
cybercrime. The adapted model (SAT-RI) aimed to explain the reasons why people commit 
cybercrimes. It aimed to do this by taking into account the basic elements of SAT: crime as a 
process of deliberation occurring when any given individual’s crime propensity interacts with 
an environment that is conducive to crime. SAT sees the moral norms of the setting and the 
individual as the core elements in crime causation, as well as the mediating role of self-control. 
In addition, SAT-RI takes into consideration any given individual’s cybercrime propensity when 
interacting with the internet (as a setting) and also the effective application of a neutralisation 
technique. It, too, considers the role self-control plays.  
 
The mixed methods study seemed to support the need for a development of the SAT model 
into the SAT-RI model, although data pointed towards a different relationship between 
variables than the one originally theorised.  The analysis of data (online survey and law 
enforcement agents’ interview data) resulted in the creation of what has been named “the 
circuit of cybercrime”: a sequential explanation of the commission of cybercrimes based on the 
“flow” of self-control, cybercrime propensity (measured as the perception of morality of 
cybercrime and the possibility of engaging in cybercrime) and the use of specific neutralisation 
techniques to facilitate the commission of that kind of crime (or the inability to neutralise a 
crime). Unanticipated factors were added to the “circuit of cybercrime”. These elements are 
referred to as “Cyborg Neutralisation Items” (CNIs). These items are very specific kinds of 
neutralisation, which stem from broader social/structural issues that become relevant when 
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considering the organic and transformative relationship forged between society, machines and 
the individual. These CNIs, however, are in need of further testing. It is important to note that 
SAT-RI could help explain the reasons behind the commission of any type of cybercrime, but 
solely cybercrimes. In addition, the concept of cybercrime presented in this essay transcends 
strict legal definitions in order to consider any form of cyberdeviance (for example, trolling). 
From a different point of view, what the theory aimed to address are the transformations 
operated by the advent of digital technology  within society  and the changes it has produced 
anthropologically (for example, the change in customs, relationships and sexual behaviour), 
and how the onslaught of that “becoming” has produced several dysfunctional responses 
(cybercrime, for examples).  
 
7.2. Further and Future Research 
 
Future research should test the new adjusted model, including the already mentioned “Cyborg 
Neutralisation Items” (CNI) either from a quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods approach. 
The CNIs emerged “ex post” interview analysis and were added to the initial SAT-RI model. It 
would be necessary to explore -based on definitions of CNIs suggested by the present 
researcher- their role in justifying cybercrime and their role in affecting the morality and 
engagement variables.   
 
Also, future research should also try to obtain a larger and more diverse sample in any online 
survey that is carried out -   one which includes minors and respondents from the UK, to 
enable comparisons between generations and countries. A study, similar to the present work, 
but on a national level, should be conducted in the future, profiting from the viral nature of 
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social networks, but also making use of face to face administered questionnaires (as it was 
done in different classrooms). This study should utilise a multi-clustered, probabilistic sample, 
drawing upon different schools and universities across Spain. It would be necessary to survey a 
sample that is more representative of the general population. Future research, if using 
vignettes to measure attitudes towards cybercrime should aim to use questions that are 
gender neutral and are devoid of any leading elements. 
 
Also, police officers from other countries should be interviewed in order to gain a better 
understanding of the cybercrime phenomenon, and to compare ideologies and law 
enforcement discourses to determine their differential impact upon police perceptions of 
offender motivation. A study on Spanish police culture (be it in relation to the investigation of 
cybercrime or police culture in general) is needed in order to shed light on how the notions of 
crime and the criminal are constructed by Spanish police officers. 
 
From a different perspective, online ethnography (Hooley et al., 2012) studies seem necessary. 
Online message boards, blogs and social networks generate immense amounts of data and 
serve to guide trends and opinions (Connor, Coombes, & Morgan, 2015; Servera, 2014a). 
Holley et al. (2012) advocate the use of online ethnography in order to capture the richness of 
human experience in the online world.  Hooley et al. also indicate that the internet offers more 
and more opportunities for research given “the vast expansion of naturally occurring online 
data” (p. 89). By using this method, more will be learnt about offender motivation; behaviors 
and the way offender construct their identities online. Online ethnography would also be a 
very effective tool in order to understand budding social movements (for example hacktivists) 
or online subcultures. Moreover, online ethnography could also be used in order to study, 
understand and contextualize pornography and paraphilia in the online world. By doing this, 
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more will be learnt about offender motivation; behaviors and the way offender construct their 
identities online.  
 
Finally, the most valuable research that could be conducted is that with cybercriminals. 
Interviews should be conducted with all types of cybercriminal including, for example, 
fraudsters, virus designers, online child sex abusers and child pornography users. A qualitative 
approach is recommended in order to gain a deeper understanding of their motivations and 
perceptions, and to determine how different types of cybercriminals assign meaning to their 
personal narratives.  Research on cybercriminals could be complemented with qualitative 
document analysis (Bryman, 2012) using case rulings about cybercrime as source of data, as 
well as newspaper and magazine articles. Data on the media portrayal of cybercriminals and 
cybercrime would be very valuable in order to understand cybercrime as a cultural narrative 
(Wall, 2008a, 2008b). 
7.3. Implications 
 
7.3.1. Prevention programmes based on SAT-RI  
 
The “circuit of cybercrime” represents the moral deliberation process as follows (Figure 23): 
self-control can affect crime propensity and the use of non-neutralisations, at the same time 
the use of non-neutralisations affect crime propensity. 
 
On the other hand, the use of efficient neutralisation techniques can affect crime propensity. 
Also, it is theorised, cognitive distortions and “Cyborg Neutralisation Items” (CNIs) have 
314 
 
analogous effects to neutralisation techniques, being able to also affect crime propensity (this 
has not been tested as it has been theorised ex post data analysis). 
 
Prevention programmes should aim to truncate the flow of the “circuitry”. One of the key 
elements to be tackled should be the use of neutralisation techniques. Effective neutralisation 
techniques should be identified by future research, which policy-makers could then act upon. 
An emphasis should be placed upon personal responsibility and personal agency, for example, 
trying to transmit to either the general public or a specific cohort that cyberbullying is not a 
game between children but can be a crime with serious consequences. In terms of illegal 
downloading, work might need to be undertaken by policy-makers (and even entertainment 
companies) in disseminating and reinforcing a solid understanding of the law in relation to 
intellectual property or redesign the “streaming market”. 
 
7.3.2. A new paradigm for approaching cybercrime: "cyborg criminology” 
 
At the end of the second chapter of this thesis, six postulates were presented as foundation of 
the SAT-RI: 
1) It is a theory that serves as an explanation of cybercrimes only (albeit all types of 
cybercrime). 
2) It operates under a broader definition of cybercrime presented in Chapter 2 that also 
includes deviant cyber-behaviour (for example, trolling). 
3) It considers that that the mere exposure to the internet is criminogenic in itself, 
therefore exposure will be treated as constant (in the propensity x exposure x 
neutralisation model). On the other hand, self-control, cybercrime propensity and the 
use of neutralisation techniques are going to be measured.  
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 4) It does not pay attention to the device the internet is accessed from (computers, 
wearables, and smart phones, for example). 
5) It considers the whole of the internet as the setting and does not make any 
distinctions as to whether the user is accessing the surface internet or the darknet (or 
deep web). 
6) It tries to consider the impact of the advent of digital technologies on human nature, 
behaviour and identity. 
 
Several issues relating to some of the postulates (especially the sixth postulate) arose during 
data analysis and even more so in the course of preparing Chapter 6 – the integration of the 
survey and interview data.  These issues were well exemplified in the discussions about 
pornography, narcissism in social networks and compulsive consumerism (see Chapter 6). One 
of the best examples, perhaps, of the effects of digital technology lies in the “death by selfies” 
incidents (ABC, 2015; El País, 2015; Golby, 2015; Ruiz Marull, 2015): people that end up dying 
in their search for a perfect selfie, for example falling from a precipice or shooting themselves 
accidentally. The death by selfie serves as a tragic example of the ultimate ontological sacrifice 
- dying because of the “becoming” cyborg. The sacrifice is represented by the fact that the 
necessity to post a picture in social networks outweighs personal security. In parallel, this sort 
of “cult to oneself” creates a new breed of excess celebrity culture, like the one represented by 
Dan Bilzerian (Millard, 2015), who has amassed millions of followers on Instagram and Twitter 
by posting about his excessive lifestyle; one dominated by guns, planes, scantily clad women, 
and swimming pools. Another example of this phenomenon is the “Youtuber” in which 
“average regular people” becoming celebrities and cultural influencers. The normalisation of 
criminal and/or deviant activities, such as sexting, amongst young people, or the construction 
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of the illegal downloading of movies as a daily “everyday habit”, also pointed towards changes 
brought upon mankind by the proliferation of digital technologies. Moreover wearables, the 
Internet of Things (IoT), Augmented Reality and the Cloud create a multi-layered network of 
humans, objects and data, all of which incorporate crime prevention capabilities or, contrarily, 
criminogenic properties (see Europol, 2015; Servera, 2014, 2015).  
 
All in all, a new criminological approach to cybercrime, which tackles all of the issues discussed 
in the previous paragraphs, could offer a fresh view on the dysfunctional aspects of human 
behaviours stemming from the human/machine interface. Studies on cybercrime have focused 
more on the manifestations of cybercrime, its evolution, its regulation and prevention, and its 
repercussions (essentially economic), rather than on the human cost of the networked society 
and its psycho-social impact. By contrast, other human sciences have tackled issues such as 
addiction, deviance, sexuality, identity and eventually transcendence (to the trans-human, 
then the post-human) to great avail (Haraway, 1991; Jewkes & Sharp, 2003; Vicini & Brazal, 
2015; Wells, 2014). Criminology, understood as a multidisciplinary science (Herrero Herrero, 
2007; Garrido et al., 2013), could benefit from the use of more psychological, social and/or 
anthropological approaches to cybercrime.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
317 
 
The initial postulates of cyborg criminology would be: 
1) A criminology that considers the impact of digital technologies upon all facets of 
human behavior, and studies the emotional rapport forged between mankind and 
digital technology (essentially the internet). 
2) A criminology that considers the forms of crime created by the proliferation of digital 
technology and by the mankind/machine interface, but also deviant behaviour and/or 
dysfunctional attitudes, such as, among others, addiction, obsession, inequality 
(including gender inequalities), sexual deviation, pathology, suicide. 
3) A criminology that also incorporates an anthropological, philosophical, social, 
psychological, sexual, critical and cultural discourse on the relationship with machines.  
4) A criminology that aims to develop and test criminological theories for the explanation 
of cybercrime under the previous postulates. 
 
Such criminology might offer a very different perspective on cybercrime, especially if 
combined with other disciplines. In fact, the cyborg discourse as indicated by Haraway (1991) 
is essentially postmodern and eclectic: “cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of 
dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This is a dream not 
of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia” (p. 181) Haraway adds 
The machine is not an it to be animated, worshipped, and dominated. The machine is us, 
our processes, an aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines; they 
do not dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they. 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 180) 
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A cyborg criminology would, essentially, address broader issues than those generally discussed 
by cybercriminology and would be in tune with current cultural and technological 
development. 
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Annex 2:  Vignettes 
 Vignette Questions 
Illegal Downloading 
 
Jill wants to watch the latest X-Men movie, but she prefers to 
stay at home, also the cinema is 6 £ which she finds very 
expensive for her student budget. Jill decides to download a 
pirate copy of the movie on the Internet and watches it at home. 
1.-Would you do what Jill did? 0-10 (being 0 absolute 
disagreement, being 10 absolute agreement) 
2.- How morally wrong do you think Jill’s actions are? 0-10 
(being 0 absolutely not immoral, being 10 absolutely 
immoral) 
3.-In the case of case of doing it (place yourself in Jill’s 
shoes). What would you tell yourself or others to justify 
what you have done? 
Revenge Porn 
 
Peter and Susan were going out. Susan used to send suggestive 
pictures of herself via e-mail and messages accompanied by 
saucy messages. One day Peter discovers Susan is having an 
affair and he decides to take revenge on her by sending her 
pictures and messages to his friends via social networks and e-
mail, as well as posting them on the internet. 
4.- Would you what Peter did? 0-10 (being 0 absolute 
disagreement, 10 absolute agreement) 
5.- How morally wrong do you think Peter’s actions are? 0-
10 (being 0 absolutely not immoral, 10 absolutely 
immoral) 
6.- In the case of doing it, what would you tell yourself 
(place yourself in Peter’s shoes) or others to justify what 
you have done? 
Cyberbullying 
 
John has a class-mate that people call Pete Pimple. He is usually 
mocked at school because of his personal appearance. John 
decides to create a fake social network profile with the name of 
Pete Pimple. In that profile John posts caricatures of Pete and 
doctored pictures (always offensive) as well as fake statuses and 
comments (always harmful). 
7.-Would you what John did? 0-10 (being 0 absolute 
disagreement, 10 absolute agreement) 
8.- How morally wrong do you think John’s actions are? 0-
10 (being 0 absolutely not immoral, absolutely immoral) 
9.- In the case of doing it, what would you tell yourself 
(place yourself in John’s shoes) or others to justify what 
you have done? 
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Sexting 
 
Gena is a 16 year old that, by using social networks, has 
befriended a 31 year old man called Bad_Wolf and has started a 
sexual relationship. One day Bad_Wolf asks Gena for some naked 
pictures of herself. Gena agrees and does it. 
10.- Would you do what Gena did? 0-10 (being 0 
absolutely disagreement, 10 absolute agreement) 
11.- How morally wrong do you think Gena’s action are? 0-
10 (being 0 absolutely not immoral, 10 absolutely 
immoral) 
12.- In the case of doing it (place yourself in Gena’s shoes). 
What would you tell yourself or others to justify what you 
have done? 
Cyberfraud 
 
Alfred is 26 year old man, yet on the internet he pretends to be 
an attractive Russian splinter called Natasha looking for marriage 
in the UK. He sends e-mails and fake pictures to random people 
telling them how much “she” loves them and that “she” would 
like to marry them. Also, “she” asks for money in advance in 
order to get a passport done and travel to meet “her” future 
husband. Some people have already sent him money. 
13.- Would you do what Alfred did? 0-10 (being 0 absolute 
disagreement, 10 absolute agreement) 
14.- How morally wrong do you think Alfred’s actions are? 
0-10 (0 absolutely not immoral, 10 absolutely immoral) 
15.- In case of doing it, what would you tell yourself (place 
yourself in Alfred’s shoes) or others to justify what you 
have done? 
Cyberstalking 
 
Tom is secretly in love with his work-mate Deborah. He 
constantly sends her e-mails and texts from a fake e-mail 
account singed as “Your secret admirer”. Tom has created a web-
page called “DeborahIdDevourYou.com” where he posts pictures 
of her taken without permission and love letters. Deborah feels 
very uncomfortable and scared about this. 
16.- Would you do the Tom did? 0-10 (0 absolute 
agreement, 10 absolute disagreement) 
17.- How morally wrong do you think Tom’s actions are? 0-
10 (0 absolutely not immoral, 10 absolutely immoral) 
18.- In case of doing it, what would you tell yourself (place 
yourself in Tom’s shoes) or others to justify what you have 
done? 
Wi-Fi Stealing 
 
Alistair just moved into his new flat in Liverpool. Everything is 
ready, but the Wi-Fi. The provider seems to delay the 
installation. Browsing the networks he finds and open and 
powerful Network called “Marty_2C”, belonging to his 
neighbour. He decides to log on to this network whilst his 
connection is not ready.   
19.-Would you do what Alistair did? 0-10 (0 absolute 
disagreement, 10 absolute agreement) 
20.- How morally wrong do you think Alistair’s actions are? 
0-10 (0 absolutely not immoral, 10 absolute immoral) 
21.-In case of doing it, what would you tell yourself (place 
yourself in Alistair’s’ shoes) or others to justify what you 
have done? 
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Annex 3: Vignette Graphs 
The vignettes coloured in a darker tone show a different distribution pattern. 
 Morality graphs Engagement graphs 
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Annex 4: Summary of Cases from Interviews with Law Enforcement Agents  
 
Case List Source Name Cybercrime Investigation Offender/s 
involved 
Neutralisation Special 
Features 
C1 GCEX “The Botnet” Hacking: 
Creation of Zombie/slave 
networks 
-Contact from 
software 
company 
- Reversing of 
malware 
-Forensics of 
infested 
hardware 
- Led to control 
panel in Spain 
-IP analysis 
-3 (organised 
crime) 
 
- Career 
Criminal/Professional 
 
-Slovenian 
contacts 
 
C2 GCEX “The Social 
Network” 
Prostitution/Soliciting via 
Social Networks 
- Minor reveals 
illegal activity  
- Investigation of 
social networks 
-10 profiles 
invstigated 
 
- Minors: 15 
-Adults: 10 
- The robustness of 
heterosexual identity 
 
-Minors 
involved 
-Excessive 
acquisitiveness 
of capitalist 
societies 
C3 GCEX “Phishing” Cyberfraud: 
Bogus bank webpage 
Fake ID’s 
Fake cards 
 
-International 
investigation of 
Fake ID’s 
-Following 
money trail 
-Bank 
surveillance 
-Organised 
crime 
-Career 
Criminal/Professional 
 
- International 
Complexity 
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C4 PSEX “Nannysex” Peadophile ring/Child 
Pornography exchange 
community/Child abuse 
-P2P exchanges 
-Investigation of 
IP’s 
- Private message 
boards and chats 
-+100 offenders 
- Mostly 
consumers, they 
reach one of the 
producers 
-Fun/Game 
-Cognitive distortions 
-Extreme 
public outrage 
-Gravest 
known 
paedophile 
ring in Spain 
C5 PSEX “The solitaire” Bank Robbery aided by 
computer: Not a valid 
cybercrime 
-Forensic 
investigation of 
computer 
 
-The solitaire -Not indicated -Media 
repercussions 
C6 PSEX “The kid with 
the katana” 
Murder of parents with 
sword: Not a valid 
cybercrime 
-Forensic 
investigation of 
computer 
- Left a letter in 
computer 
-Minor with 
psychopathology 
-Not indicated -Minor 
involved 
-Media outrage 
C7 PSEX “Information 
Breach” 
Copy/Selling of 
confidential information: 
Disloyal employee 
practices 
- Not Indicated -Disgruntled 
employee 
-Denial of injury 
- Capitalistic critique 
Private Sector 
C8 PSEX “Ticket Scam” Hacking of hard-drives in 
order to sell fake tickets 
for show 
-General 
overview 
-Not indicated -Not indicated Current case 
C9 PSEX “Breaking of e-
mail 
confidentiality” 
Hacking and spying 
company’s mail accounts/ 
Disloyal 
competence/Security 
breaches 
- General 
overview 
- Not indicated - Absence of a culture 
of privacy and 
security 
(neutralisation 
implicit) 
Private Sector 
C10 NPEX1 “Online 
gambling 
fraud” 
Cyberfraud (including 
money laundering and ID 
fraud) 
-Information 
about fraudulent 
company 
emerges online 
- Police contacts 
-3 (family 
business) 
 
 
- Career 
criminal/Professional 
- Denial of injury 
-Polish and 
Swiss elements 
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victims and 
offers legal 
actions 
- Investigation of 
fraudulent 
webpage  
C11 NPEX1 “Siglo XXI”  Hybrid fraud 
(Traditional+Cyberfraud): 
Creation of bogus 
webpages and magazines 
(usually relating to Police 
affairs) in order to obtain 
money from advertising 
-The Police starts 
receiving 
complaints about 
aggressive tele-
marketing 
schemes 
-Police starts 
investigation 
fake webpages 
-Police 
investigates fake 
companies 
-Police 
investigates fake 
magazines 
- 52 (family 
business and 
organised 
crime) 
- Charismatic 
leader: creative, 
smart and 
lacking in 
remorse 
- Career 
criminal/Professional 
-Extremely 
complex multi-
layered fraud 
-Never seen 
before  
C12 NPEX1 “Nitro” Uploading and 
performing illegal car 
races/Dangerous driving: 
Not entirely a valid 
cybercrime 
-Police 
investigates a 
series of videos 
uploaded in 
Youtube 
-Police uncovers  
an unorganised 
network of illegal 
races in Mallorca 
- 3 young people 
-A minor 
involved 
-They also had a 
Youtube for 
channel the 
uploading of 
their races 
 
- Not indicated 
- Extreme vanity and 
low intellect are 
suggested in the 
organiser 
 
-Minors 
involved 
C13 NPEX2 “Police Porn 
Virus” 
Ransomware/Cyberfraud: 
A virus stemming from 
-The Police 
investigates an e-
-27 year old 
Russian 
- Career 
Criminal/Professional 
multi-national 
virus with 
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porn pages infects 
computers and locks the 
O.S. asking form money in 
return. The virus 
impersonates the Spanish 
Police and accuses the 
victim of various crimes 
relating to watching porn 
mail and UKASH 
account 
-The Police 
discovers a virus 
spreading 
internationally 
with “bullet-
proof hosting” 
 
  
-Wealthy life-
style 
-Denial of victim and 
injury 
various 
versions 
depending on 
Country 
-Spreaded 
easily and 
quickly 
-Russian origin 
C14 NPEX2 “Cryptolocker” Ransomware/Cyberfraud: 
A virus encrypts a 
computer and needs a 
decription key boaugh 
from the black market 
-The Police are 
investigating a 
related network 
of money 
laundering and 
top-up cards 
code trafficking  
-Russian family 
-Risk-benefit 
oriented 
-False sense of 
security and 
anonymity 
- Career 
criminal/Professional 
 
Current  
C15 NPEX2 “Anonymous” Hacktivism/Defacement: 
Anonymous Spain 
(including splinter cells) 
start a campaign of 
national security 
breaches, defacement of 
political parties web-
pages and personal 
privacy violations and 
DoS attacks 
-Police 
investigates why 
Anonymous 
Spain could hold 
a grudge against 
certain specific 
people and reach 
a disgruntled 
employee 
-Police 
investigates the 
defacement of 
webapges and 
reach a splinter 
group 
-A disgruntled 
private security 
employee and 
his “acolyte” 
(there is revenge 
component)  
- A splinter cell 
in Málaga 
-A group called 
sector404 
- The Appeal to 
Higher Loyalties (The 
Anonymous cause and 
manifesto) 
- Fun/Game 
 
 
-Minors 
involved 
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C16 NPEX2 “Latin 
hackteam” 
Hacking/Defacement -Police 
investigate a 
page that posts 
screenshots of 
different hacking 
and defacement 
activities 
-2  
 
-Denial of Injury -South-
American 
connections 
C17 NPEX2 “Information 
ransom” 
Information 
theft/Cyberfraud: 
A minor steals delicate 
information from a 
company and asks for a a 
2.500 € ransom 
-Police follow an 
e-mail trail that 
leads to the 
minor’s mother 
- 1 minor: 
Introvert and 
extremely 
intelligent. He 
has done it 
before. 
 
-Denial of injury 
-Denial of victim 
- Fun/Game (implicit 
neutralisation) 
-Minors 
involved 
C18 NPEX3 “Nannysex” Paedophile ring/Child 
Pornography exchange 
community/Child abuse 
-The Police 
investigates a 
paedophile ring 
-The Police 
discovers a 
paedophile using 
the name 
“Nannysex” on 
the Internet, 
demanding 
extreme COPINE 
4 content 
-  
-Offender 
Nannysex is not 
Spanish 
-A paedophile 
ring is 
discovered 
-3 other 
offenders are 
investigated  
- Cognitive distortions 
- Fun/Game 
-International 
collaboration 
-Minors 
involved 
-Gravest child 
abuse case in 
Spain 
(including 
babies) 
-Nannysex was 
a “monster” 
within the 
paedophile 
world 
C19 NPEX3 “Cool Daddy” Paedophile ring/Child 
Pornography exchange 
community/Child 
abuse/Child prostitution 
-The Police 
investigates child 
sex abuse videos 
found at the 
-1 -Absolute denial -International 
component 
355 
 
“Deep Web”, 
depicting sex 
with sex with 
children on a 
boat 
-The Police 
investigates an e-
mail address 
referring to 
someone called 
“Cool Daddy” 
-The Police 
investigates a 
boat appearing 
on the video 
-The Police 
investigates a 
bogus company 
C20 NPEX3 “The 
Chameleon” 
Cybergrooming and 
sextortion 
 
-The victim 
reports the crime 
to the police 
 
-The offender 
blackmails the 
girls and sets a 
quota of sex 
pictures 
- He was a serial 
offender using 
several on-line 
identities (The 
Chameleon). He 
used dozens of 
e-mails  
-250 victims 
-Victim’s Fault -Sexual 
blackmail has 
profound 
effects on the 
adolescent’s 
psyche 
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Endnotes:  Original Excerpts in Spanish 
i
 El tercer delito más lucrativo a nivel mundial. 
 
ii
 La ciberseguridad es una necesidad de nuestra sociedad y de nuestro modelo económico. 
 
iii
 el objetivo es conectar a los objetos que nos rodean con las personas, y del mismo modo, conectar los 
objetos unos con otros. 
 
iv
 Ley Orgánica 10/1995 de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal. 
 
v
 El que a través de Internet, del teléfono o de cualquier otra tecnología de la información y la 
comunicación contacte con un menor de trece años y proponga concertar un encuentro con el mismo a 
fin de cometer cualquiera de los delitos descritos en los artículos 178 a 183 y 189, siempre que tal 
propuesta se acompañe de actos materiales encaminados al acercamiento … 
 
vi
 El que a través de internet, del teléfono o de cualquier otra tecnología de la información y la 
comunicación contacte con un menor de dieciséis años y realice actos dirigidos a embaucarle para que 
le facilite material pornográfico o le muestre imágenes pornográficas en las que se represente o 
aparezca un menor… 
 
vii
 Por otra parte, la extensión de la utilización de Internet y de las tecnologías de la información y la 
comunicación con fines sexuales contra menores ha evidenciado la necesidad de castigar penalmente 
las conductas que una persona adulta desarrolla a través de tales medios para ganarse la confianza de 
menores con el fin de concertar encuentros para obtener concesiones de índole sexual. 
 
viii
 También se consideran reos de estafa: 
 
a) Los que, con ánimo de lucro y valiéndose de alguna manipulación informática o artificio semejante, 
consigan una transferencia no consentida de cualquier activo patrimonial en perjuicio de otro. 
b) Los que fabricaren, introdujeren, poseyeren o facilitaren programas informáticos específicamente 
destinados a la comisión de las estafas previstas en este artículo. 
c) Los que utilizando tarjetas de crédito o débito, o cheques de viaje, o los datos obrantes en cualquiera 
de ellos, realicen operaciones de cualquier clase en perjuicio de su titular o de un tercero. 
 
ix
 197.3 El que por cualquier medio o procedimiento y vulnerando las medidas de seguridad establecidas 
para impedirlo, acceda sin autorización a datos o programas informáticos contenidos en un sistema 
informático o en parte del mismo o se mantenga dentro del mismo en contra de la voluntad de quien 
tenga el legítimo derecho a excluirlo, será castigado con pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años. 
x
 Pedro y Adela salían juntos. Adela solía mandarle a Pedro fotografías suyas sugerentes a través del 
correo y la mensajería acompañada de mensajes muy picantes. Un día, Pedro descubre que Adela tiene 
un amante, por lo que decide vengarse de ella enviando las fotografías de Adela a sus amigos a través de 
las redes sociales y el e-mail, así como colgarlas en internet. 
 
xi
 Saray es una joven de 16 años que, a través de una red social, se hace amiga de un hombre de 31 años 
llamado Bad_Wolf y comienzan una relación de tintes sexuales. Un día Bad_Wolf pide a Saray que le 
envíe unas fotografías suyas desnuda. Saray está de acuerdo y lo hace. 
 
xii
 Tomás está enamorado en secreto de su compañera de trabajo Débora. Diariamente le envía 
mensajes de amor desde una cuenta de e-mail falsa bajo el nombre “Tu admirador secreto”. Tomás 
también ha creado una página web llamada www.DeboraTeDevoraba.es donde se dedica a subir 
fotografías de Débora obtenidas sin su permiso y cartas de amor. Débora está muy asustada y 
preocupada. 
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xiii
 Vamos, lo que está claro es que son profesionales y es de lo que viven o sea no tienen otra actividad 
no, es decir,  eso es un complemento a….No no su forma de vida es esta.  
xiv
 Es decir, esto es su forma de vida entonces bueno tienen unos igual son unos elevados conocimientos, 
hablan perfectamente en este caso hablaban tres y cuatro idiomas desde ruso, inglés, español, francés, 
¿vale? O sea que tienen un aparte bueno las personas de Europa del este tienen un don para el tema de 
los idiomas. Entonces tienen una facilidad para el aprendizaje increíble, pero bueno al final no deja de 
ser una forma de vida. 
 
xv
 El menor tiene unas habilidades informáticas muy elevadas, es una persona muy retraída vive en un 
pueblo muy pequeño de Asturias que lo que hay son vacas. 
 
xvi
 si t en tu país de origen vivías de una manera y has adquirido unos conocimientos con los cuales 
cuando llegas a aquí poniendo en marcha esos conocimientos eres capaz de tener una compensación 
económica rápida y muy elevada, poder tener un nivel de vida en el cual tu no podías ni imaginar en 
estando en tu país….pues lógicamente lo vas a realizar. 
 
xvii
 es un poco remota la ciudad allí en Rusia. No había muchas posibilidades, yo creo que ni económicas 
ni nada, y claro esta salida gente que técnicamente es buena en informática, programando virus y 
demás pues una salida muy rentable a su habilidades porque el trabajo que te puede dar trabajar de 
ingeniero o de consultor informático allí en Rusia o los beneficios que te pueden dar una campaña de 
este tipo pues no tiene nada que ver. 
 
xviii
 Buen producto. 
 
xix
 Entonces claro que el engaño estaba bien pensado en el sentido en que la infección procedía de 
páginas web donde mostraban contenido pornográfico. 
 
xx
 tenía un buen virus, porque no era detectado por parte de ningún anti-virus. 
 
xxi
 es súper seguro para ellos porque en ese momento dice vale, si pues nada lo elimina todo o 
remotamente me conecto a mi servidor y elimino todo y me abres otro en otro sitio, es decir, son 
servicios muy seguros para los criminales. 
xxii
 yo tengo un buen producto, quiero llegar a cuantas más gente mejor a lo largo de todo el mundo. 
Entonces, ¿Qué forma puedo hacer?. Que es algo que visita todo el mundo, pues páginas de pornografía 
infantil, perdón, de pornografía, no de pornografía infantil de pornografía. Entonces si distribuyo este 
buen producto en páginas de pornografía que puede visitar un alemán, un chino, un español, un 
británico quien sea, pues bueno lo que tengo que hacer luego es dar un mensaje creíble a esas 
personas. 
 
xxiii
 es la madre de todos los fraudes, sinceramente (en voz baja un grandísimo hijo de puta) yo de verdad 
los he cogido cariño, porque ha sido tan brutal y tan perfeccionada y todo tan estudiado, que jamás 
había visto yo cosas más perfecta, estafador más digno de admirar que este hombre, para mí va a ser la 
investigación de mi vida. 
 
xxiv
 En este caso era una relación familiar, un clan, era una relación familiar porque siempre que hay una 
estructura organizativa criminal lo que hemos detectado es que hay una relación muy fuerte o una 
cercanía fuerte de confianza, generalmente se genera en las familias 
xxv
 Entonces vimos que efectivamente la persona era un clan familiar ruso, asentado aquí, era el padre, 
el hijo, el hijo de la novia del padre y las novias de los dos hijos, o sea era, totalmente un clan cerrado de 
la familia, tenían este modo de vida y este modo de negocio. 
 
xxvi
 evidentemente por el idioma y por la comunicación mucho más sencilla. 
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xxvii
 el perfil del estafador, es una persona sin escrúpulos, un ánimo desmedido de lucro y suelen ser 
personas muy inteligentes y muy ingeniosas y muy creativas, no porque , la verdad es que aunque te ríes 
de las argucias que utilizan para estafar. 
 
xxviii
 Y bueno el perfil de todo, un estafador con un ánimo de lucro desmedido, la estafa como forma de 
vida, la actuación en connivencia con personas de su círculo de confianza, familiares o amigos cercanos 
y…. eso una persona muy controladora, muy ingeniosa y muy inteligente, porque para hacer todo esto y 
tener controlado todo hasta el último detalle de cualquier cosa hay que ser personas muy inteligentes, 
hay que reconocerlo que sí. 
xxix
 el hacker no es una persona mala eso también que quede claro que lo que es el concepto hacker no 
es un delincuente o sea todo hacker no es delincuente. Osea son gente que está ávida de conocimientos 
quiere saber cosas están muy involucrados en el tema de la seguridad informática y les gusta descubrir 
diferentes fallos  
xxx
 el concepto hacker no es siempre una persona mala. ¿Vale? 
 
xxxi
 el fin siempre es económico. 
 
xxxii
 Internet lo que está, y bueno ya está muy consolidada la creación de una comunidad pedófila una 
comunidad pedófila que les protege, que les da soporte, que les comprende, que les hace ver que lo que 
están haciendo no está mal. 
 
xxxiii
 que eso es una acción sexual más, que la sexualidad de los niños tiene que ser enseñada por un 
adulto y bueno que el amor entre adultos y niños es posible todas esas cuestiones que la sexualidad 
nace desde que se es bebé y que bueno pues que no es ninguna cosa grave el que se realicen actos 
sexuales con los menores. 
 
xxxiv
 tratan de justificarse a sí mismos como que el acto que están realizando es algo normal y es algo 
natural. 
 
xxxv
 estoy jugando. 
 
xxxvi
 me echan a mí la culpa de todo lo que pasa pero es que el niño le dejaban ir desnudito por la casa. 
xxxvii
 ha entrado el crimen organizado en la producción de pornografía infantil, lo cual es gravísimo. 
 
xxxviii
 no tienes que ir buscándolo por ahí por la calle. 
 
xxxix
 ¿Por qué quieren ver niños desnudos?, no lo entiendo, es para desquitarse del mono que provoca 
verlos en acción, ¿para qué estar viendo fotos de hace 30 años? Si puedes estar viendo fotos actuales, 
ustedes que sean niño adictos o que, se cree que por ser más lights, esas fotos no son ilegales, pues si 
que lo son. Quizás no tanto pero lo siguen siendo. Ala que os den mucho por culo. 
 
xl
 NPEX2:No, él sabe que no está bien pero bueno lo ve como, yo creo que lo que nos decía es que, ah si, 
una cosa que decía es dice: no he matado a nadie, no soy asesino, no soy un traficante de drogas, o sea 
no veía como que esto era un delito o bajo su conciencia un delito grave, eso si que nos lo dijo, no soy 
un traficante de drogas, vale, yo pago por lo que he hecho pero joder, no entiendo porque esto es tan 
grave o  esta pena tanto porque no soy, no he matado a nadie, no soy un traficante de drogas, no tenía 
una percepción de que es un delito violento sino que tenía esta percepción. 
xli
 Pero que nunca hacíamos daño. 
 
xlii
 podría haber accedido a más datos, no voy más allá. 
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xliii
 Sí, sabía que estaba cometiendo un acto ilícito pero lo veía como diciendo no tengo la sensación de 
que iba, que tampoco quería hacer más daño, yo quería mi dinero. 
 
xliv
 es que quería comprarme una bicicleta. 
 
xlv
 los que tenían entre 12 10 entre 10 y 13 años esos ya sí porque tampoco eran conscientes de que es 
lo que están haciendo, simplemente bueno, les van a dar 50 € les van a dar una PlayStation y ya stá no 
tiene ninguna importancia.  
xlvi
 Estamos en crisis. 
 
xlvii
 bueno pues cuando los detienes todos, no saben de qué hablas, no sabes que es lo que estás 
investigando, evidentemente ellos no han hecho nada, no, ellos no, no, sólo tienen  un negocio lícito 
que les fue mal y que no muestran ningún tipo de arrepentimiento y no eso si no que no llegan a 
reconocer ni tan siquiera el daño que han hecho. 
 
xlviii
 Evidentemente, él dijo que esto no era un delito que era un negocio licito, que él era un empresario 
que daba trabajo a muchísima gente, que hacia la función social muy buena porque gracias a él había 
mucha gente trabajando. 
 
xlix
 si eran de algún modo conscientes. 
 
l
 Jorge: ¿Pero cómo una mentira para fuera o para si mismo? 
NPEX1: No, una mentira para fuera, lo que pasa que en el momento esto es ilícito e ilegal se cae todo, o 
sea es que está reconociendo la existencia del delito.  
li
 La gente lo hace pues bueno, realmente, el cometer ese dicho “delito” está ahí a día de hoy no hay 
algo estipulado pero estaríamos robando o hackeando el coste de la Wi-Fi que supone mensualmente 
pongámosle 30/40 € ese tipo de delito pues bueno la gente dice Naaaaa esto no es nada y lo hago y a 
veces por el simple hecho de Qque bueno soy que he hackeado la Wi-Fi del vecino. 
 
lii
 Primero yo creo, uno es por una motivación (pensando) por una ideología. El primero de todos es 
porque piensa en que puede cambiar, o sea el discurso este de “Anonymous”, el discurso este 
hacktivista de que podemos cambiar el mundo, fuera los corruptos, de que libertad a la hora de 
compartir información, o sea el discurso hacktivista este de “Anonymous” que estas totalmente 
integrado y que dices yo quiero colaborar a la causa, somos muchos que queremos cambiar el mundo, 
que tal. Entonces yo con mis conocimientos, lo poco que se lo que puedo poner en estos servidores 
pues lo voy a poner, hay un componente ideológico. 
liii
 No, no si son ellas las que provocaban si, es constante también el groomer. 
liv
 Jorge: O sea los groomers incluso también os han dicho que es culpa de las chavalas o chavales 
involucrados. 
NPEX3: Sí, sí en muchas ocasiones. 
lv
 no veía a la víctima. 
 
lvi
 Jorge: ¿Y por qué crees que los más adultos sí que exigían ser ellos los que penetraban pero no se 
penetrados? Es decir, ¿Por qué se produce esa contradicción? 
GCEX: Porque como estas agresiones son de carácter homosexual, el concepto que tiene el menor es 
que yo no soy homosexual. El momento en que yo no soy penetrado o yo no realiza nada, osea yo esto 
lo hago por dinero, es consciente de que está penetrando aun hombre adulto, ¿Vale? Pero su manera de 
pensar es decir yo no soy homosexual. ¿Sabes? 
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lvii
 Jorge: Y él, “Camaleón”, ¿llegasteis a saber de sus justificaciones, por qué lo hacía, por qué no? él 
¿dijo algo al respecto, dejo entrever algo al respecto? 
 
NPEX3: no, es que las motivaciones, realmente no las explicita excepto que se sientan culpables, ellos 
no, en principio no se siente culpable,. 
 
lviii
 NPEX3: Esta persona, yo le tome declaración y lo negaba todo. Ni enseñándole las pruebas ni demás, 
todo lo negó completamente todo, siempre. 
 
Jorge: ¿Pero qué no lo había hecho? ¿Que no era él? 
 
NPEX3: Que no era él, que él no había hecho nada. Pero vamos, ya te digo, es que encontramos en su 
casa todo el material, hasta los consoladores que obligaba meterse a la niña de 6 años. 
 
lix
 se cierra en banda y no. 
 
lx
 tampoco, reconoce que son delito evidentemente pero, no justifica. 
 
lxi
 no mostró resistencia pero tampoco colaboración. 
 
lxii
 vale, yo sé lo que he hecho. Si han llegado hasta mi casa es porque tiene que haber pruebas más que 
suficientes para que hayan llegado hasta aquí, pero ahora es la guardia civil la que tiene que encontrar 
todos los indicios para demostrar lo que yo he cometido. 
 
lxiii
 No te van a decir ni cuál es el origen de los beneficios económicos que han tenido, no te van a revelar 
quienes son sus clientes, no te van a revelar quienes son sus proveedores. 
 
lxiv
 Percepción de seguridad. 
 
lxv
 un grandísimo hijo de puta. 
 
lxvi
 Siempre ponerse en el lugar del otro. 
 
lxvii
 Por eso muchas personas, podemos contar anécdotas de que nos llamaban por ejemplo por teléfono 
y contaban, que joder yo es que pagaba la multa sin ningún tipo de problemas. Bueno, bueno, si, si es 
verdad pero yo creo que no es delito ver pornografía. 
 
lxviii
 No, no yo en ningún momento he visto pornografía infantil he visto el video tal y el video tal de tal 
página web que es pornografía adulta y tal pero yo no se porque me sale esto de pornografía infantil, 
pero que si hay que pagar 100 euros que es lo de menos, que yo pago 100 euros. 
lxix
 los padres eran de un estrato social medio-bajo. Vale, no vamos a decir que eran, o sea que vivían en 
osea vivían en una casa y en un barrio humilde pero que no era dentro de no eran chabolas, no eran 
vale osea era un estrato medio-bajo pero no bajo del todo. 
 
lxx
 muchas trabas a la gente de abajo se ponen muchos candados. 
 
lxxi
 Que no es lo mismo, pero bueno, la cultura de los gratis y de lo que bueno he conseguido y no me he 
gastado nada, y que bueno, estamos  en crisis […]no tiene conocimiento de toda la industria que va 
detrás del copyright, de los derechos de autor. 
 
lxxii
 una PlayStation 3, ya sea  te doy un teléfono móvil de última generación que vale 200 €, 300 #, 400 €. 
 
lxxiii
 tenemos mejor tiempo, tenemos el sol, tenemos otras circunstancias que bueno que también nos 
ayudan a relacionarnos con la gente 
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lxxiv
 Pues es un mensaje redactado en palabras sudamericanas, incluso la cuenta de correo electrónico es 
de un dominio de @bolivia.com, que por el acento el ataque que ha sufrido es por parte de un 
sudamericano. 
 
lxxv
 ¿por qué pides solo 2500 euros?. No porque es que quería comprarme una bicicleta. 
 
lxxvi
 a día de hoy el valor que se la da a mantener una relación sexual no, osea un niño no la tiene muy 
clara que valor tiene ni cuanto puede costar. 
 
lxxvii
 un ánimo desmedido de lucro. 
 
lxxviii
 si yo quiero ganar dinero y no tengo escrúpulos. 
 
lxxix
 todo se compra, hoy en día se compra absolutamente todo. 
 
lxxx
 NPEX3: Sí, sí. Cada vez hay más mujeres en relación a esto y la mayoría de las que teníamos al 
principio de las mujeres que estaban en estos temas de pornografía infantil era evidentemente dentro 
de ámbito de prostitución, es decir como una forma más de ganar más dinero, pero también ahora 
estamos viendo que efectivamente también hay un grupo de personas que son mujeres y que son 
pedófilas que son pederastas.  
lxxxi
 hay mucha producción de pornografía infantil que solamente busca el interés económico, cuando 
hablamos de crimen organizado la captación de menores, la creación de web, el blanqueo de dinero 
procedente de la venta de la pornografía infantil estamos hablando ya de personas que no creen en 
ninguna cosa de esas, son intereses meramente económicos porque les produce mucho beneficio. 
 
lxxxii
 Jorge: ¿Y en el tema por ejemplo de descargas, descargas de series, películas, música… Crees que la 
gente es consciente en este caso de que puede ser delictivo, crees que las personas piensan en algunos 
casos que es algo moral o inmoral? ¿Cuál es tu opinión al respecto? 
PSEX: Mi opinión es que la gente, si puede conseguir algo gratis ¿para qué va a pagarlo? 
lxxxiii
 Pongamos el ejemplo, si voy al cine y tengo que gastarme 8 € por ir al cine, por un entrada, si yo 
cojo y le doy con un simple click, encima estoy en mi casa, me pongo yo las palomitas y la Coca-Cola y 
me sale gratis… Que no es lo mismo, pero bueno, la cultura de lo gratis y de lo que bueno he conseguido 
y no me he gastado nada, y que bueno, estamos  en crisis. Es que la crisis se profundiza y la gente no se 
gasta tanto en…  
 
lxxxiv
 no tiene conocimiento de toda la industria que va detrás del copyright, de los derechos de autor, 
etc. 
 
lxxxv
 La gente lo hace pues bueno, realmente, el cometer ese dicho “delito” está ahí a día de hoy no hay 
algo estipulado pero estaríamos robando o hackeando el coste de la Wi-Fi que supone mensualmente 
pongámosle 30/40 € ese tipo de delito pues bueno la gente dice Naaaaa esto no es nada y lo hago y a 
veces por el simple hecho de que bueno soy que he hackeado la Wi-Fi del vecino. 
 
lxxxvi
 NPEX1: ¿Por qué colgaba esos videos? Pues ¿por qué piensas tú que colgaba los videos? 
Jorge: A mí se me ocurren muchas cosas, claro es que si te lo digo  
ES que realmente no me lo he parado a pensar, yo de verdad pienso este tío es tonto. Un tío que es un 
niñato, un niño de papa que lo que quiere es presumir de sus hazañas y que no piensa en las 
consecuencias de sus actos y mucho menos piensa que como no le pillan en ese momento haciendo las 
carreras pues ya a través de internet menos. Entonces no piensa en ningún momento que pueda ser 
delito ni que se esta jugando la vida de nadie ni nada, entonces ¿quién hace eso?. Una persona que es 
una persona arrogante que presume de lo que tiene que los canales de YouTube los utiliza pues para 
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eso para jactarse del dinero y de los coches y todo lo que tiene y de la gente que está a su alrededor, 
porque no dejaban de ser pobres críos de 18 años con dos neuronas. 
lxxxvii
 es la forma de captar a los menores a través de las redes sociales se capta a los menores pero luego 
se les lleva a otro sitio, es decir se les lleva a que faciliten las imágenes y los vídeos, bien a través de 
Skype o a través de aplicaciones que permite una rápida comunicación. 
 
lxxxviii
 Ellos no saben que lo que están haciendo es realmente un delito. 
 
lxxxix
 El tema de la educación existe una gran barrera que es una, se llama brecha digital, en la cual no 
puedes inculcar a los menores sin haber inculcado anteriormente a los mayores. 
 
xc
 Un padre le compra una Blackberry a un niño de 11 años desconociendo de que en la mano tiene un 
arma que puede cometer bueno puede cometer el suicidio de una niña la cual la están abusando. 
 
xci
 una sensación que no les iban a pillar. 
 
xcii
 Comunidad pedófila. 
 
xciii
 Que es algo que visita todo el mundo, pues páginas de pornografía infantil, perdón, de pornografía, 
no de pornografía infantil de pornografía. 
 
xciv
 En España, un 4% de los menores entre 10 y 16 años dice haberse hecho a sí mismos fotos o vídeos 
en una postura sexy (no necesariamente desnudos ni eróticas) utilizando el teléfono móvil. 
 
xcv
 y vas a meter datos, denuncia por denuncia y te hace estos esquemas  y te saca las relaciones. 
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